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This thesis examines the management of Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment (B-BBEE) policy by the provincial government of KwaZulu-Natal, 
South Africa. Several authors have analyzed the policy on B-BBEE in South 
Africa, mainly focusing on the impact of the policy on the ‘actors’, and the 
ethical implications of the policy, but no research has been done on its policy 
implementation and management, particularly in the public service in South 
Africa.  
The central aim of this thesis is to investigate the organizational complexities 
surrounding how the policy on B-BBEE is managed by the provincial 
government of KwaZulu-Natal. The study focuses on the three KwaZulu-Natal 
technical clusters: the economic sectors and infrastructure development, 
governance and administration, and the social protection, community & 
human development cluster. The thesis identifies various government 
departments in each cluster to examine how the policy on B-BBEE is managed. 
The investigation revealed that government has been successful in 
implementing some aspects of B-BBEE policy as the majority of blacks were 
holding key strategic positions within the provincial government. However, the 
provincial government was grappling with serious management challenges.  
 
This thesis explores instruments for policy management, that is, policy co-
ordination, organizational transformation, organizational hierarchy, and policy 
communication. The results showed that much as the provincial government 
has been able to open up opportunities for black people there is still a long 
way to go in terms of transforming policy management structures, functions, 
processes, norms, values, procedures, organizational culture, and 
organizational decision-making in improving policy management. The study 
revealed that various government structures, functions, processes, procedures, 
norms, values and organizational culture are incompatible with B-BBEE policy 
objectives. Government decision-making is hierarchical which obstructs the 
management of B-BBEE policy implementation. Furthermore, B-BBEE policy is 
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1.1 Background and motivation for the study 
The Department of Economic Development and Tourism (DEDT) is considered 
to be a custodian of Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) 
strategy formulation in the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government. I have 
served the DEDT for several years in my previous capacity as a deputy 
director and am now the director of B-BBEE in the province. My job functions 
in the DEDT entail B-BBEE strategy formulation as well as its operations. It was 
therefore in the course of performing my functions in the B-BBEE policy arena 
in the province that I recognised serious challenges in the implementation of 
B-BBEE policy since it was not achieving its intended objectives. The reason 
why it was not achieving its objectives warranted further investigation. 
Admittedly, any new endeavour of this magnitude could have expected to 
have encountered complex organizational management challenges, given 
the country’s history of racial segregation. 
The dismantling of apartheid during the 1990s and the ushering in of a new 
era of democracy in 1994 and subsequent majority rule in South Africa were 
major turning points in its history. The importance of these changes meant 
that various organizational functions, operations and structures had to be 
transformed to reflect the new ethos of the Constitution.  
In 1994 the new democratic government came into power with a mandate 
to redress the inequalities of the past. This mandate is embodied in the South 
African Constitution Act 108 of 1996. Section 9(2) of the South African 
Constitution prescribes the right to equality. The Constitution imposes 
obligations on the state to take active steps in addressing historical 
imbalances. The B-BBEE Act 53 of 2003 emerged in response to this demand. 
Public sector organizations are required to ensure that B-BBEE policy is 
implemented according to this legislation. Section 11 (a) of the B-BBEE Act 
provides for an integrated, co-ordinated and uniform approach to B-BBEE 
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policy implementation by all organs of state and public entities. Every organ 
of the state and public entities must themselves apply B-BBEE codes of good 
practice, plan in terms of B-BBEE policy and report on compliance with the B-
BBEE Act.   
Public sector organizations use public procurement as leverage for B-BBEE 
policy implementation. However, implementation of public procurement to 
realise B-BBEE objectives faces challenges within state institutions. The Auditor-
General’s report in 2009 noted government officials’ conflict of interest in 
failing to declare their private business interests. This revealed shortcomings in 
managing B-BBEE policy in South Africa. It was on this basis that on the 24th of 
July 2009, President Zuma, addressing members of the Confederation of Black 
Business Organizations (CBBO), argued that government needed to improve 
the implementation of B-BBEE policy in South Africa (President Zuma, July 
2009). The President suggested that the government’s view was that the B-
BBEE policy framework was adequate, but there was, however, a need to 
sharpen its implementation and communication. This was a clear 
demonstration that various organizational structures, including those within 
the public sector, were still not yet far enough down the road of 
transformation, despite the fact that the introduction of B-BBEE policy was 
hailed as a major turning point in terms of organizational normalisation. High 
levels of inequalities and unresponsive public institutions were still evident.  
According to the African National Congress (ANC), the skewed patterns of 
ownership and production, the special legacies of the apartheid past and 
the tendencies of the economy towards inequalities, dualism and 
marginalisation would not recede automatically as economic growth 
accelerates (ANC 52nd National Conference 2007:10). The ruling party 
resolved that decisive action was required to thoroughly and urgently 
transform the economic patterns of the present in order to realise the vision of 
the future. B-BBEE policy empowers government organizations to drive this 
process. Such a vision includes the transformation of organizational 
operations, procedures, norms, values, structures, decision-making and 
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organizational cultures. The public sector is expected to take a leadership 
role, and act as an example for the private sector to follow. 
It is therefore not surprising that whenever B-BBEE is pondered it invokes a 
range of emotions amongst academics, journalists and politicians who hold 
very diverse views on the subject (Edigheji 1999: 10). The central theme of this 
debate is claims and counter claims about the supposed successes or failures 
of B-BBEE policy implementation which reflect a host of political, legal and 
ethical issues and suppositions.  
For several years now the policy on B-BBEE has been part of the South African 
socio-economic transformation, a key component for social, economic and 
organizational normalisation. Yet, despite this, the implementation of the 
policy remains a serious challenge for South Africa (KPMG BEE report 2008: 12, 
and DEDT report 2009: 15). The reasons why the policy on B-BBEE is not 
achieving its desired results deserves investigation. In general, the literature as 
well as the discourse of B-BBEE policy in South Africa reveals that the 
discussion on B-BBEE policy has not transcended matters of morality 
(reparation). There is a need to move away from the current debate centred 
on the ‘actors’, and to focus more on how the policy on B-BBEE is being 
managed. 
The attention placed on the moral implications of B-BBEE policy is not 
surprising given the moral responsibility of the South African state. B-BBEE 
policy needs to correct history, a history which is not only about the ‘actors’ 
but also about institutional design, which requires highly strategic public 
managers to guide the process of transformation. However, addressing the 
past by making use of present strategies within the constraints of regulatory 
framework encounters contradictions and policy tensions. Government 





1.2 Research questions 
There is now a greater need to move the B-BBEE policy conversation and 
ultimately its understanding from the current discourse and to examine it 
instead in terms of the broad framework of structural policy administration. 
This study will do so by investigating B-BBEE policy management in the 
provincial government of KwaZulu-Natal according to key principles of public 
policy management: managing policy implementation, policy co-ordination, 
organizational transformation, organizational hierarchy, and policy 
communication.  The research intended: 
(i) To gain a comprehensive understanding of how the provincial 
government manages B-BBEE policy implementation. 
(ii) To understand how the provincial government co-ordinates B-BBEE policy 
implementation.    
(iii) To understand the extent to which B-BBEE policy target groups participate 
in B-BBEE policy implementation. 
(iv) To understand the relationship between the top executive and 
operational employees on B-BBEE policy implementation.  
(v) To understand how the provincial government communicates on B-BBEE 
policy implementation.  
 
This investigation was limited to an analysis of B-BBEE policy management 
within government and as such policy implementation outside government is 
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(iii) Local government 
The three spheres of government are autonomous and should not be seen as 
hierarchical. The Constitution further prescribes that the three spheres of 
government are distinctive, inter-related and inter-dependent.  At the same 
time they all operate according to the Constitution and laws and policies 
made by national parliament or the provincial legislatures. Government is 
structured into three parts: 
(i) The elected members (legislatures) – who represent the public, 
approve policies and laws and monitor the work of the executive and 
departments.  
(ii) The cabinet or executive committee (executive) – who co-ordinate the 
making of policies and laws and oversee implementation by the 
government departments.  
(iii) The departments and public servants – who are responsible for the 
administrative operations and account to the executive. 
The national and provincial spheres of government have a corresponding 
legislative competence in accordance with Schedule 4 of the Constitution 
(Act 108 of 1996). Consequently, parliament and the provincial legislatures of 
the Republic of South Africa at national and provincial level have powers to 
make laws for the country in accordance with Section 43(a) and Section 44 
of the Constitution. The National Council of Provinces represents the 
provinces at the national level to ensure that provincial interests are taken 
into account in the national legislative process. The provinces participate in 
the national legislative process on issues affecting them. Section 43 of the 
Constitution states that legislative authority of the national, provincial and 
local sphere of government is vested in: 
(i) Parliament  i.e. the National Assembly (NA) and the National Council of 
Provinces (NCOP) 
(ii) The nine provincial legislatures 
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(iii) The municipal councils. 
In terms of Section 44(1) (a) of the Constitution, the National Assembly has the 
power to: 
(i) Amend the South African Constitution 
(ii) Pass legislation with regard to any matter within the functional areas of 
coexisting national and provincial legislative competence, but 
excluding matters falling within the functional areas of exclusive 
provincial legislative competence. 
(iii) Assign any of its legislative powers, except the power to amend the 
Constitution, to any legislative body in another sphere of government. 
In terms of the Constitution, the national legislative authority vested in 
parliament confers on NCOP the power to: 
(i) Participate in amending the Constitution. 
(ii) Pass ordinary bills affecting the provinces. 
(iii) Consider ordinary bills not affecting the provinces but passed by the 
national assembly. 
Parliament may intervene and pass legislation that falls within the functional 
areas of exclusive provincial legislative competence only when it is necessary 
to achieve the following: 
(i) Maintain national security. 
(ii) Maintain economic unity. 
(iii) Maintain essential national standards. 
(iv) Establish minimum standards required for the rendering of services. 
(v) Prevent unreasonable action taken by a province, which is prejudicial 
to the interests of another province or to the country as a whole.  
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Table 1.1 indicates the structure of the national, provincial, and local spheres 
of the South African government. This includes the relationship between the 
political and administrative arms of government. 
Table: 1.1 South African government structures 
Sphere Legislature Executive Administration 
National Parliament President and Cabinet Director General and 
Departments 
Provincial Legislature Premier and Executive Council Heads of Department and 
Staff 
Local Council Mayor and Mayoral Committee Municipality Manager 
 
Each province has a legislature which is made up of between 30 and 90 
members. Provincial laws are approved by these legislatures which also pass 
the provincial budget every year. Legislatures are elected once every five 
years, at the same time as a national election. A provincial Premier is elected 
by that province’s legislature and appoints Members of the Executive Council 
(MECs) to be the political heads of each provincial department. The MECs 
and the Premier form the provincial executive council (cabinet). 
A provincial government is headed by a Director General. Each provincial 
department is headed by a Deputy Director General or by a Head of 
Department. A Head of Department appoints the Directors (managers) and 
all other public servants to administer government operations. In each of the 
nine provinces there are usually at least twelve government departments. 
Every province has to develop a provincial growth and development 
strategy (PGDS) that spells out the overall framework and plan for the 
development of the economy and improving services.  Figure 1.2 reveals the 
management structure of the KwaZulu-Natal provincial administration 
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Africans were clearly in the majority across the occupational levels within the 
KZN managements structure, 10 of them (90.91%), were Directors 
General/HODs, only 1 (9.09%) was Asian/Indian. 17 (60.71%)Africans were also 
the majority in terms of Deputy Directors General positions. This trend 
continues from junior, middle, to the executive management levels where 
Africans are the clear majority. This places them at an apex in the 
management of B-BBEE implementation. Tables 1.3 and 4 shows the KZN 
management structure by race and gender.    
Table 1.3 KZN management by race and gender (numbers) 
Occupational 
Levels 




















Director 106 158 18 30 5 4 13 28 362
Deputy 
Director 2171 2957 1167 1226 102 110 500 669 8902 
Assistant 




Director 26 59 8 9 1 0 0 5 108 
Deputy 
Director 









Overall 17123 8941 4394 2998 522 237 1725 1104 37044 








Table 1.4 KZN management by race and gender (percentages) 
Occupational 
Levels 































































































0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
Overall 
Percentage 46.22 24.14 11.86 8.09 1.41 0.64 4.66 2.98 100 
Source: KZN Office of the Premier, July 2012 
As noted in Table 1.2 Africans were clearly in the majority across the 
occupational levels within the KZN management structure. Additionally, there 
was parity of numbers in terms of the gender of Africans at the top 
management structure of the provincial government. Notably, seven (0.02%) 
of the Deputy Director Generals were female, as well as four (0.01%) of the 10 
Director Generals or Head of Departments. African females were clearly in 
the majority 14809 (39.98%) at an Assistant Director level in the management 
structure. The dominance of African females at an entry management level 
can also mean that in the future they would be the majority at the top 
echelon in the management structure of the provincial government. Thus, 
empowerment in the province has led to opportunities opening up for 
women.     
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1.4 Research methods and methodology 
The study employed both quantitative and qualitative methods. It was felt 
that the experiences of a select number of government officials in 
management positions would be the ideal population to be researched 
since they are responsible for policy implementation and have considerable 
insight into the challenges emanating from B-BBEE policy management in 
their respective clusters. 
This study drew on an analysis of government legislation and reports, a 
questionnaire was administered to government officials, and there were 
personal interviews with some officials. The empirical investigation was 
conducted on three clusters of the KZN government. A cluster is a group of 
departments. The clusters are organized as follows:  
(i) Economic Sectors and Infrastructure Development cluster (ESID) 
 Economic development and tourism 
 Transport 
 Public works 
                  Provincial treasury 
  Agriculture, environmental affairs, and rural development. 
(ii)  Governance and Administration cluster (G&A) 
 Office of the Premier 
   Co-operative governance and traditional affairs 
   Provincial treasury 
   Community safety and liaison.  
(iii) Social Protection, Community, and Human Development cluster     
(SPCHD)  
   Education 
13 
 
   Health 
   Social development 
Sport and recreation 
   Human settlement 
   Arts and culture 
The purposive sample that was used was based on the knowledge of the 
researcher, and his colleagues. Having sound knowledge of government 
officials in the three clusters, the researcher was able to choose respondents 
from all the departments in the clusters. Sixty returns to the questionnaires 
were elicited, twenty from each of the three clusters. The survey sample was 
an appropriate selection chosen from the population under study. The 
selection was done with a certain degree of flexibility in mind (Reaves 1994: 
94). Given the nature of the population identified above as the target of the 
study, it can be understood that not all government officials in the provincial 
government could be asked to participate in the research project. Although 
the vast majority of them were assumed to be well or relatively informed on B-
BBEE policy implementation, the reality was that the nature, development 
and research of B-BBEE policy implementation require specific knowledge 
and expertise.  
The questionnaires were formulated in such a way as to:  
(i) Be relevant to the aims and objectives of the study. 
(ii) Pose questions relevant to the broad goals of the study. 
(iii) Consider the relevance of questions to the individual respondents (Bailey 
1994: 108-110). 
 
The structure of the questionnaires was designed to ensure that they followed 
a certain order. This included a mix of structured questions, close-ended 
questions and open-ended questions (see Appendix 2). The Likert scale was 
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used for the structured section of the questionnaire as it is a common means 
in social surveys to measure the attitudes, beliefs, ideas and opinions of select 
individuals who are asked to express strong agreement, neutrality, 
disagreement or strong disagreement (Riley 2004: 34-39). The questionnaires 
were administered by research assistants. Some respondents requested that 
the questionnaires be emailed to them. 
On the basis of results gained from documentary study and the 
questionnaires, personal interviews were undertaken with Key Informants (see 
Appendix 4 which shows the schedule of the interviews). These were 
government officials who were responsible for B-BBEE policy management at 
various levels. The Key Informants were selected for their expertise and 
specialist roles in B-BBEE policy management. They included specialists from 
supply chain management, legal services, human resources development, 
public policy specialists, economic planning, communications, and 
enterprise development/B-BBEE specialists. Some government departments 
have officials designated as B-BBEE specialists.  
Partially structured interviews with the Key Informants began with open-
ended questions in order to allow the respondents to elaborate on themes 
that they find most important (see Appendix 3). These interviews were 
conducted by research assistants. Four specialists from each cluster were 
targeted, giving a total of twelve interviewees. The interviews were guided by 
the aims and objectives of the study. Any doubts that the interviewees might 
have regarding the study could be clarified immediately, while the research 
assistants also had the opportunity to introduce the research topics and 
encourage the interviewees to provide frank answers.  All the responses to 
the interviews were written down by the research assistants. The responses 
were organized according to their relevance to each question. The 
responses were then returned to the interviewees for correction and 
elaboration. Given the researcher’s own position in government, and 
involvement with B-BBEE strategy management, the role of assistants to 
administer the questionnaires and to conduct the interviews was crucial in 
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order to avoid bias or awkwardness. Further assurance was provided by 
guaranteeing that the identity of the respondents would not be disclosed, 
not even to the researcher himself (see Appendix 1). 
The data analysis for the study was performed with two objectives: getting 
the feel for the data, and testing the goodness of the data (Sekaran 
2000:307-308). An Excel spread-sheet was utilized for capturing, coding and 
analysing quantitative data. Qualitative findings were gleaned from content 
analysis of responses to the personal interviews, as well as from open-ended 
replies to questions in the survey.  
1.5    Challenges   
As B-BBEE policy is a new concept in South Africa, which was enacted in 
legislation in 2004, it was anticipated that undertaking complex research of 
this magnitude would have some kind of limitations. Four main challenges 
arose in the course of this study: 
(i) The South African government adopted the cluster system to co-ordinate 
various policies and programmes. There was a lack of information 
regarding a cluster’s operations and decisions. The majority of the 
respondents in this study were either unaware of or misunderstood the 
processes of their cluster.  
(ii) Government performs a dual role in B-BBEE policy implementation. First, 
government has a legislative mandate to ensure that B-BBEE is 
implemented by all role players in the province. This includes both the 
public and private sectors. Second, government has a duty to implement 
BBEE policy within its structures. The central focus of this study was the 
latter. However, the respondents tended to include both sets of 
responsibilities in their responses. This was understandable given the 
entrenched beliefs within government that policy implementation must 




(iii)  B-BBEE policy information within government was regarded as sensitive, 
and such, information was treated as confidential. It was difficult to 
persuade government officials to complete the questionnaire, as many of 
them were afraid of releasing such information.  
(iv) There was not enough academic literature on B-BBEE policy, and little has 
been written on general policy management in post-apartheid South 
Africa.  
 
 1.6 Structure of the study    
Chapter Two provides the contextual framework for Broad-Based Black 
Economic Empowerment policy in South Africa, covering the macro-
economic context for B-BBEE policy, B-BBEE policy evolution, B-BBEE policy 
regulation and the strategic framework, compliance targets for B-BBEE policy, 
and a conceptual analysis of empowerment. Chapter Three is on the 
theoretical framework for the study which focuses on organizational 
management: managing policy implementation, policy co-ordination, 
organizational transformation, organizational hierarchy, and policy 
communication.  
Chapters Four to Six present and analyze data from the three clusters, with a 
chapter devoted to each cluster. The format for these chapters is identical, 
making comparison between them possible. The data in each chapter is 
derived from the questionnaire administered as well as from the responses 
gained from the personal interviews. Quotations are used extensively to 
illustrate and to explain the quantitative findings. Finally, Chapter Seven is a 
comparative analysis of the three clusters in terms of the theoretical 






Chapter Two  
Contextualising the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment policy 
 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment policy has gained considerable 
impetus in South Africa since the enactment of Act 53 of 2003. B-BBEE policy 
emerged as a blueprint for the transformation of the South Africa economic 
system, which has over the years excluded the majority and benefited the 
minority.  
The transitional period of the democratic administration, from 1994 onwards, 
meant that the state had to devise a number of policy alternatives and 
innovations which were intended to rid South Africa of the vestiges of racial 
discrimination. Among these was the government of national unity which was 
introduced in 1994 in order to achieve political stability. This was founded on 
the principles of power sharing and nation-building and it covered the first 
five years of the transition to democracy. 
The government’s strategic objective was a vision of non-racialism in pursuit 
of democracy and economic development. The anticipated outcome was 
economic recovery and a reduction of poverty among large sections of the 
population, which would ultimately lead to socio-economic transformation. 
This proved to be a complicated process to be achieved within a short 
period of time due to entrenched racial inequalities and underdevelopment. 
The introduction of transformation by regulation as well as its strategy 
emerged from the reality of entrenched racial disparities. The main objective 
of this chapter is therefore to discuss various transformation programmes, 
policies, Acts and regulations. The chapter provides a contextual analysis of 
B-BBEE policy. It is organized into major themes: the macro-economic context 
for B-BBEE policy, B-BBEE policy evolution, and consequences of macro-




2.1 Macro-economic context for B-BBEE policy  
The B-BBEE policy programme is implemented within the broad macro-
economic policy context of South Africa. The South African government has 
always regarded itself as leading a capable and developmental state. 
According to the National Development Plan, the South African 
development vision for 2030 (NDP 2012: 408), a developmental state is 
defined as one that is capable of intervening to correct historical inequalities 
and to create opportunities for more people. The NDP plan suggests that to 
address the twin challenges of poverty and inequality, the state needs to 
play a transformative and developmental role. This requires well-run and 
effectively co-ordinated state institutions with skilled public servants who are 
committed to the public good and are capable of delivering consistently 
high quality services, while prioritizing the nation’s developmental objectives 
(NDP 2012: 408).  
A number of interventionist policy options have been part of the South 
African administration since the inception of democracy in 1994. However, 
for right or wrong reasons, there have been many policy modifications, 
alterations, and refocus at macro-economic level. It is within this ever-
changing policy terrain of the South African state that a discourse of B-BBEE 
policy implementation must be located from 1994 until the present. This will 
help to unmask the state’s policy options as it tries to advance B-BBEE policy 
implementation. 
On the eve of democracy in 1994 the state experienced a large number of 
challenges. As Brecker wrote two years after 1994, what remains is the entire 
social edifice upon which this system was erected: the land hunger and 
massive joblessness, the infrastructural underdevelopment of the rural areas, 
the migrant labour system, the peri-urban township system, the apartheid 
cities and the segregated social services (Brecker 1996: 31). Brecker indicated 
that there were still gross inequalities in the provision of health, education and 
housing, as well as mass impoverishment, squalor and disease amongst the 
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majority of the country’s population. As an immediate step, the first 
democratic government introduced the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) in order to deal with the problems of economic redress 
and redistribution. The RDP base document passed through a thorough 
process of wide ranging consultation and discussion, which as Holdt (1993: 
25) noted, eventually included the active participation of corporate business. 
A programme that had began as a potential framework for progressive 
transformation was reshaped into a document where any issue which might 
have suggested a serious conflict with the interests of the rich and powerful 
was smoothed over (Holdt 1993:25). A RDP White Paper discussion document 
was then drafted and released in September 1994, evoking some concern. 
The White Paper contained an amalgam of developmental approaches, 
mixing neo-liberal prescriptions with some residual Keynesians regulations, 
corporatist processes with a ‘people driven’ approach, and ostensible firm 
commitments to redistribution with strong macro-economic structures (Holdt 
1993: 27). When the White Paper was released the popular organizations 
criticised it for its compromises, while private sector organizations welcomed 
its ‘realistic’ aspect and at the same time criticised those popular elements 
that were retained (Holdt 1993: 27). 
There were a number of reasons why the progressive document which 
purported to bring about real economic empowerment for the majority had 
to be compromised to include business interests as a core element. It can be 
surmised that this occurred in order to be in line with the compromise-laden 
paradigm of the political transition (inclusion, conciliation, consensus, 
stability). This approach was for all intents and purposes an unsurprising 
development (Marais 1998: 77).  
Marais outlined that the RDP was promoted as a unifying, national 
endeavour that allegedly transcended parochial interests. This meant in real 
terms that the RDP ‘belonged to everybody’. In a class society, the notion of 
common interests was essentially an ideological device to generalise and 
20 
 
attribute a specific class interest to all society (Marais 1998: 78). According to 
Marais, the RDP base document revolved around the following five sub-
programmes:  
(i) Meeting basic needs 
(ii) Developing human resources 
(iii) Building the economy  
(iv) Democratising the state 
(v) Implementing the RDP programme. 
 
The RDP was conceived as an attempt to programme measures aimed at 
creating a people-centred society which measured progress by the extent to 
which it had succeeded in securing liberty, prosperity and happiness for 
every citizen. Ultimately, this was to achieve equality and reduction of 
poverty.  
Central to this would be an infrastructural programme that would provide 
access to modern and effective services such as electricity, water, 
telecommunications, transport, health, education and training. The RDP base 
document had all the elements of the current B-BBEE policy, more especially 
its central focus on the empowerment of the broader community with special 
emphasis on the poor and the marginalised sections of the society. 
 For example, the RDP base document had pledged, among other things, to: 
(i) Create 2, 5 million new jobs in ten years. 
(ii) Build one million low cost homes by the year 2000. 
(iii) Restructure state institutions to reflect the racial, class and gender 
composition of South Africa society. 
(iv) Redistribute 30 per cent of agricultural land to small-scale black farmers 




It must further be stressed that what was central in the RDP base document 
was an attempt to establish a mutually reinforcing dynamic between 
provision of basic needs and economic growth, while simultaneously 
promoting redistribution, mainly through B-BBEE policy. There seemed to be a 
major conflict of interest when this was contrasted with the parameters of the 
global economy, more specifically the fact that the global economy has 
been primarily driven in the last few decades by the principle of economic 
growth at the expense of redistribution. It is for these reasons that in 1996 the 
South African government adopted a new macro-economic policy, Growth 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR). 
The GEAR policy document was released in 1996. It did not carry the full 
support of the government’s political partners, namely, the Congress of South 
Africa Trade Union (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). 
This was partly because COSATU and the SACP felt that there was no proper 
consultation process and because of the perceived neo-liberal approach 
adopted in the document.  The ruling party’s allies expressed publicly their 
belief that the adopted programme did not address the aspirations of the 
poor.  
The aims and objectives of GEAR were to achieve sustainable economic 
growth coupled with the creation of employment at a rate of 270 000 new 
jobs by the year 2000. The original growth target was a real GDP growth rate 
of 6% by the year 2000. In 1998 government launched the Medium Term 
Expenditure Framework (MTEF) according to which revisions and forward 
planning of fiscal policy elements were made three years ahead. In terms of 
the revisions reported in the budget speech of 23 February 2000, a real GDP 
growth rate of 3.4% on average was envisaged for the next three years 





To achieve these targets, the following strategies were envisaged according 
to GEAR:  
(i) Fiscal reforms were aimed at budget deficit reductions to such an 
extent that, in terms of current projections, the budget deficit should be 
2, 2% of GDP in 2002 (Strydom 2000: 1).  
(ii) Fiscal policy had to concentrate more on redistribution.  
(iii) Privatisation through the selling of state assets. Infrastructure investment 
growth was envisaged to reach an average of 2.4% in 2000.  
 
Furthermore, closely related to these fiscal reforms, government envisaged 
the development of a flexible labour market supplemented with rigorous and 
expanded skills development programmes which aimed at encouraging high 
levels of job creation. Monetary policy objectives were to maintain a 
stringent policy in order to reduce inflation. With the introduction of inflation 
targeting in 2000, government agreed on an inflation target of 3 to 6 percent 
to be achieved by 2002 (Strydom 2000: 2).  The opening up of the economy, 
the liberalisation of international trade and international economic co-
operation were high on GEAR’s agenda. It was in this macro-economic 
context that B-BBEE policy was introduced. 
2.2 B-BBEE policy evolution 
The current B-BBEE policy embraces many of the fundamental principles of 
the Freedom Charter of 1955, more especially on the economic front. It must, 
however, be noted that the Freedom Charter principles had to be refined to 
respond appropriately to modern challenges in the form of the B-BBEE Act 
and its strategy for 2003. The Freedom Charter adopted at the Congress of 
the People in Kliptown on the 26th of June 1955 established a fundamental 
vision for South African economy in order to meet the needs of the people in 
a more equitable manner.  
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Steytler (1991: 270) stated that an appropriate understanding of the Freedom 
Charter when it comes to economic redistribution was of importance if 
The national wealth of our country, the heritage of South Africans, shall be 
restored to the people. The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks 
and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of people as 
a whole. All other industry and trade shall be controlled to assist the well-
being of the people. All people shall have equal rights to trade where 
they choose, to manufacture and to enter all trades, crafts and 
professions. 
It was therefore not surprising that in the 1990s a few South African black 
entrepreneurs together with their white counterparts engaged with each 
other on a number of negotiations and business deals.  These business deals 
included the Sanlam conglomerate selling part of Metropolitan Life to 
METHOLD (the for-runner of New Investment Ltd, NAIL in 1993). There was also 
the Anglo-American deal involving Southern Life selling part of African Life to 
Real Africa Holding (RAIL) led by Don Ncube. These business deals were 
narrow in the sense that their main focus was on equity ownership rather than 
on broad-based black economic empowerment.  
These deals had no economic substance for black people in that they were 
based on loans from a number of  commercial financial institutions, which 
had conditions for payment attached that would not allow for the 
transformation of the South African economic landscape (Bond 2000: 39). 
These included financial structures such as Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs), 
which enabled black companies such as RAIL and NAIL to invest without 
capital. These models were not sustainable. As a result, the business sector in 
its effort to appease the imminent assumption of power by the new 
administration in 1994 engaged government around empowerment issues 
which led to an important agreement with the state to establish the B-BBEE 
Commission, which was chaired by a senior ruling party member, Mr. Cyril 
Ramaphosa.  
The idea of  the B-BBEE Commission arose out of a resolution taken at the 
Black Management Forum (BMF) National Conference held from the 14th to 
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15th of November 1997 at Stellenbosch. The B-BBEE Commission was formally 
established in May 1998 under the auspices of the Black Business Council, an 
umbrella body representing eleven black organizations. The prevailing view 
was that black people should be instrumental in directing and taking charge 
of a new vision for B-BBEE, a process that until then had been conceptualised 
and driven largely by the private sector. The B-BBEE Commission report 
proposed that the following targets should be achieved within a period of 
ten years, which should guide the development of integrated national B-BBEE 
strategy: 
(i) Black people should hold at least 25% of the companies of shares listed 
on the Johannesburg Security Exchange (JSE). 
(ii) At least 40% of non-executive and executive directors of companies 
listed on the JSE should be black. 
(iii) At least 50% of the state owned enterprises (SOEs) and government 
procurement at national, provincial and local levels should go to black 
companies and collective enterprises as defined in the document. 
(iv) The national human resource development (HRD) strategy should 
ensure that black people comprise at least 40% of the number of 
people in professional training. 
(v) The HRD strategy should ensure that the country’s higher education 
and training system should increase the black participation rate to 20% 
(vi) At least 40% of the government incentives to the private sector should 
go to black companies (B-BBEE Commission report 2001: 11).   
 
In 2001, the B-BBEE Commission released its report which contained one of its 
most important recommendations, that there should be the development 
and adoption of an integrated national B-BBBEE strategy. The Commission 
further recommended that there should be a B-BBEE Act. As a result, the B-
BBEE Act 53 of 2003 as well as an integrated national B-BBEE Strategy were 
drafted and adopted by the national cabinet in 2003. 
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2.3 B-BBEE policy regulations and strategic framework      
The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 was enacted 
in 2004 with the central objective being to establish a legislative framework 
for the promotion of B-BBEE policy implementation in the country.  Section 11 
of the B-BBEE Act empowers the Minister of the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) to change or replace the national B-BBEE strategy.  
The national B-BBEE strategy provides for an integrated, uniform approach to 
B-BBEE by all organs of state and other stakeholders. Thus, the national 
strategy officially defines B-BBEE policy as an integrated and coherent socio-
economic process that directly contributes to the economic transformation 
of South Africa and brings about significant increases in the number of black 
people who manage, own and control the country’s economy, as well as 
significant decreases in income inequalities (B-BBEE Strategy 2003: 24). In this 
context black is a generic term which means Africans, Asians/Indians and 
Coloureds who are all regarded as target groups for B-BBEE policy. 
Accordingly, government believes that the challenge in defining black 
economic empowerment is to find the appropriate balance between a very 
broad definition and an overtly narrow one. To define B-BBEE policy too 
broadly equates it with economic development and transformation in 
general (B-BBEE strategy 2003: 17). The national B-BBEE strategy further states 
that B-BBEE policy is commensurate with the totality of government’s 
programme of reconstruction and development. The strategy provides for a 
system for organs of state, public entities and other enterprises to prepare B-
BBEE plans and report on compliance with those plans.  
The successful implementation of the B-BBEE strategy would be measured 
and evaluated against the following policy objectives:  
(i) A substantial increase in the number of black people who have 
ownership and control of existing and new enterprises. 
(ii) A substantial increase in the number of black people who have 
ownership and control of existing and new enterprises in the priority 
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sectors of the economy that government has identified in its macro-
economic reform strategy. 
(iii) A significant increase in the number of new black enterprises, black-
empowered enterprises and black-engendered enterprises. 
(iv) A significant increase in number of black people in executive and 
senior management of enterprises. 
(v) An increased proportion of the ownership and management of 
economic activities vested in the community and broad-based 
enterprises (such as trade unions, employee trusts, and other collective 
enterprises) and co-operatives. 
(vi) An increased ownership of land and other productive assets, improved 
access to infrastructure, increased acquisition of skills, and increased 
participation in productive economic activities in under-developed 
areas, including the 13 nodal areas identified in the urban renewal 
programme and the integrated sustainable rural development 
programme. 
(vii) Accelerated and shared economic growth. 
(viii) Increased income levels of black people and a reduction of income 
inequalities between and within race groups (B-BBEE strategy 2003: 18).  
 
The strategy calls for government to utilise a number of policy instruments to 
achieve its objectives. These include legislation and regulation, preferential 
procurement, institutional support, financial and other incentive schemes. 
In addition, government would seek partnerships with the private sector in 
order to accelerate the B-BBEE process. This would be achieved through the 
conclusion or adoption of various sector codes or sectoral charters (B-BBEE 
mechanisms where business sectors agree on specific sector targets to 
achieve B-BBEE policy implementation). This means that various economic 
sectors set specific targets and projections for transformation and 
empowerment of targeted groups. This was to be done through consultation 
and agreement between all the major role players in the sector. 
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There would be further institutional support such as the formation of a B-BBEE 
advisory council, which would be established to: 
(i) Advise government on B-BBEE policy implementation. 
(ii) Review progress in achieving B-BBEE policy implementation targets. 
(iii) Provide advice on the drafting of B-BBEE codes of good practice, 
which the Minister of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) must 
publicise for comment in terms of Section 9(5) of B-BBEE Act. In line with 
this, in 2012 the DTI publicised the revised B-BBEE Amendment Bill and 
the codes of good practice for public comment. 
(iv) Advise on the development, amendment or replacement of B-BBEE 
strategy. 
(v) If requested to do so, advise on draft transformation charters, and 
facilitate partnership between organs of state and the private sector 
that would advance the objectives of B-BBEE Act (B-BBEE strategy 2003: 
17). 
 
The KwaZulu-Natal provincial government launched its B-BBEE Advisory 
Council on the 10th of August 2010. Various organizations from then on were 
called before the B-BBEE Advisory Council to account for B-BBEE policy 
implementation. It is, however, not clear in terms of legislation or policy what 
the relationship would be between the national B-BBEE advisory councils and 
the provincial ones. 
Furthermore, the national B-BBEE strategy (2003:17) indicates that the 
financing of the B-BBEE process is strategically important for the economy. It is 
understood that B-BBEE policy implementation must have a credible 
financing component in order to proceed successfully and efficiently in 
accordance with the existing legislation. Without this, firstly, the extent of B-
BBEE policy implementation would be limited without enough financial 
support, and secondly, investment funds would be diverted into asset 
transfers with the danger of a flow of funds out of the economy from the 
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sellers of assets. Both outcomes, the B-BBEE strategy states, would be 
economically and politically dangerous (B-BBEE strategy 2003: 18). 
Additionally, the B-BBEE strategy shows a critical awareness of what is 
necessary to South Africa’s approach to investment, more especially in an 
economy where the rate of savings and investment is still too low for the 
developmental needs of the country. South Africa’s ability to attract foreign 
savings is dependent on its own economic growth and the overall economic 
environment prevalent in the country. It is clear that any financing strategy 
should not jeopardize domestic or foreign sources of savings or investment (B-
BBEE strategy 2003: 18). 
In the South African context, the connection between the attraction of 
foreign investment and the creation of a favourable domestic environment is 
in conflict, in the sense that the domestic challenges demand very strong 
state intervention (through B-BBEE policy) in the economy in order to reduce 
inequality and poverty . At the same time, favourable conditions for foreign 
direct investment often demand less state involvement in economic activities 
unless and where there are market failures. Importantly, a favourable 
environment for foreign direct investment is dependent upon the reduction 
of poverty and the level of unemployment. To this end, B-BBEE strategy 
highlights that the following must be taken into account in the financing of B-
BBEE policy implementation: 
(i) Maintaining a macro-economic balance: B-BBEE cannot be financed 
by taking on excessive debt or large scale deficit financing or by 
assuming excessive sovereign contingent liability.  
(ii) Commercial risk must remain with the private sector. The state will 
facilitate access to capital and collateral, both structural problems for 
the black community. The state will not assume commercial risk. It is 
believed that this must remain with enterprises, the entrepreneurs and 
investors. This is crucial from the point of view of the macro-economic 
stability of the economy but also, more importantly, it will improve the 
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quality of enterprise development and, therefore, the competitiveness 
of the economy (B-BBEE strategy 2003: 19). 
 
All this clearly indicates that the burden for market failures cannot be carried 
by the state and that the private sector must assume a much greater role in 
empowerment or take some responsibility for the implementation of B-BBEE 
policy. This militates against the principle of market fundamentalism which 
was highlighted above, which contends that the state must not play a role in 
the market, unless there are market failures. This, however, does not mean 
that B-BBEE policy financing needs to be left entirely in the hands of the 
private sector. On the contrary, the state has been actively and decisively 
advocating a synergic strategy and co-operation between government and 
private enterprise at all levels, where they basically operate as social 
partners. 
The state has devised various mechanisms for financing and implementing B-
BBEE policy. A new mandate for the National Empowerment Fund (NEF) and 
a review of the roles of other development finance and support institutions 
need to be decisive in ensuring that these resources are effectively and 
efficiently employed (B-BBEE strategy 2003: 18). The frameworks for such 
operations and initiatives would be developed by the DTI and the National 
Treasury. Financing mechanisms would revolve around, but would not be 
limited to, the following critical strategic areas:  
(i) Grants and Incentives - this is based on the understanding that the DTI 
provides a range of grants and other incentives to enterprises. The DTI 
would therefore seek to co-ordinate such financing in synergy and 
cooperation with other programmes in order to maximise the B-BBEE 
policy implementation impact. New schemes and amendments to 
existing schemes have also been considered in support of B-BBEE, 
including supplier development, support for skills development and the 




(ii) State facilitated lending: the focus in this instance is on the small and 
medium sized enterprises. Government has created lending facilities 
and has also provided for underwriting and risk sharing. Khula 
Enterprises is the primary facility in this regard. However, a number of 
problems have arisen over the last several years. A distinction is now 
being made between micro enterprises, and small and medium 
enterprises (SMMEs), and a new initiative for apex funds for micro 
lending will be established.  
 
(iii) Project financing. This is based on the notion that the public sector can 
play an important role in ensuring B-BBEE policy compliance in new 
project development. The key institution here is the Industrial 
Development Corporation (IDC). The IDC also deals extensively with 
SMME projects and has a specific B-BBEE policy approach. However, in 
public sector led projects, such as those in Transnet (freight and 
logistics) and Eskom (electricity utility) or new entities like iGas (gas 
Development Company) and PetroSA (petroleum), significant gains in 
B-BBEE policy could also be achieved. A Private-Public Partnership 
(PPP) is also considered to be a means for effecting B-BBEE policy 
implementation. 
 
(iv) Venture capital. This is predicated on the state’s priority in facilitating 
specific venture capital projects in particular sectors (B-BBEE strategy 
2003: 21).  
 
The last mechanism relates to targeted investment. It is believed that 
government will provide inducements to finance empowerment ventures. 
The implementation of the various programmes will include investment in the 
various strategic development initiatives and in the rural and urban nodes. 
This means that B-BBEE policy here is based on a co-ordinated, integrated 
core investment. It is a strategy that links transformation, economic growth 
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and development. This process is driven at numerous levels, that is, national, 
provincial, local levels, as well as by the public and private sectors.  
B-BBEE policy is seen as a viable government programme that will improve 
the quality of life and reduce a high level of poverty amongst the designated 
groups. However, its success requires that various sectors of the economy, 
including government, must comply with B-BBEE policy implementation 
targets.  
2.4 The compliance targets for B-BBEE policy  
Socio-economic transformation policies in South Africa, as pointed out in 
Chapter One, emerged directly from the South African Constitutional Act 108 
of 1996. Section 9(2) of the Constitution provides a legal framework for the 
promotion and achievement of equality and other measures that need to be 
taken which are designed to protect or advance people, or categories of 
individuals, who had been disadvantaged by historically unfair discrimination. 
In contrast, Section 217 of the Constitution requires that the state organs and 
any other institution identified in national legislation to contract for goods or 
services must do so in accordance with a system that is fair, equitable, 
transparent, competitive and cost effective.  
However, Section 217(2) of the Constitution indicates that this requirement 
does not preclude state organs or any other institution identified in the 
national legislation from implementing a policy or policies providing for 
categories of preference in the allocation of contracts, as well as for the 
protection or advancement of persons, or categories of persons, 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. Section 217(3) states that there must 
be national legislation prescribing the framework within which the policy may 
be implemented.  
Thus, on the 9th of February 2007 the DTI released the final B-BBEE codes of 
good practice in accordance with Section 9 of the B-BBEE Act 53 of 2003. The 
DTI is required by the B-BBEE Act to issue the B-BBEE codes of good practice 
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that may include the further interpretation and definition of B-BBEE policy, 
and interpretation of different categories of black empowerment entities 
through a variety of initiatives. In terms of B-BBEE Act 53 of 2003, this must be 
applicable in relation to: 
(i) Issuing qualification criteria for preferential purposes for procurement 
and other economic activities. 
(ii) Finding indicators to measure B-BBEE policy implementation. 
(iii) The weighting to be attached to B-BBEE indicators. 
(iv) Guidelines for stakeholders in the relevant sectors of the economy to 
draw up transformation charters for their sectors, and any other matter 
necessary to achieve the objective of the B-BBEE Act (B-BBEE Act 53 of 
2003: 5). 
Furthermore, Section 10 of the Act outlines  the status of the codes by stating 
that every organ of state and public entity must take into account and as far 
as is reasonably possible apply any relevant code of good practice to: 
(i) Determine the qualification criteria for the issuing of licences, 
concessions or other authorisations in terms of any law. 
(ii) Develop and implement a preferential policy. 
(iii) Determine the qualification criteria for the sale of state-owned 
enterprises. 
(iv) Develop criteria for entering into partnership with private sector (B-BBEE 
codes 2007:13). 
 
Organizations in South Africa, including the public service itself, would 
therefore be measured against the following adjusted B-BBEE codes of good 
practice. Each element of B-BBEE is allocated weighting points which must be 





Table 2.1: Adjusted public sector scorecard 
Element Weighting Code series reference 
Management Control 15 points 200 
Employment Equity 15 points 300 
Skills Development 20 points 400 
Preferential Procurement 20 points 500 
Enterprise Development 15 points 600 
Socio-Economic 
development 
15 points 700 
Source: Government Gazette, 9 February 2007 
Table 2.1 indicates how the South African public sector has to comply with B-
BBEE policy imperatives and requirements according to six elements. These 
elements are:   
(i) Management control:  measures effective control of economic activities 
by black people, mostly boards of directors and executive management. 
This means that black people must occupy key positions within the South 
African organizations where they will be able to determine strategic 
direction.  
 
(ii) Employment equity: measures the equitable representation of black 
people at work place, specifically at junior, middle, and senior levels. 
 
(iii) Skills development: measures the skills development of black people in 
the work place. Organizations are required to spend a certain portion of 





(iv)  Preferential procurement: a measure that was designed to widen market 
access of black entities in order to integrate them into the main stream 
economy. The standard practice is that various organizations committed 
to B-BBEE policy would prefer to interact and procure from companies 
with higher B-BBEE policy implementation status. 
 
(v) Enterprise development: its aim is to measure and assist the development 
of the operational and financial capacity of black enterprises so that they 
become independent and can grow and sustain themselves. 
 
(vi) Socio-economic development: this measures the social contribution by 
government departments. They are required to help the communities with 
education programmes, HIV AIDS initiatives and with infrastructural 
development programmes (B-BBEE codes 2007: 18).  
 
B-BBEE codes of good practice apply to all organs of the state and public 
entities listed in the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (PFMA). This 
means that any enterprise which undertakes any business with any organ of 
state or public entity would be measured in terms of its B-BBEE policy 
compliance. In addition, any private sector or business entity providing goods 
or services to another business which is subject to measurement under the 
codes may be required to provide evidence of its own B-BBEE policy level of 
compliance to its customer. Importantly, businesses providing goods or 
services to other businesses which are subjected to B-BBEE policy compliance 
will generally find themselves also subjected to B-BBEE policy compliance as 
well. As such, the pressure to become B-BBEE policy compliant applies not 
only to businesses interacting with the public sector, that is, state owned 
enterprises and public entities, but also to those interacting with the private 
sector as well.  
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Consequently, the pressure to comply with B-BBEE policy is spreading across 
the economic landscape, and this is the central idea behind the codes 
which are supposed to help transform the South African economic terrain. 
The DTI has created the South African National Accreditation System (SANAS) 
which is a public entity tasked to accredit verification agencies/auditors, 
which are responsible for B-BBEE policy compliance verification and audit 
throughout the economy.  
At the end of the B-BBEE verification process each government department is 
issued with a certificate indicating clearly the level of B-BBEE policy 
compliance. B-BBEE policy levels of compliance range from level one 
(presumed to be an optimal B-BBEE policy contributor) to level nine 
(presumed to be non B-BBEE compliant). In terms of B-BBEE codes anyone 
doing business with a government department can request a B-BBEE 
certificate. This means that, for example, a government department that is 
level nine B-BBEE compliant will lose a business opportunity as compared to a 
department that is level one B-BBEE policy compliant. B-BBEE verification 
certificates last for a period of twelve months, and thus every organization is 
required to go through the same process on an annual basis.  
2.5 Consequences of B-BBEE policy.  
B-BBEE policy implementation, when not properly placed in the overall 
context of South African macro-economic policy arrangements, could 
generate pointless expectations amidst its presumed beneficiaries, as well as 
unwarranted uncertainties among those who expect to be undeservedly 
excluded by it. The debate on B-BBEE policy in South Africa reveals a number 
of diverse views on the understanding of the concept. B-BBEE policy has 
generating controversy amongst academics, labour unions, business 
organizations, government officials and people in the street, invoking hopes, 
fears and scepticism (Edigheji 1999: 2). Clearly, the concept of B-BBEE policy 
means different things to different people in South Africa. 
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Some have argued that the South African government has implemented 
many progressive policies and laws at the macro-economic level, with more 
than 800 laws promulgated since 1994 (Gqubule 2006: 40). Gqubule suggests 
that it is the macro-economic framework which determines what is possible in 
all areas of the economy, from industrial policy to education, arts, culture, 
entertainment and sports. Gqubule, however, believes that government’s 
deflationary macro-economic policies made it impossible to achieve 
meaningful capital reform together with the goals of B-BBEE policy. He 
concluded that the macro-economic priorities embraced by the 
government during the first decade of democracy conflicted with the 
objectives of capital reform and B-BBEE policy. However, others hold far 
different views. 
Jack (2007: 15), for example, believes that if South Africa is to continue on a 
capitalist course the poor must be provided for. Jack argues that the 
objective of B-BBEE policy is to introduce poor people into the mainstream 
economy, thereby allowing them to reap the benefits of the capitalist system. 
Bond (2000: 39), however, provides an extreme view that the white 
establishment use black faces to gain access to the new government 
opportunities and often pay blacks in the form of shares in their companies. 
This means that at the end of the day it is a handful of black people who are 
being enriched (Bond 2000: 39). Bond concluded that if ever there was a 
case where the white South African élite laid a neo-liberal ambush for their 
success, it is B-BBEE policy. Thus B-BBEE policy strikes a fatal blow against the 
emergence of black entrepreneurship by creating a small class of 
unproductive but wealthy black crony capitalists who have become strong 
allies of the economic oligarchy (Mbeki  2009: 61). Mbeki, the younger 
brother of the former South African State President, further maintains that the 
black élite, which describes itself as made up of previously disadvantaged 
individuals (PDIs), sees its primary mission as extracting reparations from those 
who put them in a disadvantaged position. To achieve this requires a transfer 
of resources from the wrongdoers, who are perceived to be white-owned 
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businesses and the South African state, to the victims, the previously 
disadvantaged individuals (Mbeki 2009: 69). Mbeki concluded that this 
transfer of wealth from the strong to the weak was what has come to be 
known as B-BEE policy.  
It can therefore be seen from these views that a discussion on B-BBEE policy in 
South Africa is often based on ideological or ethical considerations. In terms 
of the South African macro-economic policy arrangements, private 
individuals are at liberty to make their own private decisions. They are within 
their rights to pursue their individual business interests in the market. However, 
the contention that B-BBEE policy is empowering a few at the expense of the 
majority highlights structural challenges in the economy where B-BBEE may be 
seen as creating  a barrier to the pursuit of individual business interests.  
The issue of skills shortages has always been cited as a key problem for the 
empowerment of the poor. This is the reason why in 2006 government 
introduced various programmes and strategies to deal with shortages of skills 
as well as job creation. The Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative for South 
Africa (ASGISA) was launched in February 2006 to speed up the process of 
job creation and to reduce poverty amongst the poor. In March 2006, the 
Joint Initiative for Priority Skills Acquisition (JIPSA) programme was launched to 
deal with the development of priority skills that were required by the 
economy. However, this does not seem to have achieved the desired results 
as unemployment, poverty, and inequalities remain deeply entrenched in 
economic structure of South Africa (NDP 2012:408).    
It was in this context that the Presidential International Growth Panel (PIGP) 
argued that the same structural variables that influence who participates 
and benefits from the  South African economy also impact  on what new 
ideas enter, what products are produced and what growth opportunities 
exist (PIGP 2007: 8).  South Africa’s organizational arrangements prompt and 
constrain economic actors all the time, shaping what is produced, how, and 
by whom (PIGP 2007: 8). Furthermore, the South African economic landscape 
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is prone to favouring large firms and vertical relationships; for example, 
organizing structures offer opportunities for large scale undertakings that 
emphasise substantial capital investment (PIGP 2007:9). Such structures, the 
PIGP suggested, were less conducive to flexible adjustment in the face of the 
changing global economy.  
The PIGP (2007:9) further noted weaknesses in the South Africa economic 
structures, which limited new entry into markets because of high levels of 
capital concentration and vertical integration in key industries. The PIGP 
(2007:9) pointed out that such factors restrict the entry of new ideas, the 
inclusion of outsiders (including potential entrepreneurs and low skilled 
workers) and the development of a climate conducive to emerging business. 
This presents a situation that is not conducive for the implementation of B-
BBEE policy. B-BBEE policy requires a business environment that is flexible to 
new entries, new ideals, and a total commitment of stakeholders to the 
development of low skilled workers for long term benefits.  
In November 2010, the New Growth Path Framework was introduced by 
government. Its main goal was to provide a strategic framework for the 
creation of decent work in order to reduce inequality and to defeat poverty 
(New Growth Path Report 2010: 8). The framework for the New Growth Path 
suggested that South Africa must address its key tradeoffs to prioritize efforts 
and resources in order to support more rigorously employment creation and 
equity. Government’s intention in introducing this initiative was to entice the 
business sector to invest in new areas of the economy. This would mean that 
business and labour would collaborate with government to address 
inefficiencies and constraints across the economy. This could create a 
conducive environment for the reduction of poverty and advance B-BBEE 
policy implementation that would lead to real transformation.  
Yet despite all these initiatives the issues of poverty, unemployment and 
inequality remain a major challenge for South Africa. Government has 
publicly expressed concern that poverty and inequality undermine South 
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African democracy (NDP 2012: 409). This has led some even several years 
ago to question the very concept of B-BBEE policy by suggesting that this 
policy is a risk in the short term although possibly a benefit in the long term 
(Mabanga 2004: 5). Mabanga explained that in respect of B-BBEE policy 
there is an immediate dilution of value when companies sell off a stake with 
the risk that a new partner may not deliver value but merely extract 
dividends. This is the reason why there are those who have strongly suggested 
that the principal problem in promoting black capitalism is that blacks as a 
whole lack capital (Southall 2004: 7). Southall argues that to become a black 
capitalist, aspirant members of this class have to be given or be able to 
borrow capital at a favourable rate. After a decade of democracy only a 
relatively small handful of emerging black magnates had emerged as owners 
of the small number of new black conglomerates, or as partners of 
established white corporations (Southall 2004:7).  
It is important to note that the need for B-BBEE policy has to be 
complemented by a flexible macro-economic framework aimed at 
achieving socio-economic transformation (Gqubule 2006: 40). Currently, 
there is a disjuncture between B-BBEE policy objectives and South African 
macro-economic policy arrangements. At the outset, one of the B-BBEE 
policy beneficiaries, Saki Macozoma, expressed the view that many of those 
who critique B-BBEE policy were by then saying to themselves that they were 
being caricatured (Macozoma 2004: 8). Macozoma suggested that there 
was a need to accept the deracialisation of the economy, but there was a 
perception that the process has ‘elitist’ consequences because it was not 
alleviating poverty, but enriching a few.  
The challenges faced by B-BBEE policy do not lie so much in the aims of the 
policy itself but rather in the context of the South African macro-economic 
policy arrangements. Consequently, many organizations have adopted a 
narrow approach towards B-BBEE policy implementation. Nicholson (2001: 60) 
provided a detailed account of the implications of adopting a narrow 
approach. Nicholson (2001:60) suggested that progress in black economic 
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empowerment has come to be measured in terms of the control of shares on 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). Thus B-BBEE policy implementation 
in this sense is about transferring ownership of companies to black investors. 
This reinforces what was stated earlier in respect to the official definition of B-
BBEE policy, namely, that the challenge in defining black economic 
empowerment is to find an appropriate balance between a very broad 
definition and an overly narrow one. The transfer of shares to black individuals 
is a very narrow interpretation of B-BBEE policy whereas a broader 
interpretation would entail empowerment of those who had been historically 
disadvantaged.  
It must be remembered that black people were oppressed as a group, and it 
was because of their group identity that they suffered under apartheid. Thus, 
the successful implementation of B-BBEE policy should be interpreted as 
economic development of blacks as a group rather than as individuals. This is 
the reason why many in South Africa have used the concept of 
empowerment interchangeably with that of development.  
Friedman (1992:15) has provided an appropriate conceptual basis for an 
understanding of empowerment. He defined empowerment as a form of 
development which places emphasis on the improvement of the conditions 
of the lives and livelihood of the excluded majority. Friedman (1992:15) 
argued that empowerment aims to redress the historical process of 
systematic disempowerment or exclusion of the vast majority of the country’s 
people from economic and political power. Friedman explains that 
disempowerment has denied the majority of ‘human flourishment’ as their 
lives are characterised by hunger, poor health, poor education, a life of 
backbreaking labour, a constant fear of dispossession, and chaotic social 
relations. Empowerment aims to humanise the system that has shut out the 
majority, and its long-term aims are to fundamentally transform the whole of 
society, including the structures of power (Friedman 1992: 15).  
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Empowerment can be described as one form of development. The 
researcher believes that development is broader than empowerment in both 
essence and content. Empowerment as enshrined in the B-BBEE Act is 
centred on the notion that economic development of black people is the 
key to real transformation of the South African economic landscape. 
Empowerment is centred on people rather than profits. It faces a profit-driven 
development as its dialectical other (Friedman 1992: 42). Friedman argues 
that unlike neo-classical economics, which perceives the individual as its unit 
of analysis, empowerment takes the household as such. It is because of this 
dialectic that only a few individuals benefit from B-BBEE policy programmes 
at the expense of the targeted majority. Central to state intervention in the 
form of transformation policies is the pursuit of equality so that the economic 
and subsequently the social ‘playing field’ can become balanced.  
The South African legal system upon which B-BBEE policy is based calls for a 
synergistic, cooperative model between what are often identified as ‘role 
players’, ‘stakeholders’, and ‘social partners’. When Friedman states that 
although empowerment is centered on people rather than profits in a 
capitalist context he encapsulates the synergy that has been evident in 
South Africa from 1994. In the final analysis, the position of the South African 
government is that people-centered development does not preclude 
members of the private sector: they are basically seen as ‘social partners’.  
2.6 Conclusion      
This chapter has highlighted the complex and often contradictory B-BBEE 
policy environment. The context is characterized by dissimilar interpretations 
of B-BBEE policy and various expectations of different stakeholders in the field 
of policy implementation. Contradictions and tensions in policy 
implementation are informed not only by internal policy actors but also by 
the global policy terrain. Consequently, the state is continuously challenged 
to readjust its policy trajectory. When this occurs policy winners and losers are 
created. There are those who have argued that the policy on B-BBEE has 
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empowered elites at the expense of the majority. However, policy options for 
the state are limited. Given this, the management of government policy will 
determine the success or failure of the policy on B-BBEE. 
Just how successful such policy implementation has been managed can be 
assessed in terms of policy co-ordination, organizational hierarchy, managing 
transformation processes, and policy communication. Theories of 
organizational management will help to understand how the KwaZulu-Natal 
provincial government manages policy implementation within the existing 
constraints that have been identified in this chapter. Accordingly, the 
following chapter discuss theories of organizational management. This will 
lead to the theoretical framework which is the basis for the investigation of 



















The intention of this chapter is to discuss theories of organizational 
management according to five themes: managing policy implementation, 
policy co-ordination, organizational transformation, organizational hierarchy, 
and policy communication.  
3.1 Managing policy implementation 
The motivation of organizations when adopting a specific policy depends on 
how policy implementation is managed. This requires a number of 
interrelated steps that need to be adopted in the implementation process. 
Importantly, policies often exhibit the strategic focus of the organizations. It is 
always necessary to understand a strategic manager’s policy choices. It is on 
this basis that, Simon (1997:18) argues that: 
We cannot understand either the ‘inputs’ or the ‘outputs’ of executives 
without understanding the organizations in which they work. Their 
behaviour and its effects on others are functions of their organizational 
situations. Organizations are therefore important because they provide 
those in responsible positions with the means for exercising authority and 
influence over others.  
It must be pointed out that disproportionate authority may also be 
problematic in conditions that require more influence and persuasion of 
others. In this context, a balance is needed for the success of policy 
implementation. Thus, policy implementation by its very nature is a complex 
phenomenon. 
Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002:5) state that “policies are dynamic 
combinations of purpose, rules, actions, resources, incentives, and behaviours 
leading to outcomes that can imperfectly be predicted or controlled”. 
Grindle (1997:7) adds that “good government often begins through the 
making of hard choices in regard to what should be responsible for and what 
activities it ought to abandon”.  
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A distinction has to be made, though, between policy implementation and 
project/programme implementation. Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002: 23) 
explain the following most significant differences: 
Policy implementation is rarely a linear, coherent process: programs and 
projects have a beginning and an end, there are specific time-lines, 
targets and objectives which are specified for each phase. While policy 
implementation is important, change is rarely straightforward. Policy 
implementation can often be multidirectional, fragmented, frequently 
interrupted, and unpredictable and very long term. No single agency 
can manage the policy implementation effort: projects and programmes 
have project managers or programme heads, and it is clear who is in 
charge. Policy implementation requires the concerted actions of multiple 
agencies and groups. Even if there is a lead agency, there is no one in 
charge. Authority and responsibility are dispersed among actors involved, 
traditional command and control is rarely applicable. Policy 
implementation creates winners and losers: projects and programmes 
provide benefits to those they affect.  
Thus tensions in policy implementation are inescapable. It is the duty of every 
organization to be aware of the intricacies of policy processes. This means 
that a clear distinction between policy implementation and project 
implementation must always be made. The distinction will help to create an 
environment where there would be less confusion and ultimately fewer 
problems in the implementation phase. In situations where policy 
implementation is treated like a project there will always be unrealistic 
expectations for urgent results.  
Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002: 25) explain that policy implementation includes 
the following: 
Educating policy beneficiaries, managing expectations, allaying fears, 
explaining and reassuring. Some individual, group, or organization must 
assert that the proposed policy reform is necessary and vital, even though 
it will present serious costs. This step involves the emergence or 
designation of a policy champion, some individual or group with 
credibility, political resources, and the willingness to risk that political 
capital in support of the policy. The more contentious the policy issue or 
the more the new policy departs from past practice, the more important 
will be the legitimization function that will be the basis of such a process. 
Since support is frequently absent, an adequate constituency for reform 
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must be developed, the reform must be marketed and promoted. Policy 
managers or reformers should not assume that because a policy is sound 
or correct, support will automatically be forthcoming or that stakeholders 
will clearly and immediately see that it is in their interest to support the 
change. Certainly, policy benefits take time to be realised, while 
stakeholders must invest their energies and time in its realisation. Policy 
processes within the organization may require the hiring of new people 
(policy champions) and organizational designs to suite the new 
challenge. 
The introduction of “new tasks and objectives accompanying policy reform 
will likely cause modifications within the implementing organization(s)” 
(Brinkerhoff and Crosby 2002:28). Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002:28) further 
observed that: 
An organizational design and/or modification pose several problems: first, 
because of the existence of entrenched procedures and routines, and 
alliances with existing constituents and interests, there is frequently 
resistance to making changes in either the mandate or the structure of 
the established organization. Secondly, the tasks called for by reforms 
may be substantially different from current ones. This means that with 
significant policy change an agency can be affected in terms of its 
internal arrangements and of its relations with its operating environment. 
Internally, what the agency does and how it goes about those tasks may 
change, and new tasks will call for new structures and procedures.  
This requires highly sophisticated and strategic management to guide the 
process of implementation. Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002:40), explain that 
strategic management consists of four guiding principles: 
First, the strategic approach is oriented toward the future: It recognizes 
that the environment will change. It is long range oriented, one that tries 
to anticipate events rather than simply reacting as they occur. Second, 
the strategic approach has an external emphasis: it takes into account 
several components of external operating environments, including 
technology, politics, economics, and social dimensions. Strategic thinking 
recognizes that each of these can either constrain or facilitate the 
organizations involve in policy implementation. Third, the strategic 
approach concentrates on assuring a good fit between the environment 
and policy implementation. Organizations: this includes their missions and 
objectives, strategies, structures, and resources, and attempts to 
anticipate what will be required to assure continued fit. Finally, the 
strategic approach is a process: it is continuous and recognizes the need 
46 
 
to be open to changing goals and activities in light of shifting political, 
economic, and social circumstances. 
Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002:40) conclude by highlighting that “unlike 
traditional paradigms of public administration for routine service delivery and 
government functions, strategic management is ideally suited to the needs 
and challenges of policy change and implementation”. This would help 
policy managers to respond appropriately to the challenges as they occur. 
Furthermore this approach “seeks to fortify and strengthen new beneficiaries 
but softens the landing of those groups negatively affected by change” 
(Brinkerhoff and Crosby 2002:41). This would create a conducive environment 
for the buy-in of the previous winners who may now be losers as a result of 
new policy implementation. This may further create an opportunity to draw 
on their experience and for them to transfer their skills.  
3.2 Policy co-ordination 
Policy implementation often requires a network of relationships at various 
levels within and outside an organization. Significantly, policies are 
implemented in a complex and sometimes contradictory environment that is 
characterized by different stakeholders who have different interests, 
expectations, and authority. Thus the policy implementation process is 
dynamic and characterized by a lot of ‘twists and turns’.  The policy 
environment may further be compounded by other human related factors 
that may include, but are not limited to, shortages of critical skills, a lack of 
resources, as well as the absence of consensus among key role players. Thus 
policy co-ordination is integral to management practices and processes.  
In order “to implement policies successfully, managers need, first of all, to 
clarify what forms of co-ordination are appropriate, and second, to address 
obstacles to co-ordination, including their political dimensions” (Brinkerhoff 
and Crosby 2002: 122). Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002:123) further stated that 
“joint action is clearly the most intensive form of co-ordination, with the 
highest degree of potential problems for policy co-ordination obstacles. Joint 
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action can pose real challenges when organizations are brought together 
which do not share a history of working together and/ or have very different 
operating procedures or organizational cultures”. As Simon put it succinctly, 
“however, unfortunately, problems do not come to the administrator 
carefully wrapped in bundles clearly sorted out” (Simon 1997:4).  
Problems and weaknesses need to be remedied in order for an organization 
to achieve its designated goals, which in most cases have been set by 
legislation, rules and regulations. The difficulty with this is that some policies, 
such as B-BBEE policy, often encounter serious resistance from other sectors of 
the economy and society. Strategic management “in multi-actor policy 
implementation is not a question of command and control” (Brinkerhoff and 
Crosby 2002: 118). Managing policy implementation “is about developing a 
shared vision, influencing and persuading supporters and opponents, 
negotiating agreements, resolving conflicts, co-operating with a wide array 
of stakeholders, devising work programs in participatory and collaborative 
ways” (Brinkerhoff and Crosby 2002: 1180).  Brinkerhoff and Crosby further 
contend that “policy co-ordination is often a thorny and potentially conflict-
provoking problem”. This means that resistance and conflict amongst key 
stakeholders are inescapable facts of policy co-ordination. Importantly, 
conflicts form part of the ‘total package’ of policy co-ordination.  
Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002: 119) believe that for co-ordination to be 
effective, it must deal with three inter-organizational problems: 
Threats to autonomy: a core dynamic in most organizations is to try to 
maintain as much independent control over inputs, outputs, and 
operations as possible. When co-ordination requirements impinge upon its 
independence, an organization will be reluctant to co-ordinate. Threats 
are increased in situations in which stakeholders interests are diverse, co-
operating agency operational procedures are different, resources are 
scarce, and linkages among agencies are multiple and interlocking. Lack 
of task consensus: agreement on what the policy is intended to achieve 
and how to reach its objectives. This includes the client groups to be 
targeted, the actions to be undertaken, the services to be provided, and 
the methodology to be employed. Even where role players may have an 
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agreement on the noble intentions of public policy, there might be great 
disagreement on how to achieve the common goal. The diversity among 
stakeholder perceptions and interests, political considerations, multiplicity 
of linkages, and scarcity of resources aggravate the co-ordination 
problem. Stakeholders will always be reluctant to participate in a policy 
programme when there is nothing to gain from it. Conflicting vertical-
horizontal requirements: most implementation actors belong to a variety 
of networks, and/or some formal hierarchies.  
Co-ordination may include various stakeholders from the public, private and 
civil sectors. In many cases stakeholders do not share common interests. 
Often some organizations are driven by profit accumulation, while others are 
interested in the empowerment of a community. Frequently, “co-ordination 
places actors whose actions are to be co-ordinated in a situation in which 
they are subject to conflicting demands” (Brinkerhoff and Crosby 2002: 121).  
Stakeholders may have different forms and quantities of power and authority 
which determine their leverage in achieving co-ordination. Government 
organizations have legislative authority to determine the ‘rules’ of 
engagement. The difficulty, however, “arises from legal constraints imposed 
by enabling legislation and administrative statutes that place limits on the 
agency’s margin for manoeuvre” (Brinkerhoff and Crosby 2002: 121). Such 
considerations of power have a bearing on organizational transformation. 
 3.3 Organizational transformation 
Fox (2006:33) explains that transformation is a process of organizational 
change, which can be understood: 
In terms of standards, norms, hierarchies, decision-making, and 
organizational cultures, etc. The culture of an organization is the result of 
its history, environment, selection process and socialization practices. 
Organizations have histories, prevailing beliefs, customs, traditions and 
way of doing things. Organizational culture is the social adhesive that 
assists in holding the organization together by providing standards about 




The history of many South Africa organizations is informed by exclusion, racial 
discrimination, and an organizational culture which was not designed to 
serve the majority. Transformation requires South African organizations to 
adopt new ways of doing things in order to allow for inclusion and diversity. 
Importantly, those who were previously excluded must now come to 
participate in determining the key strategic direction of various organizations. 
The expected outcome is a new inclusive organizational culture that is 
responsive to the plight of the poor. In this context, participation of the 
previously excluded group can be defined as “a process through which 
stakeholders can influence and share control over development initiatives 
and decisions and resources which affect them” (World Bank 1996: 3). 
However, simple participation of the previous excluded group is not enough 
when this does not bring about the empowerment of the group: “citizens’ 
participation is not a panacea for future implementation success” 
(Brinkerhoff and Crosby 2002: 52).   
Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002: 52) argue that “serious questions can and 
should be raised regarding the expectations for, and limits of, participation in 
the policy process”. They identify five forms of participation, which are 
relevant to this study. These can be conceptualised as: 
(i) Information sharing: “it serves to keep actors informed, to assure 
transparency, and to build legitimacy” (Brinkerhoff and Crosby 
2002:54).  
(ii) Consultation: “consultation involves sharing information and garnering 
feedback and reaction. This may include consultation through 
organizing town hall meetings, focus groups, national conferences, 
round tables, and parliamentary hearings” (Brinkerhoff and Crosby 
2002:54). In South Africa this may further include Izimbizo or what has 
been defined as taking parliament to the people. The problem with this 
form of consultation is that resolutions are adopted and there is no 
follow up to check the process and outcomes of implementation. On 
close scrutiny, the community does not have power to organize these 
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meetings (Izimbizo) themselves, and invite government to account: it is 
the other way around. This is the reason why government has been 
accused of organizing community gatherings (Izimbizo) every time a 
general election nears.   
(iii) Collaboration: “joint activities in which the initiator invites other groups 
to be involved but retains decision-making authority and control. 
Collaboration moves beyond collecting feedback to involving external 
actors in problem solving, policy design, monitoring and evaluation. 
Examples include public reviews of drafting legislation, government-led 
working groups, and government convened planning sessions” 
(Brinkerhoff and Crosby 2002:54).  
(iv) Joint decision-making: “collaboration where there is shared control 
over decisions made. Shared decision-making is useful when the 
external actor’s knowledge, capacity, and experience are critical for 
achieving policy objectives” (Brinkerhoff and Crosby 2002:54). 
Examples are joint committees, public private partnerships, and blue 
ribbon commissions or task forces. 
(v) Empowerment: “transfer of control over decision making, resources 
and activities from initiator to other stakeholders. Empowerment takes 
place when external actors, acting autonomously and in their own 
interest, can carry out policy mandates without significant government 
involvement or oversight. Examples are local natural resources 
management committees, community empowerment zones, water 
user associations, and some forms of partnerships” (Brinkerhoff and 
Crosby 2002: 54).  
 
Empowerment as a form of participation for B-BBEE policy implementation 
often gives rise to unintended outcomes where the transfer of control is not 
accompanied by the transfer of skills. This can create the problem of 
sustainability because the communities lack appropriate skills to carry out on 
policy implementation. These communities may also lack technical skills to 
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mobilise financial resources and as such they become dependent on 
government support. This cannot be considered as real empowerment. 
Consequently, “policy managers need to give some thought to the 
objectives to be achieved through expanded participation” (Brinkerhoff and 
Crosby 2002: 55).  
Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002:57) stress that: 
There are several interrelated objectives of expanded participation: first, 
there are objectives that are primarily of benefit to the groups newly 
participating but that ultimately may increase the likelihood of 
implementation or sustainability of a new policy. Second, objectives for 
expanded participation include assuring or enhancing the successful 
implementation of a policy that leads to better delivery of services. These 
objectives relate to effectiveness, cost-sharing, and efficiency. Expanding 
participation helps to assure greater responsiveness to the needs of 
proposed beneficiaries, resulting in a better fit between needs and policy 
solutions, leading to increased service-user satisfaction. Third, objectives 
seek to increase support, legitimacy, transparency, and responsiveness of 
a particular policy, and this set relates to the principles of democratic 
governance.  Finally, expanding participation can reduce opposition to a 
particular policy.  
To this end, Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002: 57) believe that “the inclusion of the 
opposing groups may persuade them to support a proposed policy. This may 
be achieved through making concessions to the opposing group so that they 
can be co-opted within the policy process”. But there is a danger in adopting 
this approach without considering the internal policy dynamics of a particular 
country. Many government organizations may choose to make concessions 
to a few very powerful individuals. For the last few decades, which have 
been described as the era of globalisation, it has been customary for most 
governments to abandon policy programmes that seek to uplift the plight of 
the poor due to the influence and predominance of market forces which are 
based on an accumulation of wealth for the benefit of the few. When the 
interests of the powerful are threatened they may decide to oppose policy 
proposals. Obviously, governments need the market forces for the success of 
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policy implementation, but governments are often obliged to pursue the 
common good.  
This is the reason why it has been suggested that a “government should be 
judged on the basis of how citizens access basic services” (Peters 2001: 46). 
This is an expansive view of popular participation. The disadvantage is that 
“unstructured and unmanaged participation leads to cacophony and 
confusion, which is not necessarily good for the attainment of policy results” 
(Brinkerhoff and Crosby 2002: 59). Brinkerhoff and Crosby further believe that 
“while there are solid technical, social, and political reasons for expanded 
citizens’ participation in the policy process, it is, however, important to 
recognise that there are limits and trade-offs inherent in increasing 
participation”.  
This implies that policy managers should not raise expectations which cannot 
be met. They need to consider the availability of financial, as well as human, 
resources since “successful policy outcomes depend not simply upon 
designing good policies but also upon managing their implementation” 
(Brinkerhoff and Crosby 2002: 6). Brinkerhoff and Crosby suggest that “instead 
of identifying ideal solutions up front and imposing them top-down, policy 
implementers need to iteratively develop ‘second-or third-best’ answers that 
collaborating agencies and stakeholders can agree upon”. Furthermore, for 
a “practitioner in public and social administration, it is important to be aware 
of the situation in all relevant dimensions of multi-loci framework in which he 
or she is functioning” (Hill & Hupe 2002: 187). Accordingly, a public manager 
must involve as many people as possible and in addition be aware of the 
policy environment which might determine the success or failure of public 
programmes. At a more basic level, “a flexible government is simply the one 
that is capable of responding effectively to new challenges and of surviving 
in the process of change” (Peters 1992: 79).  
Policy managers need to carefully balance conflicting interests. Public 
managers should thus ensure that, to a large extent, all stakeholders are 
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involved in the process in most if not all aspects of the planning and 
implementing stages. Participation within organizations depends on the form 
of organization, which typically entails some sense of hierarchy.   
3.4 Organizational hierarchy 
An organizational hierarchy is composed of the top management, middle 
management and the operative employees. Many organizations, including 
government departments, are characterised by hierarchy, which requires 
coherence in policy management. This includes processes, functions and 
operations within the organizational hierarchy, which require that both the 
top echelon and the operative employees have to play their role in an 
integrated way so that the organization can achieve its goals. Normally the 
top echelon determines the strategic direction of the organization. The 
operative employees are at the interface of policy implementation. This often 
goes with a certain level of responsibility and authority. It is therefore the very 
nature of power and authority which is distributed unequally between the top 
and the operatives that often creates tension in policy management.   
The relationship between the top echelon and operative employees is 
therefore important to the success or failure of policy objectives and must be 
managed well so that an organization can be able to achieve its strategic 
vision. However, the policy environment abounds with challenges, such as 
scarce human and financial resources, limited responsibility or authority and 
the lack of a mandate to solve complex organizational challenges. This 
situation may be viewed differently within the organizational hierarchy, 
depending on the power and influence exercised through the structures. This 
poses a fundamental operational predicament since policy problems often 
demand urgent actions irrespective of the allocation of authority within the 
organizational structure.  
Accordingly, “breaking the monopoly of central design and expanding the 
options of administrative design are two of the major challenges facing 
decision-makers in developing countries” (Cohen & Person 1999: 6). Central 
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design determines the function and operations of an organization. Normally 
this leads to organizational decisions which are determined by a 
bureaucratic organizational structure. The top echelon of an organization has 
authority to determine the rules of engagement, leaving those at the bottom 
with little authority, thereby possibly making them less effective. It is “equally 
clear that the persons above the lowest  operative level in the administrative 
hierarchy are not mere surplus baggage, and that they too must have an 
essential role to play in the accomplishment of the agency’s objectives” 
(Simon 1997: 2). For this to happen “the operative employees must always be 
persuaded, rather than ‘directed’” (Simon 1997: 2). Simon concludes that “an 
administrative organization involves more than a mere assignment of 
functions and allocation of authority, and the success of the organizational 
structure will be judged by the operational employee’s performance” (Simon 
1997: 2).  
In some cases the operational employees may feel constrained by the 
organizational structure. This creates a situation where there is no room for 
operational employees to exercise their talents and potential. There are 
“politics involved in both innovation and change” (Pfeffer 1992: 12), Pfeffer 
observed:  
Unless and until leadership in organizations are willing to come to terms 
with organizational power and influence, and admit that the skills of 
getting things done are as important as the skills of figuring out what to 
do, their organizations will fall further and further behind. The problem is, in 
most cases, not an absence of insight or organizational intelligence, but 
one of passivity (Pfeffer 1992: 12). 
A number of factors inform this ‘passivity’:  
(i) Lack of ‘political will’ to achieve organizational strategic goals,  
(ii) Behaviour of top echelon personnel that leads them to personalize and 
‘own’ the organizational functions rather than providing strategic 
leadership, and  
(iii) A lack of strategic specialised skills (Pfeffer 1992: 12).  
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Problems of implementation are “in many instances, problems in developing 
‘political will’ and expertise, the desire to accomplish something, even 
against opposition, and the knowledge and skills that make it possible to do 
so” (Pfeffer 1992: 7).  Pfeffer (1992:7) further states that: 
Accomplishing innovation and change in organizations requires more 
than the ability to solve technical or analytic problems. Innovation almost 
invariably threatens the status quo, and consequently, innovation is an 
‘inherently political’ activity. The combination of these factors additionally 
also lead to what may be termed ‘passivity,’ depending on how the 
policy is managed within the organizational structure.  
Consequently, “policy changes are thus, in many instances, controversial” 
(Brinkerhoff and Crosby 2002: 19). Various levels within the organizational 
structure must always be aware of this reality, otherwise this would affect or 
compromise the ability of the organizations to meet its policy objectives. 
Conversely, this is impossible in an organization that is governed by a highly 
formal organizational structure that imposes decisions from the top. What is 
critical is the relationship between the hierarchical structure of an 
organization, processes and procedures.  
Peterson (1997:159) states that: 
The principal role of hierarchy is to co-ordinate an organization’s 
interdependences. Hierarchies achieve co-ordination by defining 
standard procedures that govern the behaviour of individuals or the 
premises by which individuals make decisions.  
Peterson (1997: 160) highlights issues pertaining to such procedures: 
Roles are not institutionalised and thus the behaviour of administrative 
staff is not governed by legal rationality, but by social pressures. As such, 
the bureaucracy is accustomed to pursuing the interest of the individual 
or his/her social group. The administration duties are performed by 
personal intervention rather than procedure. The leadership and in turn 
the management of the bureaucracy is often highly politicised. This 
creates a situation where an interventionist administration is adopted to 
meet political demands promptly to ensure response from an 
unresponsive organization. An interventionist administration erodes 
procedures.   
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As a result, concludes Peterson (1997:160): 
Weak procedures create a weak organization. The reality of many 
African bureaucracies is that practices or functions are not based on well 
established procedures. Instead of being integrated through procedures, 
public bureaucracies are often fragmented organizations with numerous 
micro-hierarchies. The leaders of these micro-hierarchies either vie 
amongst themselves for access to senior officials or they languish in 
isolation. 
3.5 Policy communication 
The implementation of all policies are determined and shaped by the actions 
of the actors, the stakeholders, the role players and the implementing 
agencies and groups. This includes policy actors within and outside the 
organization. All organizational groups and individuals need information to 
solve complex organizational challenges. Therefore communication must be 
at the center of organizational strategic decisions. 
Communication has been formally defined as “any process whereby 
decisional premises are transmitted from one member of an organization to 
the other” (Simon 1997:208). Information is “a bit like water: too little and you 
die of thirst, too much and you can drown” (Cohen and Eimicke 2002: 157).  
Cohen and Eimicke further observed that “if you obtain too much 
information, you may be inundated with needless detail, if you have too little 
information, you risk being taken by surprise by an unanticipated policy 
outcome”. Importantly, “without communication there can be no 
organization, for there is no possibility then of a group influencing the 
behaviour of an individual” (Simon 1997: 208). It is clear that with adequate 
information “a decision-maker can accurately assess a situation and know 
with absolute certainty the effect of a given action within that situation” 
(Cohen and Eimicke 2002: 157). In organizational terms, communication is a 
process that “takes place upward, downward, and laterally throughout the 
organization” (Simon 1997: 208). Accurate information may be scattered and 
flow from various sources within and outside the organization. 
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Difficulties experienced by an organization “are often seen as problems of 
information flow, while in actual reality they are problems of a poorly 
designed organizational structure and inadequately constructed 
assignments” (Cohen and Eimicke 2002: 170). Cohen and Eimicke argue that 
“probably the most common example of poor information flow is evident 
when one part of an organization is unaware of what another part is doing. 
This is what makes an organization so dynamic and very complex”. Policy 
managers are therefore tasked to find policy solutions within the dynamics of 
a policy environment. In this context organizations are viewed “as 
embodying patterns of communication and relations among a group of 
human beings, which include the processes of making and implementing 
decisions” (Simon 1997: 19). Simon notes that “an organization’s pattern 
provides its members with much of the information and many of the 
assumptions, goals, and attitudes that enter into their decisions”. It also 
provides a “set of stable and comprehensible expectations as to functional 
and structural requirements, responsibilities and duties expected of the other 
members of the group and how they will react to a variety of situations they 
face within the ambit of these functions” (Simon 1997:19). Simon asserts that 
sociologists call this pattern a ‘role system’.  
Organizations must be able to communicate at all levels by making use of 
the multiplicities of modes of communications. Good “information flow is not 
a set of procedures and technology” (Cohen and Eimicke 2002:170). Cohen 
and Eimicke contend that “although effective procedures and technologies 
can be helpful, good information flow is the result of an attitude toward work 
that drives staff members to ask the right question” (Cohen and Eimicke 
2002:170). This can be achieved through organizational communication 
channels. In reality “information and orders that flow downward through the 
formal channels are only a small part of the total network of communications 
in all organizations” (Simon 1997:209). Two modes or forms of communication 
must be “present for the transmission of information to be effective, in formal 
and informal ways” (Simon 1997: 211). Irrespective of which form of 
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communication an organization may adopt, there will always be challenges, 
particularly from vested interests within and outside the organization. Power 
can be exercised either to withhold or to release certain information 
depending on a particular situation.  
Information can further be twisted or distorted for certain ulterior motives. It 
has been suggested that “each time a message passes up through an 
organizational level, it may be modified” (Cohen and Eimicke 2002: 159). 
Cohen and Eimicke believe that “due to modification of information in the 
process of communication by the time it reaches the top, it may bear little 
resemblance to the message originally sent”. 
There are therefore a number of reasons why one has “too much of the 
wrong information and not enough of the right information” (Cohen and 
Eimicke 2002: 161). According to Cohen and Eimicke:  
The information you receive may be distorted as it passes through 
hierarchical levels. The information you receive is biased according to the 
organizational and the political interests of the sender. You may not be 
aggressive enough in seeking out external information sources, nurturing 
a network of information sources, or planning an information strategy. It is 
only when you ask for information that matches your actual priorities that 
reporting can serve management. 
Additionally, “the attention a communication will receive will also depend 
upon its form” (Simon 1997: 216). The form of communication is important for 
an organization’s decisions as well as policy actions. All “organizations need 
well-developed internal networks to take advantage of their informal 
organizational and communication patterns” (Cohen and Eimicke 2002: 166). 
This will help them to process all sorts of information coming from different 
sources. Importantly, this helps an organization to eliminate irrelevant 
information which could harm decision-making or convey inaccurate 
information to the outside stakeholders.  
A well-developed internal communication network needs to be 
complemented with a strategy for appropriate and enhanced dissemination, 
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because a “poorly thought-out strategy for disseminating information outside 
the organization can greatly impair a program” (Cohen and Eimicke 2002: 
165). Many organizations introduce their own internal special 
communications units to deal with information dissemination or to 
communicate with external stakeholders. This serves an important function, 
serving various purposes - marketing, education, consultation and 
accountability. 
The key factors associated with each of managing policy implementation, 
policy co-ordination, organizational transformation, organizational hierarchy, 
and policy communication that arose in the proceeding discussion are 

















Table 3.1: Summary of the central themes of the theoretical framework  
Themes Strategic focus 
Managing policy 
implementation 
 Policy implementation is  rarely a linear, coherent process 
 No single agency can manage policy implementation effort 
 Creates winners and losers 
 New policies  do not come with budgets 
 Support is frequently absent 
 Policy benefits take time to be realised 
Policy co-
ordination 
 Co-ordination must deal with threats to autonomy 
 There is always a lack of task consensus 
 Conflicting vertical/horizontal requirements 
 Linkages among the agencies are multiple and interlocking 
Organizational 
transformation 
 Organizational transformation: process of organizational change, 
standards, norms, hierarchies, decision making, organizational culture. 
 Culture of an organization is the result of its history, environment, 
selection process and socialization practices. 
 There are five forms of participation: information sharing, consultation, 
collaboration, joint decision-making, and empowerment 
 There must be collaboration among stakeholders 
 Participation is not a panacea for future implementation success 
Organizational 
hierarchy  
 Hierarchical-rule based organizational designs  
 Organizational power and influence 
 Policy change is controversial 
 Strengthen political will 
 Boost specialised skills 
Policy 
communication 
 Communication must take place at all levels 
 Good information flow is not a set of procedures 
 Without communication there is no organization 
 Attention to communication is dependent on its form 
 There are official and informal forms of communication 
 Communication must be at a centre stage of strategic decisions  







This chapter was structured according to the five themes which inform this 
study: managing policy implementation, policy co-ordination, organizational 
transformation, organizational hierarchy, and policy communication. In the 
course of discussing these in this chapter, vital sub-themes emerged, which 
are summarised in Table 3.1. The five themes constitute the overall theoretical 
framework which will guide the investigation into how the policy on B-BBEE 
has been implemented and managed within the provincial administration of 
KwaZulu-Natal. The sub-themes identify variables for considering each 
particular theme in relation to the three clusters of government. The 
investigation commences with the Economic Sectors and Infrastructure 


















Economic Sectors and Infrastructure Development cluster 
Introduction 
The main objective of this chapter is to present and discuss research data 
derived from the questionnaire and interviews with public officials in the 
Economic Sectors and Infrastructure Development cluster (ESID) in the 
provincial government of KwaZulu-Natal. The chapter explores, in turn, each 
of the five themes identified in the previous chapter as the theoretical 
framework for investigating the implementation and management of B-BBEE 
policy within the provincial government, the themes being managing policy 
implementation, policy co-ordination, organizational transformation, 
organizational hierarchy, and policy communication. First, though, the 
chapter begins by outlining the nature of the management profile in the 
cluster. 
The profile, role and structure of the cluster 
The Economic Sectors and Infrastructure Development cluster comprises the 
following provincial government departments: economic development and 
tourism, transport, public works, agriculture, environmental affairs and rural 
development, and the provincial treasury. The cluster deals with all economic 
development issues. Each government department is represented in the 
cluster by its head of department. 
The heads of departments form a cluster management team to co-ordinate 
and develop the provincial economic development strategies, and create 
synergy among economic cross-cutting policies. B-BBEE policy is regarded as 
one such cross-cutting policy. The cluster discusses common policy 
challenges, and if these require serious policy amendments, the cluster tables 
its recommendations for cabinet approval. The cluster has the power to invite 
anyone it deems relevant to submit strategic reports. Government 
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departments and public entities regularly submit progress reports on B-BBEE 
policy implementation to update the cluster on progress or lack thereof.    
Demographic characteristics of the sampled population: 
The following table reveals the demographic and professional profile of the 
respondents in this cluster.  
Table 4.1. ESID cluster: race, occupational level, and gender of management 




African Asian/Indian Coloured White Total 

















Director 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 5 
Deputy 
Director 
2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6
Executive 
Manager 
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
Specialist 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 3
Administrator 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 
Overall 5 5 2 4 2 1 1 0 20 
 
Ten of the 20 respondents were Africans who occupied positions at all levels 
in the management structure. Six were Asians, two of whom were Directors. 
Three were Coloureds and there was a single White female, who was an 
Executive Manager. The balance between the gender was fairly even, too, 
with females comprising eight positions (40%), and five of the 11 positions at 
senior level, that is, Deputy Director or Director. Table 4.2 shows the working 





Table 4.2. ESID cluster: work experience of management employees (n=20) 
Years of experience Number of respondents 
+20 4 
11 to 20 11 
6 to 10 4 
0 to 5 1 
 
The majority in this cluster, 11 respondents (55% of the total number), had 
been employed in government for between 11 and 20 years. Four had been 
there even longer, while another four varied from six to ten years of 
government service. Significantly, only one had been in government for five 
years or less. Thus at the management level in this cluster were experienced 
government officials.  
Table 4.3 shows the age profile of the respondents: 
Table 4.3. ESID cluster: age profile of management employees (n=20) 
Age (years) Number of respondents 
20 to 29 1 
30 to 39 12 
40 to 49 5 
50 to 60 2 
 
Most of the respondents, 12 of them (60%), were in their thirties. Only seven 
were forty years old or more, with only two in their fifties, and none at all older 
than sixty. One respondent was younger than 30. So despite their experience, 
this management group was relatively young. Unsurprisingly in these 
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circumstances, 17 of the 20 respondents had some tertiary qualification, as 
Table 4.4 shows:  
Table 4.4. ESID cluster: educational qualifications of management employees (n=20) 





One respondent had a technical qualification, while two had not progressed 
beyond secondary education. What were the views and experience of these 
ably qualified management government employees about the application 
of B-BBEE policy within the provincial government?  
4.1 Managing policy implementation 
The first theme is managing policy implementation. How has this cluster 
managed the implementation of the policy on B-BBEE? According to KI: 1  1 
The Economic Sectors & Infrastructure Development cluster co-ordinates 
the programmes and projects relating to the cluster. We further design 
and implement programmes for economic development in the province. 
Our roles and responsibilities are important in the implementation of B-
BBEE policy in the province. This is due to the fact that we are the 
custodian of B-BBEE policy in the province. This means that we formulate 
and implement B-BBEE policy in the province. It is also our responsibility to 
ensure that all other stakeholders including the private sector are 
implementing this policy.  
KI: 2 clarified government’s role in ensuring that other sectors are also 
implementing the policy: “our role of ensuring that other stakeholders are 



































































































































































































highlighted incoherent ‘fault lines’ or ‘fractured’ policy processes in the field 
of policy implementation within the provincial government. Secondly, the 
responses indicated that policy managers were struggling to find the correct 
approach to support policy implementation. Consequently, contradictory 
strategies and conflicting mandates reflect the different interests and 
priorities between the departments in this cluster. According to KI: 1:  
(i) Contradictory strategies and conflicting mandates 
Obviously, the serious challenge with B-BBEE policy implementation is that 
it is implemented within broad contradictory strategies and conflicting 
mandates. This is informed by the reality on how government 
departments operate, more especially the policy implementation 
relationship between the national spheres of government with the 
provincial one. The relationship comes with a certain level of authority 
that determines and regulates operations amongst and within various 
departments. Taking, for example, the procurement of goods and 
services, this is an important leverage in advancing B-BBEE policy 
implementation. However, this is difficult to achieve in the implementation 
of B-BBEE policy because of its direct conflict with the supply chain 
preferential procurement policy framework (PPPFA). The conflict between 
the two policies arises because the PPPFA is the supreme policy when it 
comes to government procurement of goods and services. The supply 
chain in the procurement of goods and services by government 
considers reasonable pricing as an important determining factor for the 
selection of suppliers. This is the direct conflict with B-BBEE policy because 
in terms of this policy, B-BBEE compliance should be the main determining 
factor in the selection of suppliers. It is therefore because of this conflict 
that B-BBEE policy compliant suppliers get excluded from lucrative 
government tenders.  
KI: 1 went on to say that the conflict between public policies on procurement 
and on B-BBEE is compounded by the fact that the two policies were 
formulated by different government departments at different times for 
different purposes. KI: 1 believed that: 
The national department of treasury is the custodian of the PPPFA. On 
close scrutiny, the PPPFA policy was designed for Public Financial 
Management accountability rather than the advancement of B-BBEE 
policy implementation. The approach followed by procurement 
practitioners is always to strive for saving government finances when 
68 
 
arriving at serious decisions. On the contrary, B-BBEE policy was designed 
for socio-economic transformation, and it is controlled by the national 
Department of Trade and Industry. This is what complicates B-BBEE policy 
implementation because the two departments are often issuing 
conflicting instructions. The provincial government cannot align its policies 
unless the alignment starts at the national level. Thus, there is no uniformity 
in policy implementation. Each government department designs its own 
individual procedures and practices to respond to its dynamics. This is the 
reason why some departments were successful and others failed to 
deliver or to meet the public needs.   
       KI: 3 took this argument a step further, noting that: 
The real reason why there is no alignment of conflicting policies is that 
there is covert friction between the two national departments. To me, this 
is based on power relations as to ‘who’s got more power’ to influence 
government direction. The National Treasury because it controls the 
government budget and considers itself as the super department over 
any other entity in South Africa. It has become a norm within government 
that the National Treasury often issues instructions or changes the 
reporting procedures for cash flow reports. Nowadays, we are forced to 
submit detailed motivations for every spending, all in the name, of what 
has been termed within government as ‘cost cutting measures’. In this 
context, it means that the National Treasury has the power to decide 
everything that government does. Anyone who goes against the National 
Treasury’s instructions often faces the Auditor General’s qualified financial 
statements. This leads to media attention and possible expulsion. 
KI: 2 believed that it is this power of the National Treasury which is affecting B-
BBEE implementation: 
I still want to see the National Treasury auditing B-BBEE policy 
implementation. Currently, they are the ‘obstacle’ to B-BBEE policy 
implementation. Taking for example, the KZN provincial Department of 
Transport which is currently being challenged by the National Treasury for 
its zibambele empowerment project. The main objective of this project is 
to empower the local communities by opening job opportunities when 
building roads, bridges, and infrastructure for the whole province. This 
project further develops and empowers local small enterprises. However, 
according to the National Treasury, this is against the rules and regulations 
governing the supply chain management. As a result, the provincial 
Department of Transport is threatened to be taken to court by the 
National Department of Treasury. To be honest with you, we are sitting 
with threatening letters challenging us to stop what we are doing. 
However, we are not going to stop, they must just take us to court.  
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KI: 4 also suggested that: “contradictory strategies and conflicting mandates 
create serious bottlenecks for B-BBEE policy implementation. This is the reality, 
which is surprising and unfortunate because we are serving the same 
government which designed these policies”. 
COMMENT: It was evident that although there was general agreement 
amongst the respondents regarding the fundamental tenets of contradictory 
strategies and conflicting mandates, there was a slight difference of opinion 
as to the root causes of this situation. This was to be expected as different 
government functionaries within the same organizational environment tend 
to face a variety of challenges that were different in detail, if not in their 
totality. The most important revelation from the responses is the issue of power 
relations amongst government organizations. Clearly, the implementation of 
B-BBEE policy within government entails a certain level of exercise of power 
and authority. This was dependent on the organizational functions; that is, a 
government department that was controlling the resources was clearly 
‘determining the rules of engagement’ in policy implementation. On most 
occasions this plays a key role in determining the final outcome and output. 
Importantly, such an approach creates confusion and bottlenecks. Thus, in 
this context, the implementation of policies become complicated and 
characterised by a lot of contradictions. This is why it has been suggested 
that policy implementation is not a linear and coherent process. It is clear 
from the responses that this affects government organizations in many ways, 
such as a lack of knowledge transfer.  
(ii) No knowledge transfer 
Would the introduction of the policy on B-BBEE lead to a wider distribution of 
knowledge within government? In KI: 3’s view:  
When B-BBEE policy was introduced, I expected a lot of changes within 
government in South Africa. I thought that the South African government 
organizational culture would change and be more receptive to the new 
cultural norms, where new people would be given a space to influence 
government strategic direction. However, the things are different, old 
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people within government departments are not interested in the 
development of new people nor are they prepared to learn from us. 
There are three factors causing this problem: firstly, those who are 
possessing or in a position of important knowledge, normally withhold 
such information for their own personal benefits. In the B-BBEE policy 
context, this means that they are the only ones who often benefit from 
government tenders, programmes, etc. This is possible because they are 
often the only ones who are in possession of accurate information which 
makes it easy for their family members or friends to access such 
opportunities. Secondly, there is no knowledge transfer because B-BBEE 
policy calls for transformation of government organizations. This means 
that government must introduce new ways of doing things, new cultural 
norms. In this context, B-BBEE policy challenges government officials to 
get out of their comfort zones. When this happens, the experienced and 
highly knowledgeable are afraid to transfer knowledge because they 
might lose out in the system unless there is something for them to benefit. 
Lastly, B-BBEE policy is fairly new and there are no precedents on key 
policy decisions. This means that there is no new organizational culture. It 
is a ‘trial and error’ process, and it imposes serious limitations because 
everybody is learning. 
KI: 1 suggested that: “B-BBEE policy invokes a lot of negatives emotions which 
serves as a barrier for knowledge transfer”. KI: 2 mentioned why this is so: 
BBEE policy is creating a lot of fear from many people. There are those 
who truly believe that B-BBEE policy was designed for black people to 
take over opportunities from other racial groups. On the other side, there 
are those among blacks who believe that they are entitled to certain 
opportunities. When this happens there is no way that there will be 
knowledge transfer. I also think that we have failed dismally as 
government in explaining the policy intentions for everybody to 
understand its intended objectives. This policy is associated with lot of 
myths, and unrealistic expectations.  
COMMENT: as explained previously, one of the objectives of B-BBEE policy is 
the issue of skills development for black people. However, these responses 
from the provincial officials clearly indicated that there was no knowledge 
transfer in the implementation of this policy. There was a very strong negative 
attitude towards this outcome of the policy on BBBEE. As a result the 
negativity expressed poses a real challenge for policy makers as well as for 
the public service leadership in general. The respondents’ contention and 
their strong sentiments can be interpreted in a number of ways: the level of 
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understanding of government officials about the intentions of the policy, and 
their role in driving the processes of policy implementation, which they 
believed is constrained by a regulatory environment that was not conducive 
to any strategic alternatives or innovation.  
(iii)  Regulatory environment not conducive to innovation. 
In terms of B-BBEE policy, government organizations are required to become 
integrated in order to serve the public. B-BBEE policy is specific on the 
questions of racial, ethnicity, gender, and cultural integration. Government 
departments are expected to design and adopt new strategies to achieve 
such integration despite various constraints in policy implementation. Public 
managers must be innovative in their quest to find solutions to complex social 
needs. The general explanations in this section reveal that the environment of 
government policy implementation was characterised by a complex of rules, 
regulations, and strategies which served as a barrier to policy innovation.  
In KI: 2’s estimation: 
The provincial government policy environment is littered with land mines 
of regulations which are serving as a barrier for B-BBEE policy innovation. 
This means that a policy programme must first pass through the 
compliance requirements no matter how good or relevant a programme 
might be. In this context, government officials are forced to take too 
much time trying to be compliant with regulations rather than 
concentrating on the implementation. The internal operations and 
processes are designed to serve compliance purposes rather than 
adding value to policy implementation.  
KI: 3 made the same point by emphasizing the importance of risk-taking:  
It is hard to be innovative when working for government. To me, 
innovation means designing new programmes or trying to come up with 
new policy alternatives to serve various community challenges. This 
means that one must be able to take risks and be able to experiment 
new initiatives. But how do you achieve this in government? In 
government there are clearly predetermined lines of practices which 
were not designed for innovation. These practices were designed for 
compliance and any perceived deviation from the standard practice is 
punishable or you may even face expulsion from the organization.  
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KI: 4 maintained that this is creating a culture in government where people 
are afraid to take risks, that “this is the reason why the implementation of 
government policy programmes becomes static and out-dated, which is 
defeating the very aim and objectives of B-BBEE policy”.  KI: 4 then offered an 
illustration:  
In government, the pursuit of new ventures must be done once an 
approval has been granted by the authorities or proper structures. 
Normally, the authorities would want to know how the new undertaking is 
relevant to one’s job function. The difficulty with this requirement is that it 
is not based on whether the proposed undertaking would add value to 
the organization or not. Instead they look for the availability of budget, 
time, political implications, and the mandate of the department. Broadly, 
they arrive at their decision on the basis of other considerations rather 
than on whether the proposed new project is innovative and will add 
value to the organization. To me, everything boils down to whether your 
manager is well conversant with the new subject that is before him or her. 
Unfortunately, most of the times good and innovative proposals often get 
disapproved by the authorities.   
COMMENT: There was evident agreement that existing processes undermine 
the success of BBBEE policy implementation in the province. The disjuncture 
between regulations, budgets, and processes was identified as a serious 
impediment to the success of BBBEE policy. The lack of innovation was 
considered as a barrier. The question, however, remains as to how innovation 
can become an integral part of a process that is not thoroughly rationalized 
in terms of administrative planning both within and across departments in the 
cluster. Possibly, this problem was connected to a lack of proper leadership 
and understanding of the policy by senior officials. This in turn affected the 
implementation of projects. 
(iv)  No relevant implementation projects     
The general views in this section revealed that a challenge with B-BBEE policy 
implementation in government was its lack of relevant implementation 
projects.   
KI: 4 said: 
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My organization has just adopted a moratorium on projects which are not 
regarded as priorities due to the financial crisis. Unfortunately, B-BBEE 
projects are not regarded as a priority due to scarce financial resources. 
The issue of skills development and the recruitment of B-BBEE target 
groups have been put on hold until the situation improves in the province. 
KI: 1 concurred: 
Every government department is expected to prioritise the most 
important projects for implementation. The general trend in my 
department is that projects such as skills development, recruitment, and 
all other B-BBEE related projects have been put on hold. This is because 
such projects are unfortunately not regarded as a priority. It is important 
that government chooses whether the majority of employees are 
retrenched or we cut back on certain projects. However, it is rather 
confusing to determine or distinguish which projects must be regarded as 
B-BBEE policy projects because government is all about helping people. 
To me, B-BBEE policy hopes to empower the community. This must be an 
enough evidence for such projects to be included as a priority. It is rather 
confusing as to when one implements B-BBEE policy as compared to the 
general government programme of action.  
KI: 2 doubted that a lack of financial resources was sufficient reason not to 
implement B-BBEE policy, maintaining that: “the justification that B-BBEE policy 
cannot be implemented due to financial crisis is a lie from those who are 
against the policy. How do they account for lack of government spending 
when a lot of money often goes back to treasury as an unspent budget or 
what has been termed as public savings?” 
KI: 3 took this argument a step further:  
B-BBEE policy implementation does not require money most of the time. 
Departments can organize their own internal staff development, and 
have community outreach programmes as part of their social 
development which is a requirement for B-BBEE policy. This can be done 
without spending anything. Furthermore, there are so many organizations 
that are available to team up with government to empower the 
community. The real problem is not lack of funds but rather the absence 
of ‘political will’ to drive the process of transformation.  
COMMENT: The realities of the austerity measures imposed on government 
spending by the Treasury for some time now could be partly due to the 
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International economic meltdown that has had serious implications for the 
country. This might be challenging the very foundation of the government 
strategy of empowerment. Government is about helping people, yet in the 
process of achieving its goals it faces constraints which are hindered by 
market failures. Government thus has to consider budget savings at the 
expense of undertaking its historical task of serving the public. Policy co-
ordination then becomes vital to help the problem of scarce resources. It 
remains to be seen whether policy co-ordination is indeed adopted by the 
state as part of its broad strategy for B-BBEE policy implementation. 
4.2 Policy co-ordination  
In terms of B-BBEE policy and its relevant strategies, government departments 
are required to co-ordinate B-BBEE policy implementation across 
organizational structures. This includes structures within departments and in 
interdepartmental relations. The central focus of this section is to understand 
the provincial government’s B-BBEE policy co-ordination. How did the 
respondents interpret their role in B-BBEE policy co-ordination? What does B-
BBEE policy co-ordination entail? Are these officials successful in carrying this 
task? And what are the obstacles to co-ordination?  
The questionnaire asked respondents: Is your organization succeeding in co-
ordinating key stakeholders on B-BBEE policy implementation? Figure 4.2 
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ordinating structures. These organizations prefer to operate on their own even 
when they are invited to participate at the provincial stage but they are just 
not interested”.  
KI: 2 observed that this seemed to be part of a larger problem about 
difficulties of co-ordination experienced by government: 
In the past several years the provincial government adopted what was 
called ‘Operation Sukuma Sakhe’ [a process whereby all the provincial 
departments were supposed to design and implement joint projects in 
priority areas]. Unfortunately, this initiative has be reorganized to what is 
called ‘the public service week’ which now only occurs during July to 
coincide with ‘Nelson Mandela birthday week’ This means that such an 
important project now happens once every year and there is no follow-
up on the key challenges on the ground. The problem here is that there is 
nobody driving or leading co-ordination.  
COMMENT: The general agreement amongst the respondents was that 
the provincial government has been somewhat successful in establishing 
structures for B-BBEE policy co-ordination, yet there was lack of buy-in by 
stakeholders.  The respondents suggested a lot of factors for this. Co-
ordination of B-BBEE policy in the province was officially structured 
through a B-BBEE implementation team. The implementation team’s co-
ordinating meetings are organized by a central unit or the Department 
of Economic Development and Tourism. It was clear from the findings 
that the various departments were not responsible for convening such 
meetings whether or not meetings which were pertinent to policy co-
ordination. This was linked to management within each department 
concentrating on its own interests or a silo approach to policy 
management, as some expressed it. 
(ii)  Problem of silo management 
KI: 2 provided an understanding of silo management: 
We are currently experiencing a problem of silo management mentality 
within the department. Silo management can be explained as a 
condition where interdependence of various components within the 
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organization is not recognised. There are clear set boundaries which are 
not informed by the broad organizational vision. In this situation people 
have their own defined priorities and resources which are not shared or 
benefiting the wider department. Additionally, this means that project 
implementation is carried out by individual components of the 
department even in conditions where team effort is required.  
KI: 4 concurred:  
Under the current B-BBEE policy implementation it is very difficult to 
achieve policy co-ordination because many organizations have created 
‘pigeon holes’. It is all about individuals, that is, who is controlling the big 
budget rather than inter-relationships between the stakeholders. In 
government, many people more especially the top management, have 
created their own ‘little empires’ where individual operations have 
become the order of the day.  
KI: 3 outlined the more general problem which has arisen: 
In terms of B-BBEE policy, government departments are required to 
provide enterprise development programmes, that is, small enterprise 
development (SMMEs), and co-operative development. In response to 
this requirement the province has established a lot of co-operatives, and 
SMMEs. There has been a roll-out of mentorship, and training 
programmes. Unfortunately, due to lack of B-BBEE policy co-ordination 
there is a lot of duplication. In this province, every department has its own 
mentorship programme that is supporting the development of co-
operatives and small enterprises. The problem with this is that it is one and 
the same urban individuals who are benefiting from this project, and 
unfortunately the rural areas are excluded in the process. This means that 
scarce resources are not properly distributed to meet the needs on the 
ground. The conditions in the province are such that there are shortages 
of skills. This means that policy co-ordination is very important to address 
the skills gap, though this is not happening in the province. This is the 
reason why there is no uniformity in the implementation of B-BBEE policy. 
Currently, people are adopting different approaches, which makes it 
difficult to learn from one another. 
COMMENT: The problem of silo management or lack of co-operation 
amongst different units within the provincial administration has been cited as 
a major problem that was inhibiting successful policy co-ordination. It was 
evident that B-BBEE policy co-ordination was further constrained by set 
boundaries which are not in line with a broad organizational vision. The 
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findings revealed that silo management was informed by individual 
management priorities which had nothing to do with broad organizational 
strategic goals. This affects the distribution of scarce resources which could 
benefit a number of different components. It must, rather, be pointed out 
that the admission by the respondents that such behaviour was not informed 
by government policy raises one fundamental problem faced by the 
provincial government on policy co-ordination. How can such behaviour be 
allowed when it is clearly affecting policy co-ordination? This can only be 
explained as a serious problem of organizational leadership rather than a 
policy co-ordination problem. In this context, individual interests have been 
allowed to supersede the broad organizational goals.  This begs the question 
as to how such individuals can account for policy implementation when their 
operations are driven by self-interest. This explains why there were those who 
believed that there was no point in participating in policy co-ordination in the 
province because there were no benefits from the process.   
 (iii)     There are no benefits from policy co-ordination  
Some respondents suggested that there was no need to participate in B-BBEE 
policy co-ordination processes because there was nothing to gain.  
KI: 2 said: 
I really see no need to work with other people in the province in terms of 
B-BBEE policy implementation. What do I benefit in return…a lot of 
complaints, frustrations, arguments and counter arguments? People like 
to debate but at the end of the day there is no clear programme of 
action coming out of it. I feel better when I’m working alone because I 
can design my own projects, implement them and monitor the progress. 
Co-ordination structures in the province are nothing but ‘talk shops’ 
where people vent their frustration. Sometimes I believe that people 
attend the meetings for somebody else to solve their problems rather 






KI: 4 concurred: 
Co-ordination processes are time-consuming and a waste of time. This is 
because there is no programme of action coming out of the process. Co-
ordination creates a very chaotic environment for power play among the 
stakeholders which is not conducive for policy implementation. B-BBEE 
policy is a ‘sensitive subject’ and there is a need for cool heads. Those 
who lead co-ordination processes in the province must have resources 
because other stakeholders do not have money to cover the costs. Those 
who are responsible for inviting others to the co-ordination table are left 
to cover all the costs. Many organizations are represented by junior 
employees who do not have the power to make important decisions. This 
makes our participation a waste of time because important matters are 
often referred to senior management for decision.    
KI: 3 supported these views: 
My experience tells me that officials across the public sector are reluctant 
to participate in co-ordination structures if there is nothing to gain from it. 
The situation is very difficult for B-BBEE policy because this policy is highly 
regulated and complex in its implementation. For example, much as we 
are expected to implement this policy at the provincial level, the 
amendment of the Act as well as national policy happens at the national 
level. This is creating a lot of frustration in the co-ordination structures 
because stakeholders raise a lot of valid concerns which needs 
amendment of regulations and strategies. However, the province does 
not have the legislative authority to amend the national policies. This 
creates a very bad situation for the provincial government because 
many people prefer to communicate directly with the national 
government. This undermines the provincial co-ordination initiatives.  
COMMENT: The lack of co-ordination processes in carrying out B-BBEE policy 
which were described as time consuming and ineffective indicates not only a 
lack of collaboration within government but also a lack of political will 
amongst some of the key role players in the implementation process. This is 
why some identified the absence of authority to enforce co-ordination as a 
central issue. 
(iv) Lack of authority to enforce co-ordination       
On such a lack of authority, KI: 3 said:  
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It is very difficult to co-ordinate the implementation of B-BBEE policy 
because there is no legislative authority to punish non-compliance. Things 
would have been much easier if there was co-operation between the 
stakeholders. Many organizations are not interested in working with each 
other on B-BBEE policy even when they have been invited to participate 
in co-ordination structures. The implementation of B-BBEE policy within 
government is dependent upon the good will of those committed to 
change. 
According to KI: 4: 
The problem is that legislation is ‘toothless’. The legislators are responsible 
for this problem and should have given more power and authority to 
government to enforce policy implementation. Currently, the only 
leverage at our disposal is the procurement of goods and services. Our 
approach is that we do not do business with anyone who is not B-BBEE 
compliant. However, those who are not doing business with government 
are left out to do as they please. My department has done everything 
possible in co-ordinating the key stakeholders on B-BBEE policy 
implementation, but stakeholders are failing to come on board. I do not 
have authority to enforce co-ordination. Sometimes I feel powerless. I’m 
responsible for B-BBEE policy co-ordination but my efforts are hampered 
by apathy of stakeholders. They are just not interested in adding value. 
Sometimes I feel that our efforts are sabotaged by those who are not 
committed to change.  
 COMMENT: The contention from the interviewees that B-BBEE policy lacks 
legislative authority to enforce co-ordination can be explained as their desire 
for the introduction of punitive measures for those who are not participating. 
Their understanding of a policy co-ordination process is one that is officially 
structured and led by a central unit or lead department. In this sense, policy 
co-ordination has been reduced to the official process, while other key 
substantial issues associated with BBBEE policy co-ordination have been 
ignored. This interpretation of policy co-ordination defines relationships 
amongst government departments. Consequently, if government 
departments fail to co-operate at a broad provincial level there is little 
prospect of policy co-ordination within individual departmental structures. To 
understand this challenge clearly, it is necessary to analyse the level of 
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racial participation. We can achieve this through understanding one 
another’s history, heritage, behaviour, and belief system. This can 
promote integration and tolerance in the work place and ultimately lead 
to real transformation within government.       
KI: 4 expressed the same views differently:  
My understanding of transformation is that it is not only about replacing 
white people by blacks. Transformation is not about the numbers game. 
We need a lot of cultural activities to promote diversity and tolerance 
amongst ourselves. The management has failed dismally in this respect. 
As a result, many experienced and highly skilful people have resigned 
because the working environment is not receptive to the new culture. My 
organization has changed in terms of numbers. We now have black 
people occupying senior positions. However, the old way of doing things 
is still the same. Much as discrimination laws were abolished, we are still 
treated as if we are still under apartheid. For example, the black 
employees are still sent to work in rural areas, while white employees are 
working in urban areas or going overseas to represent government. How 
many times have you seen the white teacher, nurse or doctor working in 
rural areas? There is none. This further manifests itself in the number of 
other ways such as the racial allocation of the department’s cars, 
computers, and office space. This is done on the basis of race. What is 
surprising is that even black managers are participating in this. This is to 
show that this culture is so entrenched and sophisticated.  
KI: 3 took this argument a step further:  
Organizational protocol is based on the old culture - it is the way things 
are done in the organization and it has been done this way throughout its 
history. It is common cause within the department that all the important 
tasks are based on organizational protocol or practice. My experience 
has taught me that once the issue of the protocol is raised, implicitly it 
means that we must ‘religiously’ implement it without any question 
because it is ‘dressed up ‘as a standard practice. Unfortunately, it is only 
those who have been in the department for a long time who are the 
‘point of reference’ for the organizational protocol. This means that there 
are ‘unwritten rules’ whereby new black recruits are not entrusted with 
certain important responsibilities. For example, it is a standard practice 
that only senior officials sit on procurement tender committees, 
recruitment committees, and executive committees. At the end of the 
day you read in the media that all government employees are corrupt 
because of nepotism and awarding tenders to friends and family 
members. The real problem within government is the ‘standard practices’ 
which are out-dated and irrelevant to current challenges. Lucrative 
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government tenders are still awarded to white consultants while cleaning 
and security tenders are awarded to blacks. This is done by the same old 
individuals who by virtue of their experience are serving as chairpersons of 
important internal committees.    
Summing up, KI: 1 said that: “what we have achieved through transformation 
is only the employment of blacks in key positions rather than the 
transformation of practices (protocol), and organizational culture”.  
COMMENT: One conclusion that can be drawn from the responses is that 
transformation within the provincial government has advanced beyond the 
issue of race based only on numbers of black people within government. 
Evidently, government is faced with difficult management challenges for 
transformation. In this context, there are no policy precedents on how to 
tackle complex transformation problems. Transformation processes within 
government are characterized by various interpretations and misconceptions 
which give rise to high expectations and diverse hopes. Government, then, 
has to manage not only the policy processes for B-BBEE but also complex 
expectations amongst public officials.  
(ii) Youth and women are still excluded 
The empowerment of women and youth is vital for B-BBEE policy. Importantly, 
B-BBEE policy regards youth and women as priority target groups for the 
empowerment programmes. The general view expressed here is that the 
level of unemployment amongst youth and women is very high, that even 
within government the empowerment of women and youth is still moving 
very slowly.  According to KI: 4: 
Over the past few years the provincial government has prioritised youth 
and women in a lot of its programmes. My only problem is that there is a 
lot of attention placed on youth and women towards and during the 
months of June and August. However, after the celebrations we are back 
to our normal ways until the following years. To me, youth and women 
empowerment have not been adopted as part of government core 
function. Instead, youth and women empowerment have become a tool 
for scoring political points. 
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KI: 2 noted the weaknesses in leadership and in recruitment practices in 
government: 
The problem which I do not understand is that the majority among youth 
have university degrees. However, the majority of them are unemployed. 
Many people within government have argued that unemployment 
among youth is due to lack of skills and experience. However, I disagree 
with this argument because when I joined this department I had no skills 
and experience but my manager was prepared to take a risk with me. 
The serious problem with B-BBEE policy is that we lack people who are 
prepared to take risks on transformation.  
COMMENT: The reasons advanced by the respondents indicate a very 
complex environment in which to implement transformation. Notably, public 
managers are faced with contradictory tasks to balance transformational 
needs against standard requirements for efficient and effective public 
service. In this instance, transformation means that there has to be patience 
and capacity building of new recruits who are from B-BBEE policy target 
groups. However, this can conflict with expectations of the public for quality 
services.      
(iii)  Blacks participate at the lower level of the organization  
The issue here is whether progress made in achieving transformation in KZN 
provincial government is not reflected in the more senior positions in 
departments. KI: 3 said: 
My understanding of a transformation policy such as B-BBEE is that the 
main intention is to change the organizational structures at all levels. This 
means that black people must be represented from the lower level to the 
top executive. In my organization, the majority of black people are in 
lower and middle management. Middle and lower levels are important. 
However, blacks must also be represented at senior strategic levels of the 
department. This is not transformation and we cannot safely say that 
transformation is taking place. As long as this continues, we cannot 
expect other sectors to transform when we are not leading by example.  
KI: 4 believed that government itself must set an example to other 
organizations: “the provincial government must have the moral authority for 
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other sectors to follow. This can only happen once we put our house in order 
in terms of transformation”. This requires strict measures, according to KI: 2: 
Government has legislative authority to ensure that transformation takes 
place. The problem with the South African government is that it is too soft 
when dealing with other sectors like businesses. For example, government 
has been struggling for the past years to ensure that the financial service 
sector is transformed. However, it is government who is the biggest banker 
in South Africa. There is nothing stopping government from allowing co-
operative and SMMEs to form co-operative banks like other countries. This 
can allow the state to move its finances to these banks. This could ensure 
that real transformation take place.  
COMMENT: The central theme of the responses here is that government 
was expected to do more than the hiring of black people to occupy 
key positions, important though this is. There were diverse views on how 
the state can live up to this expectation. Leadership and incentives 
emerged as key factors in furthering transformation in government, and 
by government.  
 (iv) transformation processes and procedures were not standardised 
Some difficulty in realizing transformation, it was noted, could be because 
organizational process and procedures were not standardised. In KI: 1’s view:  
My experience in this department is that there is no uniformity when it 
comes to our transformation processes and procedures. This is clear in our 
recruitment and procurement processes. My understanding of 
employment equity or affirmative action policy is that it must start by 
determining whether a person is suitable for the job first before we can 
apply other affirmative action measures. However, each individual 
government department is applying its own individual criteria. Other 
departments apply affirmative action measures before they can 
determine whether a person is suitable or not. There is a lot of confusion 
and different interpretation of transformation policies. Different 
interpretations of the policy have led to different applications of the 
policy. This in turn has given rise to sub-standard, mediocrity, and poor 
quality of public service. 
KI: 4 added that: “misinterpretation and inconsistency in the implementation 
of transformation policies has led to a wrong perception that every black 
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employee is an affirmative action candidate. This implicitly suggests that 
every black person is inefficient and not deserving to hold a key position in 
government. This generalisation is due to a lot of inconsistencies in the 
implementation of the transformation policy”.  
COMMENT: These respondents have taken the issue of transformation beyond 
the issue of race. They strongly believe that real transformation means an 
overhaul of organizational processes and procedures. Conversely, the 
responses also reveal a somewhat negative attitude towards the notion of 
transformation as it was apparent that most blacks do not want to be 
associated with having benefited from it. Importantly, it was clear that the 
respondents were well aware that transformation is often misunderstood to 
be associated with a lot of negative factors such as inefficiency, a poor work 
ethic and mediocrity. The link between transformation and performance was 
seen as an important, sensitive issue. Since transformation as enacted in B-
BBEE policy was not meant to imply inferior government performance, 
however, public managers were left to deal with such perceptions. It would 
therefore be worthwhile to understand organizational hierarchy in relation to 
B-BBEE policy implementation within the provincial government.      
4.4 Organizational hierarchy. 
It was noted earlier that B-BBEE policy implementation cuts across a variety of 
organizational structures. The management of B-BBEE policy implementation 
is complex as it requires synergy between various levels within government. 
This requires coherence and co-operation between the top (strategic 
management) and the operative employees (project management). This 
section analyses the relationship between the top executives and the 
operative employees in B-BBEE policy implementation. The questionnaire 
requested the respondents to consider the view that strategic B-BBEE policy 
decisions in their organizations were imposed by the top executives without 






































































































































executive without consultation, 20% of respondents indicated that 
organizational strategy was always driven from the top, 5% thought that it is 
the way the public service was structured, 5% suggested that the operational 
employees must comply with the top directive otherwise they would not 
know what to do. These factors were explored further in interviews: 
(i) Protocol dictates this 
The general view was that strategic B-BBEE policy decisions were imposed by 
the top executive management due to the dictates of organizational 
protocol. 
KI: 1 said: 
The top management would like us to believe that everything they do is 
based on the protocol. However, I reject this as it has nothing to do with 
the government protocol. In order to understand this you must look at the 
history of this province. Traditionally, the province has been run by the 
chiefs (amakhosi), this is why we have the House of Traditional Affairs. The 
top executive within government is following the same approach 
followed by the chiefs. They want to be worshipped like citizens and 
subjects all in the name of the protocol. A practical example of this and 
how bad the situation is, can be explained by the fact that when one 
manager in the line function is not available, nobody authorise anything. 
It is unbelievable that one document takes a month just for the signature. 
One wonders when the delegation of authority is followed by senior 
officials. This happens in the name of organizational protocol. This is 
against the principles of democracy. It is the old management approach 
which does not allow for consultation. In democracy, there is no way that 
strategic decisions must be taken without consultation and you then 
expect people to happily implement such decisions.  
KI: 4 agreed and stressed the fact that: “the imposition of decisions by the 
top management is what causes confusion and misunderstanding of B-BBEE 
policy implementation”.  
COMMENT: The hierarchy of a management structure is important for the 
functioning of government organizations. It was clear from the respondents 
that nobody doubts this reality. However, serious differences among the 
respondents were on the way in which strategic B-BBEE decisions were 
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imposed by the top executives. Notably, decisions were imposed without 
consultation due to organizational protocol. The general opinion was that this 
organizational protocol was out-dated and against the principles of 
democracy. The responses revealed that this makes it hard to monitor and 
evaluate B-BBEE policy implementation. The respondents were of the view 
that this approach causes confusion and misunderstanding on B-BBEE policy 
implementation. 
 (ii)  Strategy is always driven from the top  
The general view was that key strategic policy decisions were imposed by the 
top executives, which was not beneficial for policy implementation. KI: 4 said: 
The organizational strategy that is solely driven by the top executive is not 
good for B-BBEE policy implementation. The top executive is not always in 
touch with reality on the ground. As a result their decisions are irrelevant 
to the challenges. My experience is that the top management is always 
concerned with the budget. Due to this, our operations are determined 
by the budget. In the end, budget considerations determine the kind of 
projects we are implementing rather than the needs on the ground. This is 
what drives the management decisions rather than the strategy. Actually, 
the organizational strategy is formulated in such a way that it meets 
budget considerations rather than service delivery. 
More generally, KI: 1 argued that, “things could have been far better if the 
operative employees were also involved in making key strategic decisions”.  
KI: 4 believed that: 
If the operatives were involved in key organizational decisions, their 
project management experience can guarantee that management 
decisions are relevant to the challenges on the ground. This would 
improve the policy implementation. It is not every government project 
that requires resources. The inclusion of the operative employees would 
enable them to mobilise other stakeholders to join the government in 
fighting inequalities. This would make government achieve B-BBEE policy 
objectives.  
 KI: 1 took this argument a step further: 
To me the serious problem is how government conducts its business, more 
especially its policy planning. The situation within the provincial 
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government is very unusual. We start by submitting our project proposals a 
year in advance. The finance section often tells us to adjust our project 
proposals according to the budget baseline. Once this has been done, 
senior management organize their strategic session that is only attended 
by senior managers. This is followed by various sections’ strategic 
workshops. Can you imagine the waste of resources and time because 
there is nothing to be achieved by all these strategic meetings? At this 
stage all project plans for the following year had already been approved 
or rejected anyway. This happens way before the strategic planning 
sessions. In this context, strategic workshops become a ‘talk shop’ with 
nothing substantially coming out of the process.  
COMMENT: These arguments from the respondents reflected not only 
decision processes within government, but also policy planning. Notably, 
they suggested that government budget considerations take 
precedence over any policy programme. Consequently, good policy 
programmes get compromised due to budget constraints. Thus the 
respondents believe that policy decisions cannot only be informed by 
considerations based on resources. It must be remembered that policy 
decisions are more open ended, while projects are time bound and 
specific. It is at the project planning phase where and when resource 
considerations must inform decisions, which seemed to require project 
managers to make inputs. For these reasons, the respondents were 
aggrieved that government structures and standard practices 
undermine policy implementation.  
(iii)  It’s the way the public service is structured 
Government rules and regulations determine how government operates, 
which is why the upper echelon of a department dictates policy direction on 
B-BBEE. KI: 2 noted that: 
The public service is not the same as the private sector. There are lot of 
rules and regulations that we must abide by. This goes with a certain level 
of accountability. Senior management must ensure that there is 
accountability and we are expected to account to the provincial 
legislators. It is because of this balance that some people might view 
certain decisions as imposed. It’s not the imposing of decisions that is an 
issue, but it is about accountability. Can you imagine what happens if 
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everybody within the department can be allowed to make financial 
decisions? This department would be bankrupt. This is the reason why 
legislators needed to put in some check and balances. Obviously, when 
you are not within the management you would think that some decisions 
are imposed by the management.  
KI: 3 highlighted the following examples to justify why management must 
make strategic decisions: 
Legislation demands consultation during the policy formulation phase 
before a policy is submitted to cabinet for final approval. This process was 
done and completed. Now it is time for policy implementation. 
Management must make strategic decisions so that there is 
implementation. Management is now dealing with a process of B-BBEE 
policy implementation. This requires resources and accountability for all 
government expenditure. It is the duty of the management to ensure that 
it makes correct decisions and be accountable for such decisions. The 
management cannot consult every time it makes decisions. This is the 
way the public service operates. It is the role of the operational 
employees to implement government projects which are informed by 
government policies. It is the role of the operative officials to consult with 
stakeholders on the ground and deal with challenges in consultation with 
the management. However, they cannot be consulted each time senior 
management makes strategic decisions. Senior management is always 
there to make resources available for them to perform their duties.  
However, KI: 4 took a different view: 
It is within the top management’s rights to make strategic decisions. 
However, in the process of making such decisions, they must consult 
relevant people. This would allow the management to make informed 
decisions. The vital expertise within the organization might be at the policy 
implementation phase. Consultation might assist the top executive to tap 
various experts at all levels of the organizational hierarchy. Imposing 
decisions from the top is what informs current B-BBEE policy failures. For 
example, management always imposes or hires a lot of unskilled 
consultants to perform very important tasks within the department. The 
quality of work done by these consultants is very poor and in most cases 
the consultants do not have a clue of what they are supposed to do. 
Who must be blamed here? Is it the consultants or management for 
imposing these people in the name of unquestionable protocol? 
Obviously, management must take blame for this. 
COMMENT: The responses in this section revealed that the working 
relationship between the top executive and operative employees within 
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the provincial government was centralized according to official 
structures. Importantly, it was clear from the responses that decisions 
within the provincial government flow from the top executives 
downwards through the entire organization. In this context, each 
individual component is forced to follow its functional line without 
intruding on other levels.  This made it difficult to respond appropriately 
to the challenges on the ground. The respondents believe that because 
of this nature of decision making, B-BBEE policy decisions were not 
always relevant to the needs on the ground. According to the 
respondents, senior management were of the view that such decision-
making was carried out with good intentions in order to allow the 
executives to mobilize resources in order to enable the operatives to 
concentrate on policy implementation.  
(iv) Operative employees must comply with directive from the top 
Some respondents suggested that strategic B-BBEE policy decisions were 
imposed from the top because the operative employees must comply with 
such directives, otherwise they would not know what to do.  KI: 3 said: 
My organization is using a top-down approach on key decisions. 
However, sometimes staff meetings are organized where major 
announcements are made to the general staff. There is no opportunity to 
make suggestions, in the meeting, and even if you do make a suggestion, 
what is the point? After all, serious decisions have already been made. I 
sometimes get a feeling that people are afraid to challenge or raise a 
counter viewpoint. 
In KI: 2’s estimation, “the imposition of key strategic decisions is happening to 
the extent that we are required to implement whatever the management 
wants even when we can tell such decisions are going to fail. There are 
government decisions or projects which are imposed as ‘special projects’. 
Everybody knows that when it is a ‘special project’ you must not ask a lot of 
questions, otherwise you will find yourself in trouble”. 
According to KI: 4, the top-down style of management can cause wider 
problems: “it is difficult to implement policy decisions which are imposed from 
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the top because the public always need more information which cannot be 
obtained from the operative employees. This is what is creating an 
unnecessary public uprising against the slow pace of service delivery. This 
problem can be solved through the democratization of decision making 
processes across the organizational value chain”.   
COMMENT: Despite the occasional disagreement among respondents, there 
were strong feelings about the negative effects of the hierarchical 
administrative system operating within the provincial government. A sizeable 
proportion of the respondents felt particularly aggrieved by this reality as 
they see themselves as “outsiders” and not as part of decision-making on B-
BBEE policy.  
Government officials believed that the strict hierarchical structures dictated 
that they were obligated to follow strategic decisions that were imposed on 
them by superiors irrespective of the expected outcomes.  Executive ‘special 
projects’ were supposed to be implemented irrespective of the risks involved. 
Even so, organizational decisions do not occur in a vacuum; they need to be 
communicated to the entire organization. It is, therefore, important to 
understand how the implementation of B-BBEE policy is communicated by 
government, and within government. 
4.5 Policy communication 
How did the respondents interpret their role in relation to B-BBEE policy 
communication? The questionnaire requested the respondents to respond to 
the statement, that without communication, there can be no proper 
management of B-BBEE policy implementation for there is no possibility then 
of the group influencing the behaviour of the individual. As Figure 4.8 shows, 



















































































40% of the respondents believed that communication did not contribute to B-
BBEE project implementation, whereas 35% thought that there was a lack of 
critical engagement with issues on B-BBEE policy communication. 20% of the 
respondents considered that communication was not effective because it 
was centralized at the top echelon of the organization, while according to 
5% communication was lacking because there were no collaborative 
initiatives. These views were further explored in more detail in the interviews. 
(i)  Not contributing to project implementation  
On whether implementation of B-BBEE projects was hampered by a lack of 
communication within the provincial government, KI: 1 said: 
The need for resources in the implementation of B-BBEE projects is always 
high. The level of poverty and unemployment cannot be solved by 
government alone. This needs joint efforts from all the stakeholders. 
However, joint efforts means that government must be able to 
communicate clearly at all levels. I think this is where we are failing 
dismally. There are a number of good projects proposals requiring 
funding. The problem is that our source of funding is government alone. 
Things would have been much better if the stakeholders were on board. 
At the same time we cannot blame other stakeholders when government 
lacks a proper communication strategy. 
KI: 3 supported this view, noting that “communication is a very cheap form of 
project implementation. It is cheap and not costing a lot of money because 
stakeholders are always ready to help when government takes its leadership 
role”. KI: 4 believes that the problem with “government officials is that they 
are always interested in the issuing of instructions rather than working with 
stakeholders on an equal footing”.   
According to KI: 2: 
My experience in government is that communication is not contributing 
to project implementation. Actually, communication or lack of 
communication is affecting project implementation. Many government 
policies, more especially B-BBEE policy, are very technical and complex 
to be understood by the stakeholders. The situation is even worse for the 
poor who are unable to read and write. For example, in terms of B-BBEE 
policy, the marginalised are regarded as the policy target group. This 
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means that they must be prioritised in all government opportunities. But 
how can we achieve this when all these opportunities are advertised in 
urban newspapers? Furthermore, we as government often communicate 
through English language, and worse we make use of websites, Internet, 
and emails as a tool for communication. The problem with this is that 
none of the B-BBEE policy target group has access to our communication 
tool. This is the reason why B-BBEE policy has been challenged for being 
elitist and privileges the urban class. 
COMMENT: The respondents understood the broad policy imperatives 
which must be converted into implementable programmes, which 
requires communication by various components within the organization. 
The respondents emphasized the importance of communication as a 
broad strategy for policy implementation within government. But 
communication was very poor. This was explained as a challenge that 
manifests itself in a number of ways within government: an inability to 
mobilize stakeholders in a joint programme of action and an inability to 
transmit key information to B-BBEE target groups. This leads to lack of 
critical engagement with B-BBEE policy issues. 
(ii) Lack of critical engagements with issues 
Perhaps the problems of communication within government were not 
informed by the lack of communication strategy per se, but rather though a 
lack of critical engagement with B-BBEE policy issues. KI: 4 said that:  
The serious problem with B-BBEE policy is lack of engagement with critical 
policy issues. Communication is not a problem. Everybody is aware of this 
policy. However, few people are aware of its intentions. The debate and 
discussion on this policy is too elitist, and people who are complaining 
about the policy are advancing their own personal interests. The majority 
of people are left out in the current debate. It’s only the sophisticated 
urban élite leading a one-sided debate. The policy was intended to 
benefit the poor, and there is no discussion on this important aspect. 
Communication on B-BBEE is always about prominent individuals 
benefiting big deals. 
KI: 1 suggested that,” the serious mistake by government is that every time we 
react to criticism, we are often very defensive about B-BBEE policy discussion. 
This approach is often misinterpreted as if we have something to hide. We 
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have not yet adopted a proactive step to communicate clearly the real 
intentions of B-BBEE policy”. KI: 3 believed that government must 
“decentralize the communication division from the top level. This will help to 
depoliticise the debate on B-BBEE policy. It will further redirect the focus to 
the real intentions of the policy. Government needs to consider designating 
the professionals to serve as communication champions for B-BBEE policy 
communication”.  KI: 2 concluded that “government should consider issuing 
regular communication feedbacks. This would allow government employees 
to make a contribution to the implementation of the policy. This can serve as 
an important communication and educational tool”. 
COMMENT: The centralization of communication in government departments 
cannot be used as an excuse for an internal failure to engage in constructive 
debates on policy issues. Notwithstanding the centralization of 
communication at the top, the respondents agreed that they were able to 
communicate on social issues. Clearly, the respondents do have flexibility to 
communicate with each other, but this does not seem to have translated into 
policy discussion. This problem can be interpreted in a number of ways. 
Notably, this indicates the lack of interpretation of communication within 
government. The meaning and interpretation of communication given was 
that policy discussions were officially located in government structures even 
in situations when it involved individual members of one department or 
government organization. This problem might result from entrenched 
practices within the provincial government that everything that was 
considered to be official was automatically elevated to belong to top 
management.  
 (iii)    Communication is centralized at the top echelon 
On the issue that B-BBEE policy communication was not effective because it 
was centralized at the top echelon, KI: 2 commented that:  
Government communication on B-BBEE issues is not effective because it is 
centralized at the top, that is, in the Minister’s office as well as in the office 
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of the head of the department. The senior government officials are 
interested in the political implications of policy communication rather 
than the technical policy aspects. At the end of the day, there are a lot 
of misconceptions and misinterpretations of the policy. The only way of 
addressing misconception of the policy is to allow the professionals within 
government to raise technical policy issues. Currently, this is not what is 
happening. Instead there is a growing confusion which is causing a lot of 
unnecessary emotion and unrealistic expectations. 
According KI: 4: 
Government, to a certain extent, has been successful in B-BBEE policy 
implementation. For example, black people are now occupying key 
positions within government as well as within most of the state-owned 
enterprises where the majority of chief executives officers are blacks. 
However, there is a wrong perception out there that B-BBEE policy is all 
about political connections. This problem is created by our own senior 
leaders including our politicians who have centralized communication at 
the top. Government communication is centralized in such a way that it is 
difficult to raise any intellectual debate. 
 KI: 1 argued that what informs the centralization of communication is that:  
A standard practice within my department is that any communication 
information has to go through the internal communication section. The 
internal communication section often has a final say of what get 
transmitted. Nobody is allowed to have interviews with the media or write 
media articles unless there is authorisation from the internal 
communication section. The problem with this is that there is no room to 
critique government policy. To me, this approach amounts to censorship 
because nobody dares to criticise the state from within. 
COMMENT: There were strong views that the location of communication in 
provincial government was a cause of its failure. It is important to draw a 
distinction between communication that is directed to the public outside 
government, as opposed to communication that flows within government 
structures. This study focuses on communication within government structures. 
Is the location of communication within government a barrier for policy 
implementation? Significantly, the top executives can control all the internal 
communication tools such as emails, Internet, and so on. However, these are 
not the only forms of communication at the disposal of government 
employees. There are a number of other forms of communication that can 
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be utilized which are not controlled by the top executives, for example, 
sectional meetings, and informal interaction between and among 
government employees. Possibly the final decision on government projects 
should at least be based on some communication among members of a 
sectional unit, since this is where operative employees should be able to 
undertake collaborative initiatives and be able to influence strategic 
direction for policy implementation. 
(iv) Lack of collaborative initiatives 
Communication on B-BBEE policy could be lacking because there were no 
collaborative initiatives in policy implementation. On this, KI: 3 said:  
It is clear that communication within government is lacking. Otherwise we 
would have a lot of collaborative initiatives with key stakeholders. My 
understanding of B-BBEE policy is that it seeks to transform the way we 
operate. This requires a lot of communication and collaborative initiatives 
from various government departments. Unfortunately this is not what is 
happening in the implementation. Even our own public entities are not 
sure what is expected of them in terms of B-BBEE policy implementation, 
and I’m sure that they are also not sure about our operations. What is 
even more surprising is that you read in the news about B-BBEE policy 
developments in your own department like everybody else.  
KI: 1 in support of this view noted that: 
The proper communication channels on B-BBEE policy can help to create 
collaborative initiatives with stakeholders to achieve joint government 
projects to maximise the impact on the ground. This would advance the 
aims and objectives of the policy on B-BBEE. Historically, many 
stakeholders in South Africa are not used to working together. 
Collaborative initiatives will help to change the wrong policy perceptions. 
But KI: 4 suggested that, “for collaborative initiatives to happen, government 
should drive the process. There is no way that stakeholders can work together 
unless communication channels are open. Currently, government is more 
concerned about lack of policy implementation by other stakeholders rather 
than improving its own message on B-BBEE policy”. 
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COMMENT: The responses illustrate that communication has not formed a 
central role in the broad strategy for implementing B-BBEE policy. 
Communication within government serves political aims rather than 
contributing to policy success. Government officials maintained that there 
was no other form of communication except one that flows from the top 
downwards through the organization. However, their acknowledgement that 
they were able to communicate on social issues contradicted this 
contention.  In the end, the means and channels of communication in this 
cluster had an impact on collaboration in relation to implementing B-BBEE 
policy.    
4.6 Conclusion 
The findings on the ESID cluster highlighted a number of organizational issues. 
What has been learned thus far regarding the cluster’s management of B-
BBEE policy implementation? The findings in this cluster reveal that 
implementation of B-BBEE policy was characterised by contradictions and 
conflicting mandates. The provincial government was often required to 
report and account to a multiplicity of structures. This included national and 
provincial government departments which often issued conflicting and 
sometimes contradictory instructions. This has given rise to incoherent B-BBEE 
policy implementation. It also emerged from the data presented that the 
situation was compounded by power relations among government 
organizations. Thus, those who controlled government resources determined 
the rules of engagement. This created a policy implementation environment 
which lacks innovation and knowledge transfer. As a result, this limits the 
provincial government’s ability to design and implement relevant B-BBEE 
policy programmes.      
The provincial government has been successful in setting up structures for B-
BBEE policy co-ordination. The findings showed the existence of a B-BBEE 
policy implementation team whose task was to co-ordinate B-BBEE policy 
throughout the province. However, the findings also revealed that this 
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caused a lot of policy operational problems. Notably, B-BBEE implementation 
team meetings were organized and led by one central department. Other 
government organizations did not influence the agendas of such meetings or 
were able to take leadership in organizing co-ordinating meetings. Thus, 
policy co-ordination was officially structured, but lacked buy-in from other 
government departments. It also emerged that many role players in this 
cluster have adopted a silo approach to management, which served as a 
barrier for policy co-ordination. Therefore, many in this cluster came to adopt 
individual priorities which were not informed by the province’s strategic 
approach. Many believed that there was no need to continue participating 
in the provincial policy co-ordinating structures because there was nothing to 
gain from the process. At the same time there was nothing to justify that a silo 
approach to management was any better. This is the reason why many in the 
cluster indicated that B-BBEE policy lacks legislative authority to enforce 
policy co-ordination.  
What has been learned about the level of transformation in this cluster? There 
was an overwhelming sense of agreement that the provincial government 
has been successful in providing job opportunities for black people, Africans 
in particular. The majority of Africans now hold key strategic positions in 
government. However, the cluster found that the provincial government was 
faced with difficult transformation challenges. Respondents indicated that 
there were no standard precedents on how to tackle complex 
transformation problems. In their view, government officials were having to 
deal with serious contradictions and high expectations and were often 
challenged by the circumstances to manage such contradictions. 
Expectations were often informed, at times, by misconceptions, and diverse 
interpretations of B-BBEE. The situation was further complicated because 
transformation processes and procedures were not standardized. The 
general feeling in this cluster was that the provincial government has failed to 
transform the organizational processes and procedures. In particular, many 
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thought that the organizational culture remained much the same, and was 
not responsive to the new challenges. 
On the hierarchy of decision-making in this cluster, findings revealed that key 
strategic B-BBEE policy decisions were imposed by the top executives without 
any consultation. There were diverse views as to why this happened. The 
general view was that this was dictated by the organizational protocol. 
Organizational protocol was structured in a way that allowed the executive 
to account when they are called upon by the legislators. Furthermore, 
members of the cluster suggested that it was the role of the executive 
management to mobilize resources so that operatives were able to 
concentrate on project implementation. This was based on the 
understanding that the organizational strategy must always be driven by the 
top executives. The senior managers in the cluster believed that the nature of 
the public service determined that certain decisions could not be discussed 
openly with everybody in the organization. But because B-BBEE policy 
decisions were hierarchically structured this served as a hindrance to B-BBEE 
policy implementation.    
What was learned about B-BBEE policy communication in this cluster? There 
was a common understanding that communication is important for 
government’s purposes in policy implementation, but the findings revealed 
that the provincial government was failing to meet this expectation. 
Communication was not assisting the broad strategy for programme 
implementation. As result, government officials were unable to engage with 
each other on policy problems. In the end, there was a lack of collaborative 
initiatives. This manifested itself in an absence joint programmes of action to 
deal with B-BBEE policy challenges. The location of communication at the top 
level was seen as an inhibiting factor in this cluster. This meant that 
government officials concentrated on the political implications of B-BBEE 
rather than on policy implementation. 
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 The following chapter investigates the same five main themes in relation to 


























Governance and Administration cluster 
Introduction 
This chapter reports findings on the Governance and Administration cluster in 
the provincial government of KwaZulu-Natal. It is organized along the lines of 
the previous chapter, that is, according to the five main themes, which are 
managing policy implementation, policy co-ordination, organizational 
transformation, organizational hierarchy, and policy communication. 
Information gained from the questionnaire undertaken with government 
officials from all components in the cluster was then extended in interviews 
with Key Informants. The chapter begins with the profile of the cluster itself. 
The profile, role and structure of the cluster 
The Governance and Administration cluster comprises the following 
provincial government departments: office of the premier, provincial 
treasury, co-operative governance & traditional affairs, community safety 
and liaison. This cluster deals with government policy co-ordination, 
administration as well as implementation.  
Each government department is represented in the cluster by its head of the 
department. The cluster management team whose role is to align and 
strengthen inter-sphere and inter-sectoral relations, designs the cluster’s 
programme of action, provides synergy in provincial policy administration, 
and establishes a government-wide policy performance monitoring and 
evaluation system. 
The cluster has the power to invite anyone it deems relevant to submit 
strategic reports. The cluster also has the power to make strategic policy 
decisions which are submitted as recommendations to the provincial 
cabinet. Government departments and public entities regularly submit 
progress reports on B-BBEE policy implementation.  
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Demographic characteristics of the sampled population 
The following table reveals the demographic and professional profile of the 
respondents in this cluster. 
Table: 5.1. G&A cluster: race, occupational level and gender of management 




African Asian/Indian Coloured White Total 


















Director 1 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 5 
Deputy 
Director 
2 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 
Executive 
Manager 
0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Specialist 2 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 6 
Administrator 1  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Overall 6 9 2 1 0 1 0 1 20 
 
The majority of the respondents were African, that is, 15 or 75%, who were 
represented at all levels of the management structure. The remaining five 
were one Coloured, three Asians, mostly in senior positions, and one White, a 
specialist. 
In terms of gender, there were eight females, five of whom were either a 
Director or Deputy Director, which almost matched the number of males – six 
- of equivalent rank. 






Table 5.2. G&A cluster: work experience of management employees (n=20) 
Years of experience Number of respondents 
+20 5 
11 to 20 9 
6 to 10 4 
0 to 5 2 
 
This was an experienced group of officials with a considerable number of 
years in government, 14 of them having served 11 years or more, and a 
further four between six and ten years. Their age is revealed in Table 5.3: 
Table 5.3. G&A cluster: age profile of management employees (n=20) 
Age (years) Number of employees 
20 to 29 4 
30 to 39 6 
40 to 49 8 
50 to 60 2 
 
Eight officials, 40%, were in their forties, with another two a decade older. Six 
more were 31-40 years old, and four were still in their twenties. Most of them 
were relatively young, all were well qualified as Table 5.4 shows, with every 






Table 5.4. G&A cluster: educational qualifications of management employees (n=20) 





What were the views and experiences of these ably qualified management 
government employees concerning the application of B-BBEE policy within 
the provincial government? The chapter now proceeds to discuss each of 
the major themes: 
5.1 Managing policy implementation 
In response to the general question about how the cluster manages B-BBEE 
policy implementation, KI: 5 explained that: 
The Governance and Administration cluster provides human resources 
development in the province. In the B-BBEE policy context, this means 
that we must develop the provincial strategic programmes for skills 
development for the historically disadvantaged group. B-BBEE policy 
regards skills development as the key component in the empowerment of 
the marginalised group. We also manage government employment 
equity policy. The employment equity policy was introduced so that there 
is equity in the workplace.  
KI: 6 added that “our role is bigger than just public administration because it is 
our responsibility to transfer government policies into implementation 
projects. We decide on the budget allocation, design and implement the 
priority projects.  However, this must be in line with the Ministers’ strategic 
priorities”.  According to KI: 7, “it is my belief that our role as black people 
working for government is bigger than what is stated in government official 
documents. We must be the agents of change. I see myself as part of broad 
society who must ensure that the public receive quality services. This means 
that in pursuing my duties in government I must be biased to their needs”.   
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On the challenges facing them, KI: 8 said: 
My experience working for government is that one does not have 
enough options to exercise your skills. Government operations are highly 
regulated. Everything is designed in such a way that you must seek 
approval from the authority before every action. Moreover, there are still 
a lot of inflexibilities in transforming government systems, structures, 
organizational culture, and acceptance of new ways of doing things. We 
experience a lot of frustration due to government systems. It is very hard 
to pursue new initiatives in government because one needs a lot of 
‘paper work’ in trying to convince ‘old’ people who are used to do things 
in a particular way. In government, it takes about four to five months 
before your idea is approved or mostly gets rejected. To me, government 
systems have converted us into ‘paper trailers’ or ‘typists’ with little room 
to exercise our skills. We constantly had to abide by government rules 
and regulations. As a result there is no improvement of our services. 
In KI: 5’s view: 
It is very difficult to do your work in this cluster. This is due to the fact that 
most of our policies come directly from national government 
departments. Our job is to implement national policies, but there is a 
problem of conflicting instructions and priorities between various spheres 
of government. Normally, the national government issues instructions to 
the provincial government and we are often expected to implement 
such instructions without any questions. This is the same approach 
followed by the provincial government when it comes to local 
government. This creates an unnecessary tension and incoherency in 
government operations.  
COMMENT: The Governance and Administration cluster has a dual role, 
dealing with governance related functions while at the same time providing 
administration, attempting to combine both functions effectively and 
efficiently. The success of the cluster is instrumental in shaping and elevating 
human resources development in the province. The combined functions, 
then, demand that the political imperatives and the provincial strategic 
programmes for skills development for the historically disadvantaged groups 
need to be integrated with sound administrative performance and 
competence. A B-BBEE policy-infused strategy would ultimately lead to 
advanced and comprehensive skills development as the key component in 





















































































































































































































we are suffering unintended policy consequences. For example, B-BBEE 
policy prescribes that whenever we are visiting or implementing the 
empowerment projects in historically disadvantaged areas, we must 
ensure that we procure services from local businesses so that they benefit 
economically from these opportunities. However, it is impossible to 
achieve this because many business people in these underdeveloped 
areas are not registered with government data base systems. The data 
base system is controlled at the provincial level. It is against government 
policies to procure services from unregistered suppliers. This means that 
government must bring in suppliers from urban areas for business 
opportunities that would under normal circumstances be given to local 
communities. This is a serious contradiction, because B-BBEE policy intends 
to empower ordinary poor people in rural areas.  
Another respondent, KI: 7 indicated that “South African structures and 
process were not designed to serve the majority. This was why the majority 
were excluded by the government system”.   
According to KI: 6,  
When I joined government, I thought I will be able to operate freely in 
serving my community. However, I have since realised that everything in 
government is dependent upon government systems. No matter how 
competent you might be, there are always contradictions in government 
systems. I have learned that it is ‘safe and better’ to comply with 
government policies. Unfortunately, this compromises key service delivery 
to poor communities.   
KI: 8 added: 
B-BBEE policy processes are highly regulated to the extent that it is 
impossible to achieve its aims and objectives. The example for this is its 
compliance targets for empowerment. Many people are choosing to 
meet the set compliance targets even in conditions where they can go 
beyond such targets. In other instances people would want to meet 
transformation policy targets without transforming the system. At the end 
of the day transformation becomes a ‘smoke screen’ with no impact on 
the lives of its target group. 
COMMENT: The fact that implementation structures and processes were 
outdated and rigid emerged from the examples cited by public officials 
based on their experience, especially in relation to rural areas. The admission 
that B-BBEE policy governance and models were weak is not only a serious 
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indictment of policy makers who design, plan and pass laws, but principally 
of the administrative arm of government which is obliged by law to apply 
them. This makes it difficult to achieve the objectives of B-BBEE policy. But the 
rigidity of policy processes and procedures is perhaps not the only reason for 
failure of policy implementation, as most respondents acknowledged that 
their role was more than government administration, since they have the 
power to convert government policies into implementable projects. Maybe it 
is within their brief to streamline outdated and rigid policies. If so, the 
approach taken to policy implementation could be changed. For instance, 
there is nothing in the policy that stops government officials from registering 
additional suppliers from rural areas in the data base systems so that they 
could benefit from business opportunities. 
(ii) B-BBEE governance models are weak 
The second line of reasoning was that governance models for implementing 
B-BBEE policy are weak. In KI: 5’s view:  
To me, a B-BBEE policy governance model means the best practices for 
successful policy implementation. There are no best practices in the 
current B-BBEE policy implementation. Many government departments 
have tried to introduce various methods for implementation but these 
methods are weak or ineffective in achieving the intended aims and 
objectives of the policy.  I think one of the serious mistakes we are making 
is to try to adjust old practices into the new approaches. Maybe the best 
way is to try something new, but the problem with that is that there are 
too many old people who have been working for government for too 
long. Old people always try to influence the policy direction in a 
particular long established ways. This is why we are stuck with weak B-
BBEE policy governance models.  
KI: 8 suggested that “the problem with the weak governance model is 
informed by the fact that B-BBEE policy is new, therefore nobody has 
implementation experience. Even senior officials are still learning and what 
makes matters worse is the ‘sensitivity’ around the policy. Everybody is trying 




But how new the policy is, is not the real problem, according to KI: 7: 
To me the reason why governance models for B-BBEE policy are weak is 
not because of lack of experience. In government, we all know that we 
must develop and empower those who were discriminated against 
during apartheid. You don’t need experience to understand this reality, 
and many people within government are from the historically 
disadvantaged group. They are therefore aware of the challenges on the 
ground. To me the serious problem why governance models are weak is 
because of ‘lack of political will’ or desire to develop the community. 
People are so preoccupied with their own personal interest or personal 
benefit at the expense of developing the community.  
KI: 6 expressed the same view that “the reason why governance models for 
B-BBEE policy were weak was because nobody cares anymore about the 
plight of the poor. Officials were interested in getting tenders for themselves 
and their friends. These officials are aware that if governance models are 
strong there would be no room to enrich themselves”.    
COMMENT: B-BBEE policy has been implemented since the enactment of B-
BBEE Act 53 of 2003. Therefore the policy is no longer new. The one 
respondent’s contention that the serious challenge is government’s 
approach of attempting to adopt old practices for new purposes is thought-
provoking. Essentially, this contradicts the entire aim and objectives of B-BBEE 
policy. Transformation policies were introduced for organizational change, 
not only to change the racial profile of public officials but in order to overhaul 
its practices and procedures as well. This indicates that government faces 
serious contradictions in the field of implementation. It is therefore important 
when considering the implementation of B-BBEE policy to understand the 
policy choices and the level of capacity in the provincial government.     
(iii) Implementation of B-BBEE policy is discretionary     
According to some respondents the implementation of B-BBEE policy was 
discretionary which makes it more difficult to enforce. KI: 8 said: 
The implementation of B-BBEE policy is dependent upon the ‘good will’ of 
those who are in charge of various organizations in the province. 
Government uses procurement of goods and services as a leverage to 
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enforce B-BBEE policy implementation. However, those organizations that 
are not doing business with government see no need to implement the 
policy. This means that ‘big’ businesses such as multinational corporations, 
and big ‘guns’ within the financial services are left out. This makes this 
policy a ‘joke’. Things would have been much better if there was 
legislative authority to fine or punish all those who are non-compliant with 
the policy.   
The respondent KI: 5 stressed: “I wish that there was a way where we could 
name and shame all those organizations that are not compliant with the 
policy”. Perhaps compliance would lessen the margins of profit. KI: 6’s 
argument suggests this:   
The main challenge we face in the implementation of B-BBEE policy is 
informed by an unfortunate issue of ‘greediness’ of role players. People 
are so preoccupied by unlimited desire for profit accumulation. Many 
people are no longer interested in helping others without expecting 
anything in return. The African ‘spirit of Ubuntu’ is long gone and was 
replaced by greediness.  What can you say? In 1994 when we accepted 
democracy we implicitly also accepted the free market economic 
system. How do we interfere with the market when we want to appease 
foreign investors? We decided to follow the liberal economic system at 
the expense of development.   
COMMENT: The perception that policy implementation in relation to B-BBEE is 
discretionary was mostly directed at the private sector and is seen as a key 
ingredient which limits transformation in several sectors of the economy. 
Many government departments have argued that it is impossible to enforce 
policy implementation of B-BBEE with regard to private sector companies 
which are not doing business with government. Government uses 
procurement as leverage to enforce B-BBEE policy implementation. But it can 
only do so selectively. It is in this sense that government officials understood B-
BBEE policy to be discretionary.  
(iv) Lack of specialist skills in implementing policy 
Perhaps a lack of specialist skills served as a barrier to the implementation of 
B-BBEE with the provincial government. KI: 5 said: 
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B-BBEE policy cuts across a number of functions within my department. 
This includes human resources, procurement, enterprise development, 
and legal services, and so forth. There is one senior official designated to 
serve as B-BBEE champion. This official initially was not responsible for this 
function as he was hired to perform other functions. However, later he 
was reassigned for the B-BBEE function. I have realised that this is the 
standard practice for most government departments. It is assumed that 
those officials, who have been in the organization for a long time, 
understand the internal policy implementation dynamics better, therefore 
can implement this policy accordingly. But the problem is lack of B-BBEE 
policy implementation experience or qualification among those who 
have been designated to be responsible for B-BBEE policy 
implementation.  
KI: 7 stressed the need for technical expertise: “…The problem with B-BBEE 
policy is that it is highly technical, and if you read it, it is clear that it was 
written by the accountants, etc. What make matters worse is that there is no 
tertiary institution in the country which is offering B-BBEE policy as a course. 
The DTI is only now starting to form partnerships with tertiary institutions that 
are prepared to teach B-BBEE policy as one of their official subjects”.  
The KI: 8 highlighted this broad concern: 
The difficulty with transformation processes in the country is that there is 
nobody who has the necessary experience, and the policy is ‘sensitive’ 
and raises a lot of emotions. Even highly experienced officials do not 
have transformation track records due to the apartheid past. Many 
officials are appointed to lead the process of transformation because 
they are black. The assumption is that a black person is better suited to 
implement this policy rather than possessing necessary skills. This is 
creating a major problem because the colour of the skin does not mean 
competency. A person can be black, yet still fail to achieve anything. 
Skills and experience can be gained from elsewhere, maintains KI: 7: 
Government has not adopted a strategy where we educate government 
officials on B-BBEE or learn from other countries that have gone through 
the same process of transformation. In this country, B-BBEE policy is 
implemented as if South Africa is the first country to have gone through 
the process of transformation. My conviction is that there are many 
countries that have gone through similar experiences. We can therefore 
draw a lot of experience from these countries to solve our own problems.  
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COMMENT: Staff inefficiency, mainly associated with a lack of skills and 
knowledge of different governance and administrative positions, can be 
described as a legacy of the past, but not entirely so as emerged from the 
interviews where other limitations were identified. Specialist skills on B-BBEE 
policy implementation could also be acquired through particular education 
and training, as well as from learning from how other countries carried out 
policies of transformation. Skills development is an important element of B-
BBEE policy implementation, but this is linked to other organizational issues like 
career advancement and promotion. These are all important organizational 
issues which are necessary for human resources development for any 
organization, even for those which are not dealing with the complicated 
process of transformation.      
5.2 Policy co-ordination  
In terms of B-BBEE policy and its relevant strategies, government departments 
are required to co-ordinate B-BBEE policy across the entire provincial 
administration. How do the respondents interpret their role in B-BBEE policy 
co-ordination? What does carrying out B-BBEE policy co-ordination entail? 
Are they successful in carrying out this task? And what are the obstacles to 




























































































































50% of respondents believed that the problem lay with government 
organizations having different annual performance plans. Annual 
performance plans in government determine future operations, as well as 
budgetary allocations. Five employees (25%) believed that co-ordination 
structures in the province were unable to adopt far-reaching decisions, three 
believed that the problem with policy co-ordination in the province was that 
organizations were represented in the structures by junior officials who do not 
have powers to make decisions, and a further two respondents thought that 
B-BBEE policy co-ordination was expensive. These matters were addressed in 
interviews with the Key Informants.  
 (i)  Organizations have different performance plans 
The real difficulty, said KI: 5, is that there is no alignment between policy co-
ordination on B-BBEE and the financial year: 
Everything we do in government is predetermined by our annual 
performance plans. The standard practice is that during the planning 
phase we decide on what needs to be done way before the start of 
each financial term. The proposed projects are decided upon during the 
planning phase and they form part of the minister’s budget speech. 
Once the minister’s budget speech has been adopted by the provincial 
cabinet, we move in ‘full speed’ with project implementation. The 
problem with B-BBEE policy co-ordination is that it happens in the course 
of the financial term. There is nothing substantially we can do at this 
stage, we just implement whatever was decided upon during the 
planning phase. In this context, B-BBEE policy co-ordination structures 
become a ‘talk shop’ without any substance emerging out of the 
process.   
To overcome this, noted KI: 7, it “would have been much better for B-BBEE 
policy co-ordination if there was integrated policy planning. Unfortunately 
each department has its own individual planning”. 
KI: 6 agreed: 
The problem with B-BBEE policy is that it treats government departments 
as homogeneous entities. Government departments have different 
mandates/core functions. We have departments of health, education, 
community safety, etc. It is therefore better to associate yourself with 
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other provinces that are performing the same mandate, not necessarily 
B-BBEE functions. Why must I associate myself with B-BBEE practitioners 
when the mandate of my department is community safety and liaison? It 
is better for me to take part in community safety related co-ordination 
structures rather than B-BBEE structures. B-BBEE policy is an add-on 
function rather than our core function (this means that B-BBEE policy 
implementation does not form part of our strategic focus). We implement 
B-BBEE policy once we are satisfied that our mandate has been taken 
care of in terms of our budget.  
KI: 8 made much the same point: “the problem with B-BBEE policy is that it 
brings in a lot of stakeholders who have different mandates. Can you 
imagine what would happen if we could re-allocate our resources to B-BBEE 
policy implementation instead of concentrating to health related problems? 
This would mean that people must die of health related illnesses, high crime, 
etc. in the province”. 
COMMENT: Government organizations having different annual performance 
plans are a serious impediment to policy co-ordination. Moreover, the belief 
that there was no need to participate in the provincial government’s co-
ordinating structures because performance plans were adopted before the 
beginning of the financial cycle presents a serious obstacle to the 
implementation of B-BBEE policy. Thus, B-BBEE programmes end up being 
excluded from departmental plans, and are then not regarded as a core 
function. Consequently, B-BBEE policy becomes an add - on function that 
depends on the good will of officials who are committed to transformation. 
This poses a fundamental challenge that goes to heart of the B-BBEE policy 
agenda in South Africa. It is a fundamental challenge because everything in 
government is measured on the basis of targets which are set out in the 
annual performance plans, budget policy statements and the government 
blue book. Thus, if B-BBEE policy does not form part of these key strategic 
planning decisions of government administration, it becomes very difficult for 




(ii) Co-ordination structures are unable to reach far reaching decisions 
Some public officials felt that there were no benefits in participating in B-BBEE 
policy co-ordination structures because such structures were unable to make 
far reaching decisions. KI: 8 said: 
There is no point in participating in B-BBEE policy co-ordination structures 
in the province because every time we are told that the provincial 
government does not have a jurisdiction to amend the B-BBEE Act. There 
are aspects of this Act which are problematic which need urgent 
amendment. Take, for example, B-BBEE. The policy is inapplicable in the 
procurement of goods and services because it ‘clashes’ with the 
preferential procurement policy framework. We have raised this on a 
number of occasions in our provincial B-BBEE implementation team 
meetings but nothing can be done because the B-BBEE legislation is the 
competency of the national Department of Trade and Industry. There is 
therefore no need to participate in the provincial co-ordinating 
structures. We rather communicate directly with the national Department 
of Trade and Industry who are responsible for this policy.  
KI: 6 maintained that “when we participate in any forum it’s because we 
want to solve our problems. What is the point in participating in a forum that is 
not useful”?  
KI: 7 added a different dimension: 
When we participate in any B-BBEE policy co-ordination structure we 
expect that somebody out there would solve our scarce resources 
problem. My experience in all these structures is that it’s only government 
officials who participate. Things would have been much better if the 
private sector was on board. I think the weakness of B-BBEE policy co-
ordination structures in the province is informed by the fact that nobody 
has enough resources to solve our problems. At the end of the day, co-
ordination structures have become a forum where everybody complains 
about scarce resources to implement the empowerment programmes.  
But widening the scope of participating beyond government has its own 
problems, argues KI: 5: “the problem with the government approach towards 
co-ordination is that government officials often like to exercise power and 
authority. This behaviour chases the private sector away because it creates 
an impression that people within the co-ordination structures are not treated 
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equal. I think government should stop playing the role of ‘big brother’. 
Government always summoned stakeholders to the meetings rather than 
putting a proposal on the table”. 
COMMENT: The government’s approach to exercising authority was believed 
to be hampering policy co-ordination, by summoning stakeholders to 
meetings rather than inviting them.  Even so, such co-ordination structures 
were unable to reach far reaching decisions because of some aspects of the 
B-BBEE Act were not in line with the preferential procurement policy 
framework. The provincial government lacks the legislative mandate to deal 
with the limitations of B-BBEE strategies and regulation. The respondents on 
many occasions expressed frustration and revealed their powerlessness to 
overcome difficulties in policy co-ordination because they believe that 
authority to solve such matters lies with the national sphere of government.  
(iii) Many organizations are represented by junior officials 
Provincial B-BBEE implementation team meetings were not effective because 
most organizations were represented by junior officials who were not 
authorised to make crucial decisions on behalf of their organizations. 
According to KI: 3:  
In the province we have B-BBEE policy implementation teams which help 
in co-ordinating B-BBEE policy implementation. All the provincial 
government departments are represented in the implementation team. 
We normally deal with common challenges such as problems of 
legislation, resources and learn from each other’s experiences in B-BBEE 
policy implementation. Sometimes each government department is 
given an opportunity to report on B-BBEE progress and challenges 
encountered in the implementation of the policy. However, the problem 
arises when we have identified critical areas which are affecting the 
whole government, that is, conflict of B-BBEE policy with preferential 
procurement policy framework. In this context, the provincial government 
does not have an authority to amend national legislation at provincial 
level. This requires intervention from the national government. However, 
junior officials do not have a mandate to communicate directly with the 
national government. They can only be able to do so via senior officials 
who are often not there in our meetings. 
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KI: 6 added that “this problem is informed by the fact that most departments 
are represented by junior officials who are playing a role of ‘messenger’ 
rather than contributing substantially in co-ordination of the policy. They are 
playing a role of ‘messenger’ because they always argued that they are 
representing their bosses. Sometimes they request to be given some time to 
consult with their superiors when we are supposed to make serious decisions”. 
KI: 7 provided a detailed account of this problem: 
My experience regarding the issue of government departments 
represented by junior officials is that senior government officials are not 
taking this structure seriously. It is clear that they are not taking this 
structure seriously, otherwise the junior officials would have been 
delegated to make certain decisions on behalf of their organizations. 
When you delegate someone you give that person all the powers 
necessary to achieve the organizational goals. Junior officials in B-BBEE 
co-ordination structures are not empowered to deal with the challenges 
in the implementation of this policy and this is deliberately done. I think it’s 
deliberately done because we have been complaining about it for the 
past two to three years and nothing is done to change the situation.  
KI: 8 suggested that “departments must shoulder the blame for this behaviour 
of sending junior officials. It is not that they are not aware of the limitation of 
being represented by junior officials. This is done deliberately so that on the 
face of it they would look good as participating in B-BBEE policy process 
when in an actual sense B-BBEE policy is not implemented”. 
COMMENT: Evidently, the issue of representation by junior officials was 
connected to a number of organizational challenges. Notably, junior officials 
who were representing their organizations in co-ordination structures were 
unable to make decisions or do not have powers to do so. This was informed 
by a lack of delegation of authority, which was further linked to a lack of will 
by government organizations to participate in the process. This can be 
interpreted in a number of ways. Representation by junior staff may be 
interpreted as an indication that most organizations did not take the process 
of B-BBEE policy co-ordination seriously. Furthermore, these sentiments were 
indicative of how the entire notion of policy co-ordination was viewed by 
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government organizations. There was a general perception that co-
ordination does not help because it did not arrive at far reaching decisions. 
Those who held this view pointed to the fact that they had been raising 
serious concerns regarding conflict in government strategies, but nothing had 
been done to solve the problem. This was the reason why many in the cluster 
decided to communicate directly with the national Department of Trade 
and Industry as the custodian of B-BBEE policy rather than participate in the 
provincial co-ordination structures. The problem, therefore, was not only how 
the provincial government co-ordinates policy implementation, but also its 
location in the sphere of South African government, as well as the co-
operation between the spheres.  
(iv)  B-BBEE policy co-ordination is expensive 
 
In KI: 8’s view, co-ordinating B-BBEE policy is expensive: 
My experience working in government is that facilitating B-BBEE policy co-
ordination needs multi-skills. Government has tried to hire B-BBEE policy 
consultants to facilitate policy co-ordination but it’s very expensive. B-
BBEE consultants charge a lot of money which could have been 
allocated to policy implementation. The stakeholders do not contribute 
anything in B-BBEE policy co-ordination forums. A leading department in 
policy co-ordination must cover the cost for the venue, catering, 
materials, and other equipment. One meeting including everything is 
about R1500 to R20 000. At the end of the day when you look at the 
output of these meetings there is not much to justify the cost. 
 Who bears such costs? KI: 6 indicated that “my problem with B-BBEE policy co-
ordination is that government officials are not prepared to share the cost for 
policy co-ordination. When you have invited them you must know that you 
must carry all the financial burdens”. 
What does policy co-ordination entail? KI: 5 maintains that: 
Many stakeholders come to policy co-ordination with a list of problems 
and expecting somebody else to solve their problems. I think the problem 
with government is that in terms of the provincial B-BBEE strategy for 2007, 
there is only one department that is leading or mandated to lead other 
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departments in the implementation of the policy. In KwaZulu-Natal 
province, the leading department is economic development and 
tourism. This department is therefore expected by other departments to 
carry the cost of B-BBEE policy co-ordination. The problem with this 
approach is that stakeholders do not meet on their own unless they are 
invited by the leading department.   
However, KI: 6 believed that “the problem is bigger than policy co-ordination 
cost implications. There is a serious lack of ‘political will’ to implement the 
policy. There is nothing preventing government officials to pick up the phone 
and arrange bilateral meetings with the relevant departments on issues 
affecting them. The problem is that there is no will to implement this policy”.  
COMMENT: Two main issues arose here. First, is policy co-ordination on B-BBEE 
policy the sole responsibility of the Department of Economic Development 
and Tourism, which officials identified as the lead department for this? 
Secondly, who carries the cost of such co-ordination, for example, payment 
for consultants who might be required, or the running costs of meetings for 
co-ordination purposes? Significantly, though, some officials identified a lack 
of political will to address policy co-ordination as the fundamental problem. 
 5.3 Organizational transformation  
This section analyses the degree of transformation in the cluster in terms of B-
BBEE. What has been achieved? How did the respondents interpret their role 
in driving the process of transformation within government? What challenges 
have been encountered in the process of transformation? Reponses to the 




































































































































55% of respondents believed that transformation in government was 
hampered by the fact that everything revolved around one’s association 
with the right group, 20% suggested that black leadership in government 
were not the agents of change. 15% believed that blacks had been included 
in key areas but that it remained difficult to influence the direction of policy. 
Only 10% of respondents believed that recruitment processes still 
discriminated against blacks. Explanation of such views was provided in 
interviews with Key Informants: 
(i)  Everything revolves around one’s association with the right group 
The argument here is that in government you must associate yourself with the 
right people in order to benefit from transformation. KI: 8 said: 
Transformation policies (B-BBEE) were introduced for good intentions. 
However, the implementation of it within government favours certain 
people. This means that despite being black you can still get excluded if 
you do not associate yourself with the right group. Nowadays, it’s no 
longer about being black, it’s about who you know in higher places. This 
is unfortunate because what is happening is not the intention of this 
policy. People are abusing their positions so as to have personal benefits 
and for their friends. We cannot even report this because you will be 
victimised and can even lose your job.  
KI: 6 highlighted that “transformation malpractices within government are 
difficult to report because government standard practice is that you must 
follow all internal processes before any matter can be taken through the 
official route. The problem with this is that you are forced to report to the 
same people who are committing malpractices. There is therefore no point in 
trying to be a hero, unless you risk expulsion”. 
KI: 5 took this argument a step further: 
Transformation is not going to achieve its broad aims and objectives due 
to malpractices within government. Many people have accused us within 
government of not reporting malpractices. I forgive those who accuse us 
because they don’t understand government operations. Government is 
highly bureaucratic and those who are committing malpractices are 
highly sophisticated individuals. They have ensured that they are in 
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charge or controlling all the internal channels for handling complaints. 
This means that the same people who commit malpractices are also the 
same people who are ‘gate keepers’. Indirectly, we have a situation 
where it is very difficult to report anything. Furthermore, there is a 
standard procedure that if you want to report any malpractices one has 
to be in a possession of hard documents or evidence. This means that you 
must be in the possession of confidential documents. It is hard to obtain 
such documents.  
KI: 7 concluded, “I don’t think that transformation will ever achieve its aims as 
long as manipulation of the policy processes persists within government”. 
COMMENT: Transformation in this cluster has worked in terms of opening up 
opportunities for black people as they now hold key strategic positions. But 
there was an element of frustration among blacks officials interviewed as 
patronage was seen as crucial to advancing one’s career. Moreover, the 
exercise of patronage goes unchallenged since the perpetrators are in senior 
positions of authority. Such malpractices, officials noted, are contrary to 
transformation policies.  
(ii) Black leadership is not an agent of change 
As much as government has tried to open opportunities for black people, 
those in black leadership were not agents of change, some suggested. 
According to KI: 8: 
Blacks are now occupying key strategic positions in government. 
However, when you look at their efforts in terms of addressing the plight of 
the poor, more especially the black population, there is still a long way to 
go. This is surprising because we thought black people understand the 
plight of the black majority better than any other racial group in this 
country.  We often discuss this with black managers in the department. 
Many of them are complaining about government systems. They argue 
that the government system is too rigid to achieve anything. I always 
disagree with this view on the basis that senior positions come with certain 
level of responsibilities, and transformation forms part of that responsibility. 
To me, the problem here is lack of political will from black managers. 
KI: 7 concurred with this view, that: 
The problem with black managers is that they do not have an agenda for 
change. To me it is wrong to assume that because someone is black, 
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therefore he or she will implement transformation strategies better than 
any other racial group. The black managers have gone to the same 
school just like any other racial groups in this country. The majority of them 
never suffered or live in rural areas. My view is that their world view is not 
different from any white South African. Actually, some black managers 
are worse when it comes to the provision of government services.  
KI: 5 added that “as long as the mentality of black managers is still based on 
their belief that they worked very hard for their career advancement, nothing 
is going to change in terms of transformation. This is despite the fact that 
government has worked very hard for black people to be included in senior 
positions”. 
COMMENT: The general expectation here is that black leadership is expected 
to go beyond the call of duty in trying to solve organizational challenges. In 
this context, the performance of black leadership is judged not only on the 
basis of abiding by government rules and regulations but also in terms of 
expectations to deliver on transformation goals. This is despite the 
organizational limitations they face as they try to implement transformation 
policy.  
(iii) It is difficult to influence the direction of B-BBEE policy 
Interviewees recognized that blacks have been included in key strategic 
positions but even so it was difficult to influence the direction of B-BBEE policy 
in their cluster. KI: 8 said: 
I must say that black people are now occupying strategic positions within 
government. However, the same cannot be said about determining the 
strategic direction in terms of B-BBEE policy implementation. The issue of 
transformation is a tough one to be achieved overnight. I must say that 
when I joined government I had bigger dreams to transform the 
provincial government. I can tell you now that none of those dreams 
have been achieved. This is due to the fact that in government there are 
set standard procedures, that is, recruitment procedures, criteria on how 
to organize important transformation committees, etc. This means that 
any deviation even for good intentions may lead to a lot of court cases. 
There is therefore no ways that transformation can occur without 
transforming the government system. For transformation to happen there 
must be democratisation of the composition of various committees. 
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Currently, it is not clear how people are nominated to serve on these 
committees.   
But KI: 5 viewed participation in a different light, namely, that “the problem 
with transformation processes is that its procedures are too democratic to the 
extent that it is open to mischievous individuals, who are there to ensure that 
transformation does not achieve its goals. There are so many transformation 
decisions which are delayed due to technicalities raised by those who are 
against for change”. KI: 7 expressed a more general issue: “I feel that those of 
us who are tasked with the responsibility to lead the process of transformation 
within government were set up for failure. How can we be accountable for a 
policy that is dependent upon consensus of a diverse group? It depends on 
the consensus because every decision is subjected to serious scrutiny until a 
compromise is reached”. For KI: 6, “the problem with transformation 
processes is that there is too much consultation which often leads to 
compromises”.   
COMMENT: The rigidity of transformation procedures and practices was cited 
as a major problem for transformation within government. It also transpired in 
the data analysis that too much consultation in the transformation processes 
can also serve as a barrier for transformation. This was a strange revelation, 
given the fact that the same transformation policies call for thorough 
consultation at all levels on matters affecting change and transformation. 
There was therefore nothing wrong with different racial groups within 
government organizations contesting every decision. However, this is perhaps 
revealing about the calibre of black managers who are driving the process 
of change. Their failure to exercise power and the authority vested in them in 
determining the strategic direction of policy is noteworthy. The apparent lack 
of ability of such officials to influence the implementation of B-BBEE policy 
might be related to the drawbacks of patronage which were highlighted in 




(iv)  Recruitment processes still discriminate against blacks 
While only 10% of respondents viewed the recruitment processes as an 
obstacle to black advancement, the issue received considerable comment 
in subsequent interviews. According to KI: 8: 
There is a serious problem in government when it comes to recruitment. 
There is no justification on what is happening whereby a group of local 
counsellors forms a recruitment panel to appoint a municipal manager. 
This means that a group of politicians who were elected by the public, 
who do not have managerial skills, mostly with no qualifications, are 
tasked to decide on the hiring of a qualified person. These politicians 
often make political appointments with no regard for proper 
management principles. This is a recipe for disaster and it explains why 
there is poor government service. There are a lot of examples which can 
be provided to explain this. There are instances where even ordinary 
members of public who happen to serve on school governing boards are 
often involved in the recruitment of school teachers. No transformation 
can be achieved under this blatant political interference.  
 KI: 5 provided a different argument that recruitment processes still 
discriminate against blacks: 
This province has achieved a lot in terms of transforming the provincial 
government. Black people are holding senior positions now. However, if 
you consider highly technical areas in government such as engineers, 
economists, statisticians, etc., you would notice that blacks are 
underrepresented. Each time when we discuss this within my department 
there are diverse views. There are those who argue that there is a 
shortage of technical skills amongst black candidates. I disagree with this 
view and my point is that various universities in South Africa produce a lot 
of black graduates in these academic fields. The problem is in our 
recruitment processes within government which make it hard to compete 
with high salaries offered by the private sector. It is very difficult for 
government to negotiate a better salary offer with suitable candidates. 
The standard practice by government for salary offers is predetermined 
by the national Department of Public Service and Administration. There is 
still a lot to be done by government in terms of market related salaries.  
Government over the years has tried to respond to this challenge through 
the introduction of the Occupation Specific Dispensation (OSD) (This is the 
method used by government to improve salaries of certain scarce skills). 
However, this has not solved the problem.   
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KI: 6 suggested that: 
The reason why highly technical skilled blacks are not properly 
represented in government has to do with the working environment 
rather than the legacy of apartheid. There is no point in working for 
government when the same job in the private sector offers double the 
salary. Furthermore, in government many people are deployed to work in 
rural underdeveloped areas where there is no electricity, water, 
sanitation, etc. Many young blacks prefer to work for the private sector in 
urban areas where there are modern facilities. My point is that 
transformation of government is no longer about race, but more about 
working conditions, and government recruitment processes need to be 
adjusted to respond to this modern challenge. It is not enough for 
government to put recruitment adverts in the newspapers seeking black 
candidates without at the same time specifying lucrative benefits. 
COMMENT: The challenges to the provincial government in recruitment 
are not uniquely transformation challenges, but are broadly 
organizational problems. The South African government faces a unique 
challenge of trying to recruit highly skilled, and technical black people 
(to reflect a commitment to transformation), while at the same time 
trying to address poverty and underdevelopment. Yet, keeping such 
employees for the sake of transformation means that the budget must 
be reprioritised to cater for good salaries in the form of OSD. Thus, the 
process of transformation in South Africa is subjected to tension once 
race is not the only factor for consideration. For ambitious, well-qualified, 
experienced public officials advancement depends on a variety of 
matters, like patronage, as has been shown provincially. But 
implementing policy on B-BBEE depends on structural issues, too, like 
organizational hierarchy.  
5.4 Organizational hierarchy. 
This section analyses the relationship between the top executive and 
operative employees in B-BBEE policy implementation. The respondents were 
requested to assess whether the key strategic B-BBEE decisions were imposed 
by the executive management without consultation. Their opinions are 




































































































































thought that this is done to promote accountability in their cluster, 5% 
believed that it was the duty of the top management to make strategic 
decisions, a further 5% suggested that public service rules and regulation 
determine this, and a final 5% did not provide any reason. These views were 
developed in interviews with the Key Informants.  
(i) Operative employees must concentrate on policy implementation 
The main reason given as to why decisions were imposed on the cluster was 
so that the operative employees would be able to concentrate on policy 
implementation. According to KI: 7: 
Government departments employ staff for specific duties. This is the 
reason why there are job descriptions for every post in government. 
Project managers are therefore employed to implement specific 
government programmes. They are allowed to put forward project 
proposals and they must propose budgets that will help them to perform 
their duties. This is done in consultation with their ‘responsibility’ managers. 
It is therefore the duty of senior management to ensure that a budget is 
available, and that the proposed programmes are in line with 
government’s strategic vision. In government there are oversight 
committees, that is, cabinet legislators. It is therefore the duty of the 
executive management to go and account to the provincial cabinet. 
Junior staff or project managers are not allowed to represent government 
or submit reports to the cabinet. They must do so through the executive 
management. They simply do not have legislative authority to do so. The 
issue here is legislative accountability rather than the imposition of 
decisions. 
KI: 8 confirmed the hierarchical chain of command: “in government there 
are clear guidelines on the allocation of roles and responsibilities. It is the duty 
of the executive management to lead government strategy. There is no way 
that the management can delegate this responsibility”. But, as, KI: 5 noted, 
“of course it is the responsibility of executive management to lead. However, 
in the process of leading, different teams must be consulted so that our 




In KI: 6’s estimation the style of decision - making has arisen in a specific 
context, namely, that: 
The serious problem why strategic decisions are imposed by the top 
executives is that the executive management were themselves imposed 
without any due process followed in hiring them. There is nepotism on the 
hiring of senior staff in government. This is why many executive managers 
do not have project management experience. This is the reason why 
government is very poor on policy implementation.  
COMMENT: The respondents identified a clear separation of duties which 
goes with a certain level of authority in the cluster. The executive 
management see its primary task as driving the organizational strategy, which 
means mobilizing the required resources, and accounting to cabinet and the 
provincial legislature. The point of contact between the top executives and 
operative employees was through project proposals that are drafted and 
submitted by operatives for funding and approval by the executives. This 
approach was criticized by the operative employees because it failed to 
ensure that such decisions are relevant to the challenges on the ground.  
(ii)  This is done to promote accountability 
Were decisions imposed from the top so that there was accountability in 
government? KI: 7 said:  
In government there is a very long chain of command in carrying out 
government policy implementation. Clearly, it is impossible to involve 
everyone in decision-making. However, I have a strong belief that the 
issue here is not about the imposition of decisions per se that is an issue 
but the problem is the implications of those decisions. People in 
government have their own personal interests and agendas. This means 
that if a decision is against a particular agenda it will always receive 
disapproval, and a lot of questions would be raised around consultation. 
However, if a decision favours a dominant group, it will always receive 
approval despite the fact that it might have been imposed from the top. 
KI: 6 believed that: 
For me consultation means that we must consult various structures within 
the organizations. Mostly, unions are consulted because they represent 
staff, and once we have reached an agreement with those structures we 
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assumed that they will further consult their own membership. In 
government any decision passes through a number of value chains. We 
therefore respect the structures rather than individuals. If a particular 
structure within the organization has been consulted we therefore do not 
ask how many people were absent. This is what makes people complain 
that key decisions are centralized at the top.  
KI: 5 indicated that “accountability means that one must take ownership of 
one’s actions. Unfortunately, in government this applies even in situations 
where decisions are against individual interest”.   
COMMENT: Government decisions do require accountability, but this is not 
only in terms of who makes a particular judgement call in the cluster, but also 
should entail considering the overall performance of the organization to 
assess whether government policy programmes address and are achieving 
their specific goals. This kind of accountability should not be delegated to the 
operative employees. Executive management would always represent the 
organization in the cabinet, and assume responsibility just as the project 
managers are accountable if government policy choices are not 
implemented properly. The question here is that even if administrative rules 
and regulations determine levels of accountability this need not imply that 
strategic decisions-making is confined to top management, without broad 
consultation in the cluster.  
(iii)  Public service rules and regulations determine this 
Public service rules and regulations determine that key strategic decisions 
must be taken by the executive management without any consultation. For 
KI: 8, “government operations and functions were governed by a lot of rules 
and regulations which make it difficult to consult many people”. However, KI: 
5 believed that this notion of imposing key strategic decisions was actually 
against government rules and regulations: 
Senior managers who do not want to follow democratic principles would 
like us to believe that everything they do is in line with the rules and 
regulations governing the public service. Actually, this is against the spirit 
of government rules and regulations. South African rules and regulations 
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governing the public service are clear that senior managers must make 
strategic decisions. However, the rules say that they must ensure that 
there is sufficient consultation. We are not against this principle but what is 
a problem is that key strategic decisions are imposed without 
consultation. This is a serious problem within government which is the main 
cause for policy implementations failures. 
KI: 7 provided an example of the effects of this problem, that:  
Senior officials impose key decisions even in situations where they are 
supposed to consult key internal structures. For example, the proposal 
made by Ethekwini district municipality to build a shopping mall in Durban 
City’s busy street, where people were able to sell fresh vegetables, fruits, 
etc. The hawkers were up in arms in protest against this because they 
knew that the proposed mall would have negative effects on their 
business opportunities. Many people would have not afforded exorbitant 
rental for electricity, operating space, etc. The proposed mall was 
rejected and the plan had to be stopped because consultation was not 
done. This proves that government is not only guilty for a lack of internal 
consultation within its functions but also with the public at large. 
COMMENT: According to the respondents, senior officials who have 
made unilateral decisions in government have tried to justify their 
actions on the basis of the rules and regulations that govern the public 
service in South Africa. The majority believed that this was well within the 
executive management’s rights since it was its responsibility to make key 
organizational decisions. But they also believed that such decisions must 
be based on thorough consultation to ensure that they are rational as 
well as relevant.  
(iv) It is the duty of the executive management 
In relation to the argument that organizational strategy is decided unilaterally 
by executive management because that is their responsibility, KI: 8 said: 
The reason why senior management is often regarded as ‘leadership’ is 
because it must always ‘chart’ a way forward. This means that strategic 
management must always make tough decisions. Sometimes the nature 
of a decision is too sensitive and confidential to be discussed with 
everybody. Can you imagine what would happen if a sensitive decision 
gets out to the public when the management is still trying to get the right 
way to handle it? The very nature and duties of executive management 
138 
 
are designed in a way that it makes key strategic decisions. There is no 
problem with this: the management must be allowed to perform its duties.  
However, KI: 5 believed that: 
It is the duty of the executive management to follow all good corporate 
governance principles whenever making its decisions. However, there 
must be transparency, accountability, and they must abide by the 
organizational rules and regulations. Management that upholds these 
principles would automatically accept consultation as part of 
management principles. Actually, to me, consultation would mean 
accountability and transparency which will serve the organization well in 
the long run.  
COMMENT: The positions adopted by interviewees in this section 
indicated that there was tacit acceptance of the top-down structure of 
the existing hierarchy of the government organizations, where the 
executive management’s decisions determine the implementation 
imperatives. If so, much of the success implementation on B-BBEE would 
depend on communication in the cluster. 
5.5 Policy communication 
How did the respondents interpret their role in relation to B-BBEE policy 
communication? Most respondents to the questionnaire stressed the 










































































































65% of respondents believed that communication within the cluster 
happened, but that it was not effective, 15% of respondents thought that 
communication within the cluster lacked a transformation agenda, 10% of 
respondents felt that organizational communication was not improving B-
BBEE policy implementation, and 10% considered that the communication 
structures was not democratic. These views were elaborated on in the 
interviews with the Key Informants. 
(i)  Communication happens, but it is not effective 
On the effectiveness of policy communication in the cluster, KI: 6 said: 
B-BBEE policy is a very good policy only when you read it in the official 
documents. However, what is out there in the public domain is a total 
misinterpretation of the policy. I doubt that everyone understands the 
intention of the policy as it is stated in the official strategic document. 
Many people have a wrong perception of this policy including some 
senior people within government. This is due to misinterpretation of the 
policy by many people. Many people have taken all the negatives that 
are associated with the policy as real. To me, when you read the policy, 
it’s a totally different story. Actually, B-BBEE policy does not condone all 
the wrong malpractices that are associated with it. This has to 
demonstrate the fact that communication is not effective because these 
perceptions are not corrected.  
KI: 5 suggested that: 
Communication within government is too politically controlled. As a result 
the experts in the field are unable to engage on technical aspects of 
government policies. This is what is lacking in the current evaluation of 
government performance on B-BBEE policy. Government must also take 
the blame for this because communication does not form part of 
government programme of action.   
For KI: 7 “the challenge with communication within the cluster lies squarely on 
how each individual understands it. To me, communication means that 
professionals working for government must be allowed to communicate 
freely on the challenges they experience on the ground. This means that 
government employees should be given opportunity to state the negatives, 
positives, and weaknesses. However, in government you can’t talk about 
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policy implementation challenges in public. This is always construed as 
bringing government into disrepute”. 
COMMENT: Public officials in the cluster acknowledged that there is 
communication in the cluster regarding B-BBEE policy but that its 
effectiveness is limited because of the political control over communication 
channels in government. Therefore misperceptions about the policy could 
not easily be corrected or technical aspects of the policy explained further 
without authorization by those who controlled official communication in the 
provincial government.  
(ii)  Communication lacks a transformation agenda 
The argument here is that policy communication in the cluster does not 
further the objectives of transformation in government. According to KI: 5:  
In government we do have people who are designated to be 
spokespersons of various government departments. My department also 
publishes a lot of magazines, fliers, and publicises information on the 
website, emails, etc. However, the information that government transmits 
lacks B-BBEE policy information.  My view on why communication lacks a 
transformation agenda is because transformation is viewed as a sensitive 
subject. It raises a lot of controversy and emotions. This is the reason why 
many people are afraid to communicate about it. I think this is where we 
are failing as government. We are unable to take leadership on 
communication and correct all the myths on B-BBEE policy. What is 
strange about this is that even those who are designated for 
communication are failing to set the agenda. Government has always 
been reactive when it comes to transformation.  
In KI: 6’s view: “government communicates on B-BBEE policy in response to 
pressure regarding corruption in the tendering process. This happens when 
senior government officials are accused of giving tenders to themselves or 
their friends. This is the only time you see government communicate on this 
policy”.  
The more general problem, KI: 8 maintained is that: 
Communication lacks a transformation agenda because it is not 
considered as part of the broad strategy for transformation. This is clear 
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when one look at where the communication section is located. In my 
department, the communication section is centralized at the top and 
reports directly to the minister or to the head of the department. The 
communication section controls all the lines of communication and 
further has the power not to transmit or publicise any information which is 
considered to have the potential of bring government into distribute. 
COMMENT: The sensitivity around B-BBEE policy emerged clearly in the 
interviews, which explains the tight political control over communication. 
This raised as many difficulties as it solved seemed to be the impression 
conveyed by the interviewees.   
(iii) Communication is not improving policy implementation 
Communication in the cluster was not helping to improve the implementation 
of B-BBEE policy according to some officials. KI: 8 said: 
My experience on the ground whenever I visit various district 
municipalities is that there is a shortage of information. I think the serious 
problem is not only about shortages of information but also how 
government communicates, and what communication tools we use to 
transmit government information. Over the years government has 
adopted a strategy of publicising its information on government websites, 
newspapers, etc. My experience on the ground is that all these tools are 
not accessible. We are making a serious mistake of assuming that once 
something has been publicised on the website and in the newspapers it 
will therefore be accessible to the public. Many people do not have 
access to the Internet and newspapers. Additionally, information itself is 
very complicated and too complex to be consumed by ordinary 
members of the public.  
KI: 5 concurred: “most rural areas in the province do not have access to 
basic services such as water and electricity, so it is therefore wrong to assume 
that Internet - would be accessible. Government needs to change its 
communication strategy”.  
COMMENT: The interviewees identified the means of communication by 
government as problematic, which then makes policy implementation of B-
BBEE less effective. Information is not expressed clearly and simply, nor is it 
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accessible to many in rural areas and to those who do not have access to 
technology and the Internet.  
(iv) Communication structures are not democratic 
The view here is that communication structures in the cluster were 
centralized, and as a result structures were not democratic. KI: 8 said: 
The problem with communication in government is that it is too 
centralized at the top. It is a standard practice in government that 
anything that is transmitted must go via the unit responsible for 
communication. To me, the communication unit is not democratic 
because in most cases it refuses to publicise many requests. They refuse to 
publicise information without any convincing explanation. The general 
argument is always that our issues have the potential of bringing 
government into disrepute. There is no explanation or definition on what 
constitutes the aspect of communication that might bring government 
into disrepute so that in the future everyone can know. This is not a 
democratic process because the communication unit has too much 
power that is informed by its reporting directly to the MEC and the head 
of department.  
KI: 5 suggested that “things would have been much better if communication 
on key B-BBEE policy issues occurs at every level of the organization. 
Unfortunately, we must observe the myths surrounding the policy even in 
situations where we can provide technical policy information”.   
 The general problem according to KI:  7 is that: 
Many people who are not working for government perceive 
communication differently from us within government. They think that it’s 
possible for government officials to communicate anything regarding the 
policy. People working for government know that communication within 
government is highly politicised and it can get you into trouble. There is no 
democracy when it comes to communication within the department. 
You must always be sure before you forward anything for internal 
communication, otherwise you would find yourself into trouble with the 
authorities. 
COMMENT: The interviews in the cluster revealed that a problem in the 
provincial government is that information flows from the top downwards. 
Most officials see this as a major impediment to B-BBEE policy 
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communication. There was a strong belief that such an approach was not 
democratic as the majority in the cluster do not have access to utilize the 
tools of communication. There was an element of frustration and withdrawal 
by government officials as they perceived the centralization of 
communication at the top as a kind of censorship. 
5.6 Conclusion  
This G&A cluster underscored a number of organizational issues. What has 
been learned thus far regarding the cluster’s management of B-BBEE policy 
implementation? The findings in this cluster revealed that B-BBEE policy 
implementation structures and processes were outdated and rigid. This made 
it impossible for B-BBEE policy implementation to achieve its main objectives. 
This was demonstrated by the cluster with concrete examples to demonstrate 
their point, especially in relation to rural and geographical areas where the 
potential beneficiaries of laws, rules and regulations cannot take advantage 
of them due to their rigidity and out dated nature.  
It also surfaced from the cluster’s findings that the rigidity of policy processes 
and procedures was perhaps not the only reason for failure of policy 
implementation, as most within the cluster acknowledged that their role was 
more than government administration, since they have the power to convert 
government policies into implementable projects. Thus, the cluster suggested 
that the situation was further compounded by weak governance models. For 
the cluster, this was informed by the approach of attempting to adopt old 
practices for new purposes. The cluster further found that B-BBEE policy 
implementation lacked specialist skills. Officials in the cluster suggested that 
specialist skills on B-BBEE policy implementation could be acquired through 
particular education and training.   
There was a real challenge when it come to B-BBEE policy co-ordination as 
there was no alignment between policy co-ordination on B-BBEE and the 
financial cycle in the province. In other words, there was no integrated plan 
of government key functions in this cluster. This was informed by different 
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performance plans of most organizations in the cluster. There was an 
entrenched belief in the cluster that there was no reason to participate in the 
provincial government’s co-ordinating structures because performance plans  
were adopted well before the beginning of each financial cycle. This was 
further accompanied by the perception in the cluster that co-ordination 
structures were unable to make far reaching decisions. The example 
provided to substantiate such a belief was the issue of the inapplicability of B-
BBEE policy to the procurement of goods and services because it clashes 
with the preferential procurement policy framework. These in the cluster 
further explained that there was a B-BBEE policy implementation team, a 
provincial structure that helps in co-ordinating the broad provincial B-BBEE 
policy implementation. Two main challenges arose regarding the B-BBEE 
implementation team. First, was policy co-ordination on B-BBEE the sole 
responsibility of the Department of Economic Development and Tourism, 
which officials identified as the lead department, and second, should the 
lead department carry all the costs associated with policy co-ordination? It 
emerged that there were several challenges in the B-BBEE implementation 
team as most organizations were represented by junior officials. Such officials 
did not have delegated authority to solve complex co-ordination problems in 
the cluster. 
What has been learned about the level of transformation in terms of B-BBEE in 
this cluster? There was an overwhelming sense of agreement in this cluster 
that transformation has worked in terms of opening up opportunities for 
blacks, Africans in particular. But there was an element of frustration among 
black officials in the cluster as patronage was seen as crucial to advancing 
one’s career. The cluster further found that as much as blacks have been 
included in in key strategic positions within the cluster, they were unable to 
influence B-BBEE policy. The rigidity of transformation procedures and 
practices was cited as a major problem for transformation. It also emerged 
from the findings in this cluster that the ambitious, well qualified, and 
experienced black public official’s advancement depends on a variety of 
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matters. In this context, the study’s findings in this cluster indicated that when 
other factors, beyond the issue of race, are part of the equation, 
transformation becomes complicated. 
On the hierarchy of decision-making in this cluster, research revealed that 
key strategic B-BBEE policy decisions were taken by the top management 
without any consultation.  There was a clear separation of duties which goes 
with a certain level of authority. Thus, senior management in the cluster saw 
its primary tasks as driving the organizational strategy, which meant mobilizing 
the required resources, and accounting to cabinet and the legislature. 
Additionally, there was tacit acceptance in the cluster of the top down 
structure of the existing hierarchy. 
On B-BBEE policy communication in the G&A cluster, there was a common 
recognition that policy communication is an important tool for policy 
implementation, but the findings revealed that the provincial government 
was failing to meet this expectation. Public officials in the cluster 
acknowledge that there was communication in the cluster regarding B-BBEE, 
but its effectiveness was limited because of the political control over 
communication channels. This was the reason why misperceptions about the 
policy could not easily be corrected. Thus, information in the cluster was not 
expressed clearly and simply, nor was it accessible to many in rural areas and 
to those who do not have access to technology. It was also found that policy 
communication in the cluster does not further the objectives of 
transformation in government because its structures were not democratic.                
 The following chapter investigates the same five main themes in relation to 
Social, Community and Human Development cluster (SPCHD), the third and 







 Social Protection, Community and Human Development cluster 
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the Social, Community and Human Development 
(SPCHD) cluster of the KwaZulu-Natal provincial administration and follows 
the same format of the previous two chapters on the other clusters.  
The profile, role and structure of the cluster 
The SPCHD cluster comprises the following provincial government 
departments: social development, education, health, sports and recreation, 
human settlements, arts & culture. The cluster deals with poverty eradication 
and social development issues. Broadly, the central focus of this cluster is 
socio-economic development issues which are important for B-BBEE policy 
implementation. This cluster co-ordinates government programs and projects 
relating to the cluster, as well as monitoring and evaluating them. 
Each government department is represented in the cluster by its head of the 
department. Together they constitute a cluster management team to align 
and strengthen inter-sphere and inter-sectoral relations, and design the 
cluster’s programme of action. The cluster has the power to invite anyone it 
deems relevant to submit strategic reports. It may also make strategic policy 
decisions which are submitted as recommendations to the provincial 
cabinet.  This cluster regularly submits progress reports to the cabinet. 
 The questionnaire and interviews were directed at all the departments in the 
cluster because they are all actively involved in B-BBEE policy 
implementation.  
Demographic characteristics of the sampled population 
The following table reveals the demographic and professional profile of the 
respondents in this cluster.  
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Table: 6.1. SPCHD cluster: race, occupational level and gender of management 




African Asian/Indian Coloured White Total


















Director 2 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 5 
Deputy 
Director 
3 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 8 
Executive 
Manager 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
Specialist 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 4 
Administrator 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Overall 6 2 2 4 1 2 1 2 20
 
Eight of the 20 respondents were Africans, that is, two Directors, two Deputy 
Directors, an Executive Manager and one Specialist. There were three 
Coloureds, including a Director, six Asians, four of whom were either at the 
level of Director or Deputy Director, and three Whites, including two Deputy 
Directors. 
In terms of gender, 50% of sample was female, with seven of the ten being 
either a Deputy Director or Director. Four were Africans. The experience of 








Table 6.2. SPCHD cluster: working experience of management employees (n=20) 
Years of experience Number of respondents 
+20 3 
11 to 20 13 
6 to 10 4 
0 to 5 0 
 
The majority in this sample, 13 (65%) had between 11 and 20 years of working 
experience in government. Another three had even longer service. The 
remaining four had at least six years of government employment. Their 
collective experience, then, is considerable. Most were relatively young, as 
table 6.3 shows.   
Table 6.3. SPCHD cluster: age profile of management employees (n=20) 
Age (years) Number of respondents 
20 to 29 1 
30 to 39 10 
40 to 49 7 
50 to 60 2 
 
Half of the number were in their thirties, with another nine forty-one years or 
older. None was more than sixty years old and only one was thirty years old or 
younger. Table 6.4 shows their educational qualifications. 




Table 6.4. SPCHD cluster: educational qualifications of government employees 
(n=20) 





What is notable here is that all but two of the government officials had some 
tertiary qualification. 
Hereafter the findings of investigation on the SPCHD cluster are discussed 
according to the five themes of the study. 
6.1 Managing policy implementation 
As to how the SPCHD cluster manages policy implementation on B-BBEE, KI: 9 
explained that:   
Our role is to design poverty eradication and development programmes. 
We also provide both formal and informal educational and capacity-
building programmes for the community. Our role lies at the centre of B-
BBEE policy implementation because our programmes are targeting 
historically disadvantaged individuals and groups. I believe that our 
cluster is the most important cluster for B-BBEE policy implementation 
because we serve the majority of under-resourced areas such as rural 
areas. There is always a challenge of human and financial resources. This 
is a major problem for our poverty eradication programmes. 
According to KI: 10: 
I believe that this cluster is the ‘engine’ of the government programme of 
action. Actually, government is all about solving social problems. This 
means that the failure of this cluster will mean the failure of government 
to perform its role. There is therefore no way that government can 
empower the community without the introduction of community and 
human development programmes. Broadly, our role is to design, co-
ordinate, implement, and monitor socio-economic programmes. 
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However, there is a serious problem of resources because poverty and 
unemployment on the ground is so huge. 
KI: 11 concurred: 
Our role lies at the centre of social economic development in the 
province. We deal with human development in its totality. It is our 
responsibility to design and drive government strategy implementation on 
education, social development and health related programmes. Our role 
includes community consultation so that we are well abreast with current 
challenges. This makes our role difficult because in the process of 
consultation the community often raise a lot of challenges which are 
beyond the budget allocation. The past international financial crisis 
created huge challenges for us because the majority of people lost their 
jobs. This created a situation where unemployment and poverty got out 
of control. This meant adjustment of our strategic objective by trying to 
form strategic partnerships with the private sector. However, this did not 
help because the private sector also wanted to be ‘bailed-out’ of the 
financial crisis. 
KI: 12 noted similar difficulties:  
It is very difficult to operate in this cluster because the national and world 
events have a direct impact on the cluster. This often calls for 
readjustments of our plans in the middle of the financial term. There are 
always disasters and diseases which compromises our focus on B-BBEE 
policy implementation. We often find ourself in a dilemma whether we 
allocate funds for B-BBEE policy implementation or we allocate more 
money for health related challenges such as HIV/AIDS, malnutrition, or 
educational projects.   
When asked more specifically to identify the challenges experienced by this 
cluster in implementing B-BBEE policy, one major factor was identified, as 
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KI: 11 took this argument a step further, noting that:  
The problem with B-BBEE policy is that it’s for the urban élite, those who 
are highly educated or familiar with government procurement processes. 
It is easy for them because they have been given opportunities many 
times. There is no way that the poor can compete with them even in a 
fair and open process. At the end of the day a final decision will always 
be based on the quality of the tender proposal on the table, and 
unfortunately the poor is always a loser. 
KI: 9 argued that: 
I doubt whether B-BBEE policy was introduced for poverty reduction. To 
me it was introduced for business people to make more profit at the 
expense of the poor. This is a strategy for the black élite with their white 
counterparts to accumulate more profit. Can anyone tell me, how do 
you transform the economy in rural areas where there is no economy to 
do so? Rural community relies on subsistence farming to survive. How do 
you transform the economy that does not exist? In rural areas what you 
need is the development of the economy rather than economic 
transformation.  
KI: 10 addressed the same point: 
One of the serious weaknesses of B-BBEE policy is its assumption that there 
is an economy out there that needs to be transformed. This is a wrong 
assumption. Maybe this is true in urban areas. However, in 
underdeveloped areas where the majority of blacks live there is 
absolutely nothing. There is an urgent need for economic development 
rather than transformation. In rural areas there is great need for skills, 
infrastructure, and educational programmes. Maybe we need a different 
kind of B-BBEE policy in rural areas, one that will start through 
development and investment in local economy, then diversification of 
subsistence farming into fully fledged commercial business. This would be 
real empowerment rather than what is happening right now. This, 
however, requires a different state mentality, one that is prepared and 
ready to take risks.   
COMMENT: The interviewees in this cluster provided a unique insight into B-
BBEE policy implementation in rural areas (underdeveloped areas). Notably, 
B-BBEE policy challenges in rural areas require more emphasis on economic 
development rather than the more general racial transformation necessary in 
urban areas. In this context, B-BBEE has been criticised for being elitist and 
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benefiting the urban privileged. However, the responses went further and 
connected B-BBEE policy to wider economic development in the country. 
The interviewees suggested that there was a contradiction between 
transformation and general economic development, more particularly that it 
was impossible to implement transformation policy in conditions that require 
economic development. Consequently, B-BBEE policy implementation is 
divorced from the general economic development strategy. This means that 
the B-BBEE policy programme has become an incidental outcome of 
economic development strategies. This revelation explains why some in this 
study have argued that transformation in South Africa has been very slow.  
(ii) It is creating social entitlement 
A second observation was that the implementation of B-BBEE policy was 
creating a form of social entitlement. KI: 9 said: 
People are no longer working hard because they believe that they are 
entitled to government opportunities. Nowadays, there are those who 
rely on government tenders, and social grants to make a living.  
Opportunities are available but there is a problem of people who are 
living from ‘hand to mouth’. There is no way that we can be successful as 
a nation when people do not want to work hard. Government is trying 
very hard to make interventions for the poor such as the provision of low 
cost houses, social grants and tender opportunities. However, 
government is not achieving its objectives because some people 
amongst the beneficiaries are serving as ‘fronts’ for others. They get low 
cost houses or tenders and rent it out or subcontract it to others. This is not 
allowed in terms of government policy because there is no economic 
benefit for the B-BBEE policy target group. It is difficult to stop this when 
the target groups themselves are abusing the policy. 
KI: 10 expressed the same view, that “the policy on B-BBEE is creating 
unintended consequences. I think one of the serious mistakes we made as 
government is that we have not explained in detail the intention of this 
policy. Many people consider the policy as a way of getting rich quickly. This 




KI: 12 interpreted the issue differently: 
I have heard many people complaining that B-BBEE policy is creating 
social entitlement. On close scrutiny you would realise that those who 
hold this view are the black ‘middle class’ who are highly educated and 
hold senior positions in government. There is no way that poor people can 
be blamed for expecting government to solve their problems or opening 
up opportunities for them. Government by its very nature is about helping 
people. It is therefore on the basis of the role of government that its 
citizens have a legitimate expectation from government. It must be 
remembered that when people vote government into power it is on the 
basis of the promises that individual political parties make during the 
campaign period. 
COMMENT: The central view from the interviewees in this section is that 
when B-BBEE policy beneficiaries benefit on government tenders and 
opportunities it does help to achieve the objectives of B-BBEE policy. 
One of B-BBEE policy objectives is to empower its intended beneficiaries 
to be self-sustainable. Therefore, there can be no empowerment when 
the policy beneficiaries live from hand to mouth as stated in one 
interview. But how does this relate to B-BBEE policy implementation? The 
issue of social entitlement raises one fundamental question about policy 
management. B-BBEE policy is not only about helping people but 
implicitly in its processes there must also be the empowerment element. 
This means that the continuous reliance on government tenders by B-
BBEE policy beneficiaries cannot be regarded as a form of 
empowerment. Social entitlement cannot be regarded as a result of a 
failure of government officials to explain policy objectives, as suggested 
by the interviewees. This is indicative of how the policy is being 
managed in the cluster.  
(iii) B-BBEE policy is creating a get rich mentality 
The perception that B-BBEE policy has been seen as a source of enrichment is 




My problem with B-BBEE policy implementation is that it creates a get rich 
mentality among its beneficiaries. The point I’m trying to make here is that 
when we open up opportunities for B-BBEE policy beneficiaries, our goal is 
that they would create job opportunities for others. However, my 
experience is that B-BBEE policy beneficiaries are not solving the problem 
of poverty and unemployment. The majority of them are subcontracting 
or buying goods from established companies. Additionally, the majority of 
B-BBEE companies are family enterprises. People are interested in 
accumulating profits for themselves as individuals rather advancing 
government strategic goals.   
KI: 12 took this argument a step further, noting that “many B-BBEE policy 
beneficiaries are driven by a false notion of getting rich quickly. I regard this 
as a false notion because many of them judge success or richness in terms of 
material possessions such as driving expensive cars, etc. Nobody is interested 
in helping others or advancing government policy on poverty eradication”. 
KI: 9 added that “the issue of getting rich quickly is interesting because most 
of these material possessions are bought on loans from the commercial 
banks. The majority of B-BBEE policy beneficiaries have debt from commercial 
banks. We therefore cannot be happy for this and it is not what B-BBEE policy 
was intended for”. 
COMMENT: Evidently, the success of B-BBEE policy cannot be regarded as 
real when the majority of its beneficiaries are indebted to the commercial 
financial institutions. However, this is not a failure of the policy or that the state 
is failing to manage the policy correctly. Government cannot be responsible 
for the failure of the beneficiaries to pay back their loans. But perhaps a lack 
of financial assistance from government is what drives people to the financial 
institutions for loans. Government’s response is that Funding Development 
Institutions (FDIs) were introduced for this reason. The problem is the resources 
available are insufficient to meet the needs of those who require funding.    
(iv) It is difficult to manage B-BBEE policy, as too many actors are involved 
Is managing B-BBEE policy difficult because the processes are too complex? 
KI: 9 said that: 
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My problem with B-BBEE policy is that there are too many actors involved 
in the process. This includes people from different professions i.e. 
accountants, legal, policy specialists etc. My experience is that these 
government officials have different emphases regarding B-BBEE policy 
implementation. People from the finance section would always want us 
to cut on programme spending. The supply chain and legal officials are 
concerned with compliance issues. This has created a situation where it is 
impossible to do anything substantially.  
KI: 10 highlighted that “things would have been much better if there was one 
unit responsible for B-BBEE policy implementation. This unit would have been 
given more power and authority to ensure that B-BBEE policy is implemented 
accordingly”. 
COMMENT: On the one hand, the involvement of many people in the 
implementation of B-BBEE policy should have been welcomed because it 
suggests maximising government efforts. On the other hand, those in 
authority in different departments have often issued conflicting instructions 
which hinder the implementation of the policy. This indicates a lack of policy 
co-ordination.  
6.2 Policy co-ordination  
In terms of B-BBEE policy and its relevant strategies, government departments 
are required to co-ordinate B-BBEE policy implementation across the 
organizational functions and structures. This includes structures within the 
organization of the cluster and interdepartmental relations with other 
provincial government departments. The central focus of this section is to 
understand the SPCHD cluster’s B-BBEE policy co-ordination. How did the 
interviewees interpret their role in B-BBEE policy co-ordination? What does B-
BBEE policy co-ordination entail? Are they successful in carrying-out this task? 
And what are the obstacles to co-ordination? Figure 6.2 highlights the 

















































































































































barrier for B-BBEE policy co-ordination. Five (25%) thought that B-BBEE policy 
implementation included too many actors which created problems for policy 
co-ordination.  A further five (25%) employees public officials suggested that 
the cluster faced various challenges which were too serious to be mitigated 
by policy co-ordination, whereas a final three (15%) respondents believed 
that decentralization of government functions was a barrier for policy co-
ordination. These perceptions were explored in greater detail with the Key 
Informants.  
(i) Currently, there is a culture of individualism 
The culture of individualism was seen as a problem for government 
operations as well as to the public officials themselves. KI: 12 said that: 
There is no way that we will ever be successful in co-ordinating key 
stakeholders on B-BBEE policy implementation. There is a culture whereby 
many people prefer to operate as individuals rather than involving many 
people in the process. The reason why this happens is because 
government departments have separate strategic planning. Additionally, 
government departments have different mandates which make it hard to 
co-ordinate B-BBEE policy implementation. My experience in government 
is that structures such as government cluster systems do not work. When 
the heads of department participate in the cluster they do so after they 
have already decided on their department’s strategic focus for the year. 
This makes the government cluster system ‘a talk shop’ with nothing 
important coming out of it.  
According to KI: 11, “the current culture within government is that even if you 
try to organize interdepartmental meetings, nobody comes to such a 
meeting. People are so preoccupied with their own individual functions. I 
have since realised that it is better to set my own targets and deal with the 
challenges on the ground. This is the only way I have been able to survive”. 
However, KI: 10 believed that “you cannot blame government officials for not 
participating in co-ordination structures. It’s the way government is 
structured. We have different plans, budgets and mandates which demand 
individual accountability rather than group accountability”. 
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COMMENT: Government departments are structured according to their 
functional mandates, that is, the Department of Transport deals with roads 
issues, Public Works with infrastructure related issues, and so on. B-BBEE is a 
public policy which cuts across various departments. Every department is 
expected to address inequalities by empowering the B-BBEE policy target 
group. But the need for B-BBEE to be implemented widely through the SPCHD 
cluster makes policy co-ordination difficult because of the number of 
potential actors involved. 
(ii) Too many actors create problems 
In KI: 9’s view, the involvement of a diverse group creates problems for policy 
co-ordination. 
The problem with B-BBEE policy implementation is that it involves a diverse 
group from different backgrounds. These people have different agendas. 
There are still lot of people who are resistant to change. Our meetings 
take too long debating irrelevant personal issues. It is due to this problem 
that others attend the meetings once and you would never see them 
again. I think we need to develop a code of conduct for our co-
ordinating forum. 
However, KI: 10 disagreed, arguing that it “is not the agendas of those who 
are participating in the process that is a problem. The serious problem is how 
co-ordination meetings are being run. Most of the time people come to the 
meetings without any agenda circulated upfront. This means that people 
come to the meeting not prepared”. 
KI: 11 concurred: 
Things would have been much better if we were given an opportunity to 
forward items upfront to be included on the meeting’s agenda. What is 
happening is that we get invited to a meeting without knowing what 
would be discussed. This is why many people request time to consult with 
their superiors. It is impossible to make far-reaching decisions or commit 
your department without having a mandate to do so. This can be 
mitigated through the circulation of the agenda for the meeting way in 
advance so that people can come with a mandate from their superiors. 
COMMENT: The issues here go beyond the number of participants in the 
cluster who are responsible for implementing B-BBEE policy. More 
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importantly, the issue is organizational, because meetings are 
supposedly not prepared properly, causing much dissatisfaction and 
frustration. This suggests a level of basic co-ordination in this cluster. But 
there was also the view that the real problem went beyond matters of 
co-ordination.  
(iii) Problems are too serious to be solved by co-ordination 
According to KI: 12: 
The level of inequalities and poverty among the B-BBEE policy target 
group is too serious to be solved by policy co-ordination. Sometimes, I feel 
sorry for those leading the process of B-BBEE policy co-ordination. 
Stakeholders come to our forum with a list of challenges and they expect 
us to come with solutions. I think that many stakeholders participating in 
our structure are running away from their responsibilities. My view is that if 
your department’s mandate is to provide social grants or development of 
rural economy, you must be able to lead us in the co-ordination process. 
However, this is not what is happening in the co-ordination of this policy.  
KI: 11 took a wider view: “there are three spheres of government in this 
country. However, it is impossible to work together as one government. Each 
sphere of government is fighting for its own independence to the extent that 
this compromises government function”. KI: 9 indicated that “this problem 
has nothing to do with government operations, instead it’s more to do with 
politics. When you have a different political party at local government level 
there are always problems. Government services and access to those 
services got politicised”. 
COMMENT: The common theme in this section is that inequalities and poverty 
were so rife, yet at the same time policy co-ordination of B-BBEE was not 
helping to confront this challenge. Policy co-ordination was hampered, and 
there did not seem to be a clear demarcation of roles. This is perhaps why the 
interviewees argued that such structures were introduced to serve political 
goals rather than driving government policies. Furthermore, the problem of 
coherency of different spheres of government also surfaced as a major 
problem for policy co-ordination. The general feeling in this cluster was that 
162 
 
various government structures are competing to claim the ‘space’ at local 
level rather than working together to serve the public. Thus, decentralization 
is not necessarily the solution, but brings about problems of its own. 
(iv) Problems of decentralization of government functions  
KI: 9 said that: 
There are three spheres of government in South Africa: national, 
provincial, and local government. Each one of the three spheres of 
government has an important role to play in terms of the implementation 
of government policies. However, there is a serious problem when it 
comes to policy co-ordination on the ground. Many national and 
provincial government departments have decentralized their functions to 
the local level. They have created what has been termed as ‘one stop 
centres’. For example, the Department of Trade and Industry has opened 
Small Enterprise Development Agency (SEDA) offices in every region in 
KwaZulu-Natal. The SEDA offices deal with enterprise development on 
behalf of the DTI. The same function is performed by the provincial 
Department of Economic Development and Tourism. DEDT on the other 
side has opened its own ‘one stop centres’.  These centres are operating 
at local level. These centres have indirectly taken over the role of the 
local government because the services they offer to the public were 
supposed to be offered by the local sphere of government. There is no 
proper policy co-ordination because each centre operates individually, 
and receives instructions from the national or provincial departments. This 
creates duplication and incoherence in government policy 
implementation.  
KI: 10 concurred with this view: “there is no co-operation amongst 
government departments on the ground due to decentralization of 
government functions. Government departments are now competing in 
servicing the public rather than working together to maximise scarce 
resources”. KI: 11 explained the reason for this is that “decentralization of 
government functions is a political decision rather than an administrative 
one. Decentralization… is rife in areas where there is a different political party 
at local level from the one that is at a national or provincial level. This is a 































































































































































































































































































































(i)  Concentration of blacks at the lower level 
KI: 12 said that 
South Africa has gone a long way in terms of transformation but there are 
still a lot of challenges such as the fact that the majority of black people 
are still serving in junior positions within government. My view is that this 
cannot be a failure of the government system. We have good policies in 
place to ensure that transformation happens but the problem is the 
failure of leadership to drive the process. This includes the failure of black 
managers. The problem of transformation is beyond the issue of race. 
When black people are appointed even at a lower level, it is up to 
themselves to prove their worth by working very hard to move up the 
organizational ‘ladder’. There are government policies in place such as 
promotion and career pathing to ensure that this happens.  
KI: 10 agreed that “the issue of blacks serving at a lower level is not about 
race but it is a combination of factors such as hard work, dedication, merit, 
etc. People must learn to work very hard for career advancement. You 
cannot be entrusted with important responsibilities on the basis of your race. 
You must educate yourself, work hard, and serve the public so that you get 
promotion”. However KI: 11 noted that, “there are lot of black people serving 
at the top management within government. We cannot all be at the top, 
those in the middle or lower level must work hard to gain promotion”. 
COMMENT: The profile of the provincial government that was presented in 
Chapter One noted that blacks are in the majority across all organizational 
levels. Clearly blacks are now serving in key executives positions within 
government. In terms of the provincial profile blacks are now the majority in 
key decision-making positions. Whether they are able to influence the 
strategic direction of government organization is another matter. The 
problem lies, it appears, with the organizational processes in government.  
(ii) Blacks are in charge but processes remain the same 
KI: 9 said that: 
Government processes have not been transformed despite the fact that 
there are so many black people in key positions. The apartheid regime 
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created a situation whereby government services were allocated on the 
basis of race, and geographical location. The introduction of democracy 
in 1994 abolished all the discriminatory laws. However, we still have 
underdeveloped areas, mostly rural areas, with a high level of poverty 
and unemployment. The situation is better in urban areas. Unfortunately 
there are still discrepancies in government services. Services in 
underdeveloped areas are very poor compared to urban areas. Black 
leadership who understand the plight of the poor have failed to transform 
government functions. It is a known fact that the majority of people living 
in the poor areas are the blacks.  
KI: 10 explained, that “to me this problem is not informed by any policy, but 
it’s a question of emphasis and priorities. It is easy for government officials to 
meet their targets when operating in cities because of the economic 
structure of the country”. KI: 11 also emphasized the urban dimension:  
It is wrong to assume that a black manager is anything different from 
other racial group. Remember that these black managers grew up in 
urban areas, went to urban schools, and are belonging to the élite class. 
Their world view and policy orientation are the same as any other racial 
group. Furthermore, they identify themselves with urban elites. It was 
therefore wrong to assume that black managers will be loyal to the poor.  
COMMENT: The general view was that transformation at this level has not 
lived up to its aims. There was a level of frustration that even black 
managers were incapable of transforming state institutions. The 
contention in this cluster is that the reason why black managers were 
failing to transform government organizations was because of their 
policy orientation which was not different from any other racial group. 
Nonetheless, government organizations are now required to change the 
status quo. Possibly, a serious problem was that at the beginning of 
transformation process too much emphasis was placed on the 
achievement of numerical goals in transforming the demographic 
profile of officials in the cluster which might have compromised the 
transformation of other injustices which are related to the 




(iii)  Institutional culture still discriminates against blacks 
Does the institutional culture still discriminate against blacks? KI: 10 
responded, that 
to me the issue of transformation has never been about how many blacks 
you have within your organization. The problem with transformation in 
many government departments is that many people are chasing 
numbers. It is all about how many blacks are there in your structure, that 
is, black women, disabled etc. This happens to the extent that those who 
are in a position of authority ignore other important aspects of 
transformation such as the transformation of the organizational culture to 
be reflective of a diverse group. Real transformation to me means that 
government should care about its citizens. This should be practised across 
government services such as the improvement of quality of services, 
improvement of turn-around time for payment, etc.  
KI: 9 expressed this difficulty: 
South Africa is emerging from its apartheid past where everything was 
imposed by the authorities. I still feel that the current organizational 
culture within government does not allow for constructive engagement 
on critical issues affecting us. Everything is imposed from the top without 
opening up democratic processes. There is no integrated planning where 
everybody is allowed to contribute to the strategic direction of the 
organization.  
KI: 11 suggested that “government has opened up opportunities for blacks. 
However, blacks are unable to influence anything because the culture of 
government is to comply with regulation. This means that many black people 
must comply with government practices even in situations where 
government cannot achieve its aims and objectives”. 
COMMENT: It is true that one of many expectations of government was to 
transform the public service to be responsive to the challenges on the 
ground. However, the failure to transform government culture to be more 
than standard compliance to regulations cannot be construed as 
discrimination. Any organization that relies on a rigid system might result in a 
lot of inefficiencies but this is not discrimination against a group of people. It 
was noted earlier that South African democracy is founded on the 
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Constitution which guarantees equal treatment of every citizen in the 
country. There is therefore no regulation in South Africa that promotes 
discrimination. Rigidity of government regulations can be found anywhere in 
the world, even in countries that never experienced discrimination like 
apartheid.   
(iv) Transformation is not driven by the top echelon 
Perhaps the pace of transformation in the SPCHD cluster was due to some 
lack of leadership. KI: 12 said that: 
B-BBEE and transformation in general create operational ‘nightmares’ 
within government. This is due to the fact that transformation happens 
everywhere in the organization. The problem of transformation is caused 
by different specialisations which are not necessarily transformation 
focused. For example, the financial services deal with government 
budget, etc. while human resources deal with staff development and 
training, etc. This means that the implementation of transformation 
programmes becomes an additional function and as such the 
accountability aspect of transformation is problematic because it is 
beyond your normal practice. Furthermore, transformation reports are 
submitted to the multiple departments/agencies which are beyond your 
executive management. This includes the national Department of 
Labour, the provincial cluster, provincial B-BBEE Advisory Council, etc. 
KI: 11 suggested that “things would have been much better if the head of the 
department was directly in charge of all transformation process. The problem 
is that this function has been delegated to a number of divisional heads”.  KI: 
10 took this argument a step further, commenting that, “this is creating an 
accountability problem. I cannot submit a report or explain myself to another 
divisional head who is on the same occupational level as mine. I prefer to 
submit all my reports to somebody senior who can make informed decisions. 
The problem with transformation reporting is that we report to people who do 
not have the authority to act”. 
COMMENT: Because B-BBEE policy processes and functions cut across a 
number of organizational line functions, the management of transformation is 
unique. It was clear from the Key Informant’s interpretations of their 
challenges in the SPCHD cluster that government has perhaps not taken time 
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to figure out how best to deal with management challenges to the policy. 
The current government organizational design has given rise to a lot of 
implementation problems concerning B-BBEE policy. This manifests itself in a 
number of ways on various organizational levels: policy accountability and 
different specialisations which are clearly not transformation focused were 
considered as a major operational challenge. This can better be understood 
by analysing the hierarchy of decision making within the provincial 
government. 
6.4 Organizational hierarchy 
B-BBEE policy implementation has to be implemented across various 
organizational functions, operations and structures, which require common 
understanding, effort, and co-operation between the top executive and the 
operative employees.  This section analyses the relationship between the top 
executive and operative employees in B-BBEE policy implementation. Are key 
strategic B-BBEE policy decisions are imposed by the top executive 
management without consultation?  
Figure 6.6. SPCHD cluster: consultation about decisions on B-BBEE policy 
 
Figure 6.6 reveals that 50% of the respondents strongly agreed that strategic 









































































































































































































management into strategic positions is not based on merit but rather on 
whether someone can be entrusted with certain responsibilities. This is 
why, once an executive manager has been appointed, they spend most 
of their time on matters outside the scope of government policy. There 
are so many cases in government where senior officials have been fired 
because the relationship between them and the political principals have 
broken down. To me, this means that the central focus at the top is all 
about creating good working relationships with political principals rather 
than policy implementation.  
KI: 10 concurred with this view, that “…the higher you go within the 
organizational hierarchy the more political it becomes. This means that you 
must strive to find a balance between the political mandates with policy 
imperatives. In most cases it is safer to carry the instructions from your political 
principal”. 
KI: 11 disagreed, arguing that: 
The executive management cannot be accused of not having project 
experience because it is not their role to operate at this level. This is why 
they must ensure that they hire operative employees to deal with project 
implementation. They can only take the blame for not properly 
distributing the resources, not for policy implementation failures. It must be 
remembered that when the executive management hire the operative 
employees they are at the same time delegating certain responsibility. 
The operative employees by extension serve the function of the executive 
management. 
COMMENT: The relationship between the top executives and operative 
employees (project managers) is hierarchical. Strategies were decided upon 
by the top executives without the involvement and consultation of the 
operative employees. The respondents expressed frustration regarding this 
approach because they believed that such decisions were not informed by 
concrete experiences in the field of project implementation. The various 
comments on this reflect different interpretations of how government 
structures should operate. Obviously, all levels of such structures have an 
important role to play in the management and implementation of 
government policy. However, the responses indicated some contestation of 
the role that each level plays in policy management.  
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(ii)  The executive did not move up the organizational ladder 
The general view here is that the career path for executive management did 
not follow the normal promotion of staff in the public service. What were 
consequences for managing B-BBEE policy in the SPCHD cluster? KI: 12 said 
that: 
Career pathing for the top executive management is not done through 
the normal public service practices. In practice, it may look like it’s done 
through the proper procedures because all these positions are advertised 
correctly. The problem arises when there is no fair competition amongst 
the applicants. Internally, we don’t waste our time applying for the job 
that is advertised for certain individuals that are known to be lacking 
experience at that level. At the end of the day they get appointed 
irrespective of their shortcomings on government operations. What can 
we say? The political principals reserve a prerogative to appoint the 
executive management.  
KI: 11suggested that: 
Things would have been much better if there was a rule that prescribes 
that no one must be appointed at senior level without having started at a 
project level. This would have ensured that at least senior management is 
experienced in policy implementation. This was going to improve 
relationship between senior management and operative employees.  
COMMENT: The central theme of these claims and counter arguments was 
that key decisions that were taken by the top executives in the SPCHD cluster 
were not relevant to the needs on the ground. This has been interpreted by 
those at the project implementation level as a direct result of lack of 
experience among the top executives when it comes to project 
implementation. Conversely, executive management believe that the 
operative employees were hired to close this gap, that project managers 
were delegated to solve executive management problems. However, this still 
does not explain why such important policy decisions on B-BBEE were taken 
without the operative employees having been consulted. The problem may 
not lie with consultation per se, but may be due to issues of power and 
authority, since executive management believe that it is their mandate and 
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responsibility to make key organizational decisions irrespective of the impact 
of such decisions. 
(iii)  It is because of power and control 
KI: 12 said that: 
It is a known fact that South Africa is still dealing with the legacy of 
apartheid. B-BBEE policy was introduced to solve this unfortunate past. It 
was a common practice under apartheid that everything was imposed 
from the top. This was done to enable apartheid masters to exercise 
power and control at all levels of government. This practice was 
camouflaged as government protocol and standard practice. 
Unfortunately, there are still senior managers in government who are 
adopting the same approach in the name of protocol and government 
practices. The mistake made in the transition to democracy is that we 
concentrated on policy development without at the same time 
transforming government practices.  
KI: 11 suggested that “it is impossible to change this behaviour of the top 
management because there is a standard practice within government that 
instructions do not come from below. This means that government policy is 
driven from the top”. KI: 10 maintained that “it is neither government policy 
nor practice that decisions must be imposed from the top. The problem is 
power and control by the top management, which is being exercised 
unreasonably to the extent that it affects policy implementation”. KI: 9 noted 
that, “I do not believe that the performance of those at the top is based on 
policy implementation otherwise we would have a lot of them fired. Those 
who get fired are for all the wrong reasons, such as corruption or the breaking 
down of relationships with political principals, etc. I have not seen a single 
manager being disciplined for failing to implement government policies”.   
COMMENT: The decisions of the top executives have been questioned for 
their lack of reaction to the challenges on the ground. There was a strong 
belief among those operating at the project level that this was informed by a 
lack of such performance measures for the executive management. The 
performance of the top executive was not based on policy implementation 
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results. Importantly, interviewees suggested that performance of the 
executive management is dependent upon the preservation of good 
working relationships with the political principals. This compromises the policy 
implementation of B-BBEE because the executives would always strive for 
political expediency.   
(iv)  Executives are threatened by the operative employees 
Perhaps the executive management felt threatened by the operative 
employees, which then affected the style of decision-making. KI: 9 said that: 
My experience in government is that over the years government has 
undergone serious changes. Since the inception of democracy in 1994, 
government departments have ensured that they recruit highly qualified 
young people. However, this happens at junior or lower level. What you 
have in government is that there is a concentration of highly educated 
and technical young people at an operational level. However, the senior 
top level is composed of experienced old people. Most of the old people 
do not have qualifications but they have experience and technical 
abilities which they have acquired over the years. This is creating a lot of 
challenges now because young employees want to see radical change 
in policy implementation, while the senior top are satisfied with the 
standard practices.  
KI: 10 commented “the operative employees believe that the top executives 
are threatened by their qualifications. Additionally, a lot of project 
implementation proposals get rejected by the top management without any 
proper explanation. This happens despite the fact that the operative 
employees are aware of the available budget”. The result, agreed KI: 11, is 
that “government is supposed to serve the public. However, current practices 
within government are such that we must serve the executive management. 
Nothing gets approved if it does not get the blessing from the top even when 
thorough research has been conducted on the viability of the proposed 
project”.    
COMMENT: The responses in this section have opened up a different 
dimension on the reasons why key decisions were imposed by the top 
executives. Notably, there was a strong view that the qualifications and 
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expertise at the operative level were creating difficulties because policy 
proposals or policy alternatives get disapproved by the top executives 
without any convincing reason. Importantly, the new generation of public 
officials often push for a radical shift of direction in government policy. But 
the prospect of this was limited due to the refusal of the top executives. It was 
rather strange that the executive would appoint highly qualified project 
managers and then not afford them the opportunity to exercise their 
expertise. Part of the problem in the SPCHD clusters may be how the policy 
on B-BBEE is communicated.  
6.5 Policy communication 
How did the respondents interpret their role in relation to B-BBEE policy 
communication? The questionnaire requested the officials to respond to the 
statement that without communication there can be no proper 
management of B-BBEE policy implementation for there is no possibility, then, 
of the group influencing the behaviour of the individual. As Figure 6.8 shows, 
most agreed strongly 55%, while 45% agreed. 
Figure 6.8. SPCHD cluster: importance of B-BBEE policy communication 
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prepared to talk. Informally, everybody is free to express various concerns 
regarding the policy.  
KI: 10 suggested that “communication within government is too political, and 
this was the reason why it was centralized at the MEC’s office”. KI: 11 
indicated that “it was not communication per se that was a problem in 
government. Real problems were the issues for communication. People were 
able to discuss and communicate on social issues such as government sports 
day, events, etc. However, things become difficult when you raise critical 
issues about the core function of government. For this, you must have 
permission from the communication section. The same goes for publication”.  
KI: 12 added that 
Government over the years has centralized communication in the MEC’s 
offices. They have hired highly technical individuals on communication 
such as former journalists to work as ‘spin-doctors’. The communication 
section was working as a government nerve centre for information 
dissemination. There was a strong view within government that the 
communication section should have its own newspaper for the public. 
This has to show that government was not treating information 
dissemination lightly.    
COMMENT: The provincial government’s approach to policy 
communication seemed to be problematic. Government policies are 
public knowledge. The policy on B-BBEE is a public document which 
anyone can download from the Internet. This policy seems to be 
attracting a lot of attention, much of it negative. Permitting government 
officials to communicate internally could serve government well in terms 
of clarifying technical aspects of the policy. This would better ensure 
that, when communicating with the public, government officials at least 
do so on commonly informed basis, importantly thus enabling them to 
be  ambassadors for B-BBEE policy. 
(ii) Tools for communication are controlled by the top 
The standard practice within government was that dissemination of 
information is controlled at the central corporate point. KI: 10 said that: 
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Over the years, the management has introduced control mechanisms 
over communication. Anyone wanting to distribute information, whether 
through emails, pamphlets or a meeting must first seek permission from 
corporate affairs. The standard practice is that there is nothing to be 
transmitted if it is not job related. We have a problem with this approach 
because this is perceived as censorship on issues which are critical in the 
management of the department. We are unable to raised critical issues 
through internal channels due to the fact that such issues are often 
considered as having the potential of bringing government into 
disrepute. 
KI: 11 suggested that “there is censorship when it comes to communication 
within government. There is censorship in the sense that it is only the 
corporate affairs who determines all job related publications. There are no 
guidelines given, so that everyone is aware of what constitutes a job-related 
subject. To me, it is job-related to talk openly about policy failures. Normally, 
this is considered as bringing the organization into disrepute”.  
KI: 10 noted that “this behaviour of controlling all the channels for 
communication is informed by the centralization of communication tools. 
Senior management believe that internal discussion over the emails might be 
picked up by the media. It is because of this reason that government has 
introduced control mechanisms”. 
COMMENT: The issue of the centralization of communication has been 
expressed many times in the course of this chapter. Generally, it can be 
stated that the management of government policies is highly centralized and 
officially structured. This manifests itself in a number of ways, whether in 
decision making, policy co-ordination or policy communication. There 
seemed to be a well-established tradition of control that was entrenched in 
government processes and procedures. The majority of the Key Informants 
consider this as a barrier to effective policy implementation, not least 
because negativity surrounding B-BBEE policy is not able to be corrected by 




(iii) It is because senior management is paranoid 
Some public officials attributed the centralized control over communication 
to the paranoia of senior management. KI: 11 said that: 
There is no free flow of information within government due to fear of 
senior management. The top management is so fearful to communicate 
on B-BBEE policy to the extent that strategic decisions are not 
communicated to the whole department. We rely on unofficial forms of 
communication to understand what is happening within our department. 
Sometimes this is not good because information derived from this form of 
communication is not accurate. I think the main reason why this happens 
is that management is fearful that the media might access such 
information.   
KI: 12 indicated that: 
The tools for communication such as the intranet, emails, and websites 
are controlled by the top management. Anyone intending to publicise 
anything internally must first seek permission and demonstrate whether 
such publication is relevant to one’s work before it can be transmitted. 
However, I believe that this is against the principles of democracy. We 
must be transparent. There is therefore no way that government can 
communicate internally unless all the communication channels are 
opened for everyone. 
Without such internal communication, policy implementation is undermined. 
According to KI: 9, “my department is composed of a number of divisions 
and these divisions are inter-related. The proper functioning of one division is 
dependent on the other. However, it is very difficult to operate when you are 
not sure of what the other section is doing. This is why there is a lot of 
duplication of government projects and scarce resources are not properly 
distributed”.  KI: 10 added that “even when you try to communicate at a 
project implementation level, it does not achieve anything when there was 
no proper communication in the planning phase”.   
COMMENT:  The implication of centralization and the lack of a free flow of 
information has negative effects on policy implementation. There was an 
element of frustration among those who serve at a project management 
level. They believed that a lack of communication leads to a lack of 
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understanding by various business units within the same department. 
Eventually, duplication results and scarce resources were not properly 
distributed. Importantly, it was evident from the responses that poor 
communication contributes to poor policy planning which cannot be 
mitigated by project implementation.     
(iv)  We are not allowed to engage with the public 
Policy communication on B-BBEE was regarded as weak by some in the 
SPCHD cluster because employees were not allowed to engage the public 
on key policy issues. KI: 12 said that: 
Communication within government should reflect what is happening in 
the broader society. I mean that government officials should discuss or 
communicate amongst themselves about social needs. This is not 
happening because we are not allowed to engage with the public to 
get feedback on policy impacts. To a certain degree, we receive 
feedback from the public through surveys from the consultants hired by 
the state. I believe that it could help us if we could get the first hand 
information directly through face-to-face interaction with the public. The 
only communication that government is good at, is on human resources 
related problems, that is, bonuses, promotion, salary increases or staff 
discipline. To me, this is not good because the message it sends out to the 
public is that government is all about individual’s interests. We have 
made people out there perceive us as people who are driven by 
personal interests rather than solving their challenges.  
KI: 9 commented that “communication within government would have been 
much better if all of us were allowed to communicate directly with the public 
rather through the communication section”. KI: 11 suggested that 
“communication within government is not at an expected level. Government 
has all the internal tools for communication. However, we are not utilising the 
tools at an optimal level. We receive information through ‘corridor talk’ rather 
than the official channels. There are a lot of lies. The information in the 
corridors is not about the policy but more about staff welfare. We lack 
leadership when it comes to communication”. 
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COMMENT: Evidently, lack of communication in the SPCHD cluster also means 
a failure to communicate with the public outside government structures. 
Notably, the Key Informants agreed that they were able to communicate 
freely on issues that affect them directly, such as salaries, but they were not 
allowed to communicate on policy issues. This begs one fundamental 
question. What was the cause of this situation? The answer lies in the very 
location of communication within government, which was identified as being 
at the political level. Those at this level were concerned with the political 
implications of government policies. This suggests that what gets transmitted 
within and outside the cluster was based on political considerations rather 
than being informed by technical aspects of government policy.  
6.6 Conclusion 
The findings in the SPCHD highlighted a number of organizational issues. What 
has been learned thus far regarding the cluster’s management of B-BBEE 
policy implementation? The findings revealed that B-BBEE policy 
implementation encountered a number of challenges. It emerged that B-
BBEE policy implementation was not contributing to the reduction of poverty. 
Notably, rural areas (underdeveloped areas) require more emphasis on 
economic development rather than the more general racial transformation 
necessary in urban areas. However, those in this cluster suggested that there 
was a contradiction between transformation and general economic 
development strategy. Thus, B-BBEE policy implementation was criticised for 
being elitist and benefiting the urban privileged. B-BBEE was thought to be 
creating social entitlement, because people were no longer working hard 
since they believed that they were entitled to government opportunities. B-
BBEE policy was thus creating unintended consequences, which can be 
interpreted as an indication of how B-BBEE policy was being managed in the 
cluster. Furthermore, B-BBEE policy was creating a get rich mentality among 
its beneficiaries. This occurred when people are interested in accumulating 
benefits for themselves as individuals rather than advancing government 
strategic goals to deal with poverty and unemployment. Furthermore, 
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respondents in the cluster believed that it was difficult to manage B-BBEE 
policy, as too many actors were involved in the process. Various 
specializations within government organizations had different and sometimes 
conflicting policy emphasis which was creating a problem for B-BBEE policy 
implementation.  
The findings revealed that there was a culture of individualism within the 
cluster that affected B-BBEE policy co-ordination. In this situation, individual 
business units within the cluster were considered to be preoccupied with their 
individual functions. As a result, government departments in the SPCHD 
cluster were structured according to functional mandates which hindered 
policy co-ordination. The decentralization of government functions was also 
considered to be another barrier for policy co-ordination. It was further 
suggested that decentralization of government functions created 
unnecessary competition between government organizations in the cluster. 
This was considered to be unnecessary because there was no co-operation 
to maximize government efforts. Thus, it was believed that the problems 
within the cluster were too serious to be solved by policy co-ordination. Even 
when officials in the cluster attempted to organize co-ordinating meetings, 
they did not succeed because meetings were supposedly not properly 
prepared.  
What has been learned about the level of transformation in terms of B-BBEE in 
this cluster? It emerged that organizational transformation encountered 
serious challenges. Notably, the respondents in this cluster cast a shadow of 
doubt on transformation because there were strong views on the issue that 
blacks were in charge of key positions in the cluster but that processes and 
procedures remained the same. There was a perception that government in 
general, including black managers, were incapable of transforming state 
institutions. Officials contended that the reason why black managers were 
failing to transform government institutions was due to their policy orientation 
which was not different from any other racial group. This perception was 
underlined by the belief that the institutional culture still discriminates against 
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blacks and that transformation was not driven by the top echelons in the 
SPCHD cluster. 
On the hierarchy of decision-making in this cluster, the findings revealed that 
key organizational decisions were imposed from the top without consultation. 
Thus, frustration was expressed regarding this approach because such 
decisions were considered to be uninformed by concrete experiences in 
project implementation. It became clear that there was a belief that 
executive management did not have project experience, and one of the 
main reasons for this perception was that the executive have not moved up 
the organizational ladder in the departments through the usual channels of 
job selection like all other staff members. Consequently, their lack of 
knowledge of tangible targets and projects was felt to be weak because 
they were experienced. On the other hand, there was a belief that the 
exercise of power and control of the executive over the operative 
employees was an impediment to career progression. This was further 
compounded by the opinion that the executive felt threatened by the 
operative employees. There was a strong view that qualifications and 
expertise at the operative level were not necessarily an advantage because 
policy proposals or policy alternatives were turned out by the top executives  
for unconvincing reasons.  
In general, the cluster acknowledged the importance of policy 
communication as a tool for B-BBEE policy implementation. However, on 
whether the cluster was meeting this expectation, the cluster believed that 
centralization of communication in the MEC’s office was affecting policy 
implementation. The centralization of communication was considered to be 
a form of censorship because officials were not free to transmit key technical 
policy matters. There was a strong feeling that when it comes to 
communication the centralization of the services reinforces the belief that 
senior management were paranoid. Members of the SPCHD cluster indicated 
that this has created a situation where government employees rely on 
unofficial channels to understand what is happening in their own 
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organizations. Thus, the implication of the centralization and lack of free flow 
of information had negative effects on B-BBEE policy implementation. 
Consequently, duplication resulted and scarce resources were not properly 
distributed. It was contended that communication was a major problem in 
that what gets transmitted within and outside the cluster was based on 
political considerations rather than being informed by technical aspects of 
government policy.   
The following, final chapter combines the findings on all three clusters in an 
effort to reach a general assessment in terms of the five main themes which 

















    Chapter Seven 
 Final analysis  
The previous chapters discussed data pertaining to the three clusters 
according to the main themes which inform this study, namely, managing 
policy implementation, policy co-ordination, organizational transformation, 
organizational hierarchy and policy communication. The main objective of 
this chapter is to combine and compare all these findings. This will be carried 
out in terms of the same five themes. The discussion of each theme will 
proceed with a table which presents the summary of the central themes of 
the theoretical framework that were first identified in Chapter One. This will be 
followed by another table which will indicate the main findings on that theme 
from the three clusters. The findings will indicate the issues that were identified 
by each cluster according to the significance they were given by the public 
officials concerned.     
The chapter concludes with a brief exploration of the South African 
development vision for 2030, the National Development Plan (NDP: 2012) 
which was being prepared by government, in the President’s office, at the 
same time that this research was being undertaken. The NDP is a significant 
development, which bears examination in relation to B-BBEE policy, 
especially in light of the issues that emerged from this study.  
7.1 Managing policy implementation  
What were key issues identified by each cluster on B-BBEE policy 







Table 7.1. Summary of the central themes of the theoretical framework: 
managing policy implementation 
Themes Strategic focus 
Managing policy 
implementation 
 Policy implementation is  rarely a linear, coherent process 
 No single agency can manage policy implementation effort 
 Creates winners and losers 
 New policies  do not come with budgets 
 Support is frequently absent 
 Policy benefits take time to be realised 
 
Table 7.2. Clusters: managing policy implementation 
ESID CLUSTER 
 Contradictory strategies and 
different mandates (50%)2 
 No knowledge transfer (20%) 
 Regulatory environment not 
conducive to innovation (15%) 
 
G&A CLUSTER 
 Implementation structures 
and processes are 
outdated and rigid (50%). 
 B-BBEE governance 
models are weak (20%) 
 B-BBEE policy is 
discretionary (20%)  
SPCHD CLUSTER 
 Not contributing to the 
reduction of poverty 
(60%). 
 B-BBEE policy is creating 
social entitlement (20%) 
 B-BBEE policy is creating 
a get rich mentality 
(15%). 
 
There was general agreement among the clusters regarding the broad 
challenges encountered by the provincial government on B-BBEE policy 
implementation, but there was a slight difference of opinion as to the root 
causes of the situation. As noted earlier, this was to be expected as different 
government functionaries in the same organizational environment tend to 
face a variety of challenges that are different in detail, if not in their totality. 
50% in the ESID cluster argued that contradictory strategies and different 







Those in the ESID cluster explained that each government department has its 
own unique and specific policy mandate, and their own organizational brief, 
which prescribe the nature of collaboration between departments in the 
province, as well as their relations with the national sphere of government. 
Such organizational briefs and policy mandates entail a certain exercise of 
authority. Those who controlled government resources at the same time 
determined the rules of engagement. In this setting, it was impossible to deal 
with B-BBEE policy limitations at the provincial level. This was so because 
legislative mandates were limited and dependent upon appropriate policy 
action by the national sphere of government. Consequently, those serving at 
the national government level were considered to be in a better position to 
solve complex B-BBEE policy challenges. Those in the provincial government 
clusters perceived the national government as having the legislative authority 
to overcome B-BBEE policy limitations. This view was strongly held by all 
provincial government officials despite their different briefs. Those in the ESID 
cluster suggested that there was nothing the provincial government could do 
to overcome this problem because they did not have the requisite authority. 
This reveals the organizational complexity between the spheres of 
government, even in a unitary state.  
It would have, perhaps, been expected that there was a predetermined 
legislative mechanism in place to deal with such challenges whenever they 
arose. Policy implementation can often be multidirectional, fragmented, 
frequently interrupted, and unpredictable, according to Brinkerhoff and 
Crosby (2002: 23). These considerations turn out to be true in this case and 
are complicated due to power relations between the different spheres of 
government. As noted earlier, a disproportionate exercise of authority may 
be problematic in conditions that should rely more on influencing and 
persuading others. Perhaps the exercise of authority might suggest deep 
seated structural policy problems. Note that 50% in the G&A cluster argued 
that B-BBEE policy implementation structures and processes in the province 
were outdated and rigid.  
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Consequently, an authoritative administration that issues instructions from the 
top may find it hard to solve structural problems. Unfortunately, problems do 
not come to an administrator carefully wrapped in bundles which are clearly 
sorted out (Simon 1997: 4). Thus, a conducive environment should be created 
for different organizational components to contribute to the design and 
implementation of B-BBEE policy. Problems and weaknesses need to be 
remedied in order for an organization to achieve its designated goals, which 
have mostly been set by legislation, rules, and regulations. However, 15% in 
the ESID cluster noted that the environment in which the policy on B-BBEE was 
implemented was not conducive to innovation. In this sense, a lack of 
innovation was regarded a barrier to policy implementation because 
government officials were forced to deal with compliance issues rather than  
being able to provide alternative initiatives in order to solve complex 
problems. This challenge was, perhaps, connected to a lack of proper 
leadership and understanding of B-BBEE policy by senior officials. 20% in the 
ESID cluster indicated that there was no knowledge transfer in the 
implementation of B-BBEE policy. It can be argued that knowledge transfer 
requires a concerted effort by leadership to ensure internal co-operation in 
provincial government.  
The findings further revealed that there were entrenched procedures and 
routines to meet B-BBEE compliance targets in the province. The G&A cluster 
pointed out that it has become a norm in the management of B-BBEE policy 
in government always to follow long established methods rather than being 
creative in coming up with new initiatives. It was suggested that innovation 
needs risk taking, a reality that was impossible for government officials, unless 
they were prepared to take the chance of being expelled from government. 
Furthermore, 20% in the G&A cluster thought that governance models for B-
BBEE policy implementation were weak because government officials 
endeavoured to accommodate B-BBEE policy initiatives by using outdated 
methods and procedures. This means that there were no best practices in B-
BBEE policy processes. As a result policy implementation was ineffective. This 
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could be the reason why 60% in the SPCHD cluster believed that B-BBEE 
policy was not contributing to the reduction of poverty among its target 
group.  
Officials in the SPCHD cluster maintained that it was impossible to implement 
B-BBEE policy in underdeveloped rural areas which require economic 
development. This suggests not only the limitations of B-BBEE policy 
implementation but also weaknesses in the design of state institutions. Thus, 
the provincial organizational designs in implementing policy were perceived 
to be in conflict with B-BBEE policy objectives. This has led to a lack of 
uniformity and a common approach to B-BBEE policy management. The 
findings revealed that various government organizations were affected by 
their internal arrangements, their specific contacts, as well as relations 
between the organizations. The indication that everything that needed to be 
done by government had to be in line with an overall organizational 
mandate bears testimony to this challenge.  
This can further be interpreted as a bigger problem in the provincial 
government of disintegration in policy planning, and in budgeting processes 
as well. Those in the three clusters identified a serious lack of linkages 
between government policy processes. 20% in the G&A cluster thought that 
B-BBEE policy was discretionary which makes it difficult to enforce its 
implementation. The responses highlighted that those who were non-
compliant with B-BBEE policy did not face sanctions. For instance, in 
executing B-BBEE policy, government had no leverage over companies 
which did not wish to tender for government services. Consequently, 
provincial officials desired more authority and powers to deal with such 
shortcomings. This implicitly suggests that success in B-BBEE policy 
implementation requires government organizations to have more authority to 
enforce policy implementation. Hence, there was an overwhelming sense of 
agreement among all clusters that policy managers should be empowered 
accordingly in terms of B-BBEE policy legislation. 
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The frustration expressed by all in the clusters can also be interpreted as a 
failure or absence of strategic management to mobilise and persuade 
stakeholders towards a common goal on B-BBEE policy implementation. 
However, strategic management in a multi-actor policy implementation is 
not a question of command and control (Brinkerhoff and Crosby 2002: 118). 
Managing policy implementation is about developing a shared vision (which 
in this context means influencing rather than punishing), persuading 
supporters and opponents, negotiating agreements, resolving conflicts, co-
operating with a wide array of stakeholders and devising work programs in a 
participatory and collaborative way. The advocacy for more power and 
authority expressed by officials in the clusters exposed the reality that 
participatory B-BBEE policy management within the provincial government 
was lacking.  
It was clear from the findings that there was an element of frustration among 
the clusters regarding various challenges encountered in the processes of B-
BBEE policy implementation. Those in the SPCHD cluster, for example, 
suggested that the management and application of B-BBEE policy by 
government organizations had produced unintended results. A substantial 
number of the respondents in the SPCHD cluster (60%) noted that while one 
of the key objectives of B-BBEE policy has been to contribute significantly to 
the reduction of poverty, this was not the case, as the majority were still living 
under poor conditions.  
Officials in the SPCHD cluster explained that the presumed B-BBEE policy 
beneficiaries were no longer working hard because they believed that they 
were entitled to government opportunities. 20% in the SPCHD cluster argued 
that B-BBEE policy implementation has been instrumental in creating a strong 
sense of social entitlement and a get rich mentality among its target group. 
Practical results on the ground indicated that a very small segment of the 
population had taken advantage of the opportunities, and these had been 
inconsistencies in the implementation of B-BBEE policy. As a consequence, B-
BBEE policy was not achieving its intended aims and objectives.  
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Furthermore, those in the SPCHD cluster maintained that the implementation 
of B-BBEE policy in reality has widened the gap between the ‘haves’ and the 
‘have nots’. Thus, they suggested that although the emerging black middle 
class can be regarded as ‘haves’ many of them relied on government 
tenders, social grants, and lived from ‘hand to mouth’. Those in the SPCHD 
cluster identified two main interrelated consequences that had arisen from 
the implementation of B-BBEE policy. One was the phenomenon of ‘fronting’, 
of Africans acting as the public face of companies owned by others who 
sought tenders from government. The second is when beneficiaries from B-
BBEE policy decide to rent out or subcontract such opportunities to others, 
which is expressly forbidden in terms of the policy regulations. 
In general, the challenges in managing the implementation of B-BBEE policy 
that were highlighted by officials in the three clusters can be addressed by 
co-ordination within government, which is the second main theme of this 
study.   
7.2 Policy co-ordination 












Table 7.3. Summary of the central themes of theoretical framework: policy 
co-ordination  
Themes Strategic focus 
Policy  co-ordination  Co-ordination must deal with threats to autonomy 
 There is always a lack of task consensus 
 Conflicting vertical/horizontal requirements 
 Linkages among the agencies are multiple and interlocking 
 
Table 7.4. Clusters: B-BBEE policy co-ordination 
ESID CLUSTER 
 Lack of stakeholders buy-in (30%). 
 Problem of silo management (25%). 




 Organizations have 
different annual 
performance plans (50%). 
 Co-ordination structures 
are unable to adopt far 
reaching decisions (20%). 
 Too many organizations 
are represented by junior 
officials (15%).  
SPCHD CLUSTER 
 There is a culture of 
individualism (35%). 
 Too many actors create 
problems (25%). 
 Problems are too serious 
to be solved by policy 
co-ordination (25%). 
 
Those in the clusters acknowledged that the KZN government has been 
successful in setting up a provincial B-BBEE policy co-ordination structure. All 
pointed out that a B-BBEE implementation team had been tasked to co-
ordinate B-BBEE policy implementation. It emerged that the ESID cluster is 
responsible for organizing B-BBEE implementation team meetings. The findings 
revealed that the provincial government encounters many challenges in its 
quest to co-ordinate B-BBEE policy in the province. Some challenges were 
common to the clusters and others were peculiar to a particular cluster.  
Notably, 35% in the SPCHD cluster indicated that a culture of individualism in 
government serves as a barrier to policy co-ordination, while 25% in the ESID 
cluster highlighted that there was a problem of ‘silo management’ that 
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served as a barrier to policy co-ordination. ‘Silo management’ can be 
understood as a condition where the interdependence of various 
components within government organizations is not recognized. According 
to the officials, clear boundaries were set for policy implementation which is 
not informed by a broad organizational strategic vision. Thus, individual 
components within the cluster pursue their individual projects. As a 
consequence, scarce resources are not shared to maximize policy outcomes 
and roles have become centralized which has affected attempts to attain 
policy co-ordination.  
Lack of policy co-ordination undermines joint action. It has been suggested 
that joint action is clearly the most intensive form of co-ordination, which 
carries the highest degree of potential problems for policy co-ordination 
(Brinkerhoff and Crosby 2002: 123). These considerations were found to be 
true in regard to B-BBEE policy co-ordination in the province. From the findings 
it was discovered that the situation was compounded by policy pertaining to 
operating procedures in the province. Individual government organizations 
were following their own mandates strictly in policy planning. 50% in the G&A 
cluster explained that different performance plans among government 
organizations were a serious barrier to policy co-ordination. Government 
programmes are based on targets set out in performance plans and are 
assessed accordingly. Performance plans determine government priorities in 
a financial cycle. Consequently, government performance is geared towards 
achieving targets as stated in the performance plans. Officials indicated that 
performance plans are adopted several months before the beginning of a 
financial cycle. In practical terms this means that B-BBEE policy co-ordination 
only occurs once all policy decisions, particularly financial commitments, 
have already been made. Then, because B-BBEE policy does not form part of 
the performance plan, co-ordinating is problematic. This is possibly why 20% in 
the G&A cluster suggested that inadequate co-ordination of B-BBEE policy in 
the province prevented far reaching decisions being adopted.  
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This begs a fundamental question: how; then, can government officials make 
far reaching decisions in the middle of a financial cycle, since clearly by this 
time key decisions have already been concluded? Thus, joint action can 
pose real challenges when organizations which have different operating 
procedures need to co-ordinate their activities (Brinkerhoff and Crosby 
2002:122). It was therefore apparent from the findings that policy planning in 
the provincial government was not informed by deliberations concerning 
policy co-ordination. Further evidence that policy co-ordination was not 
regarded as part of a key strategy for policy implementation was illustrated 
by most organizations delegating co-ordination tasks to junior officials. 
Unsurprising, then, 25% in the SPCHD cluster maintained that B-BBEE policy 
problems were too serious to be solved by policy co-ordination.  
Furthermore, the findings also revealed that the situation was compounded 
by the central location of policy co-ordination in the ESID cluster. As noted 
earlier, the ESID cluster played a leading role in terms of B-BBEE policy co-
ordination at a broad provincial level. Thus, those in the G&A and the SPCHD 
clusters considered that co-ordinating B-BBEE policy was the responsibility of 
the ESID cluster. 50% in the G&A cluster and 60% in the SPCHD cluster thought 
that their organizations were not successful in co-ordinating B-BBEE policy 
implementation in the province, while 40% in the ESID cluster indicated that 
they were succeeding in co-ordinating key stakeholders for B-BBEE policy 
implementation.  
This was a clear indication of how the location and the role of each cluster 
on policy co-ordination have a direct influence on policy implementation. 
Significantly, multi-organizational co-ordination that relies heavily on formal 
mechanisms which is enforced by a central unit is rarely successful, 
according to Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002: 126).  This was so in the case of 
co-ordinating B-BBEE policy where the location of co-ordination had proven 
to be ineffective. Officials in neither the G&A nor the SPCHD cluster thought 
that policy co-ordination was their responsibility. This could be interpreted as 
a deliberate mechanism to distance policy co-ordination failures from the 
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two clusters and ultimately to deny accountability. In this context, the 
‘presumed custodian’ (ESID cluster) had to shoulder the blame regarding the 
failure of B-BBEE policy co-ordination.  
Thus, the ESID cluster was placed in an unfairly conflicting situation to meet 
various expectations, especially considering that B-BBEE policy is specific to 
all government organizations which must carry out policy implementation. 
But perhaps the official arrangement of B-BBEE policy co-ordination in the 
province is what is creating a lot of confusion and leading to 
misinterpretation of the processes. The results of this can be determined by an 
analysis of the level of transformation in the provincial government.   
     7.3 Organizational transformation 















Table 7.5. Summary of central themes of the theoretical framework: 
organizational transformation 
Themes Strategic focus 
Organizational 
transformation 
 Organizational transformation: process of organizational change, 
standards, norms, hierarchies, decision making, organizational culture 
 Culture of an organization is the result of its history, environment, 
selection process and socialization practices 
 There are five forms of participation: information sharing, consultation, 
collaboration, joint decision-making, and empowerment 
 There must be collaboration among stakeholders 
 Participation is not a panacea for future implementation success 
 
7.6. Clusters: organizational transformation  
ESID CLUSTER 
 There are no cultural activities to 
promote transformation (55%). 
 Youth and women are still 
excluded (20%). 




 Everything revolves 
around your association 
with right group (55%). 
 Black leadership is not 
agent of change (20%). 
 Blacks have been 
included in key positions 
but it’s hard to influence 
change (15%).  
SPCHD CLUSTER 
 There is the 
concentration of blacks 
at the lower level (50%). 
 Blacks are in charge but 
processes remain the 
same (30%). 
 Institutional culture is still 
discriminatory (10%). 
 
The prevailing views from all the clusters were that the provincial government 
has achieved some level of success in terms of opening up opportunities for 
black people. Officials recognized that black people were holding key 
strategic positions in the provincial government, but there were many 
transformation management challenges. 55% in the ESID cluster explained 
that transformation within the provincial government has not achieved its 
objectives because there were no cultural activities to promote 
transformation. They noted that, for historical reasons, the South Africa 
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population had been segregated by apartheid and that transformation 
under democracy has failed to achieve cultural integration in the provincial 
government.  Officials believe that cultural activities could help ensure that 
there is unity among government officials in order to maximise their efforts in 
serving the public. This was an important revelation as it demonstrated that 
the inclusion or participation of black people in key positions is not a 
panacea for successful transformation (Brinkerhoff and Crosby 2002:52). 
Accordingly, real transformation cannot be measured only in terms of the 
numbers of black people occupying key positions in government. 
Furthermore, those in the ESID cluster maintained that the system of apartheid 
ensured that black people were never entrusted with important 
responsibilities in government. At that time occupational roles were allocated 
on the basis of race. This is the reason why members of the ESID cluster 
contended that discrimination was still deeply entrenched in government 
processes and procedures, even though all the discriminatory rules and 
regulation had been abolished by the democratic government.  
Most importantly, how can the majority of black managers perpetuate 
discrimination which victimised them under apartheid? 30% in the SPCHD 
cluster explained that black people are now in charge of key positions within 
government yet the administrative processes and procedures remain the 
same. This can be interpreted as an indication that, perhaps, the 
implementation of transformation has come to be associated with the 
inclusion of black people in key positions, while at the same no attention is 
given to other key transformation factors, such as the nature of structural 
injustice. The measurement of the level of transformation also makes matters 
worse as it is based on the achievement of compliance with numerical 
targets. In this context government organizations are forced to concentrate 
on statistics pertaining to personnel rather than dealing with overall 
organizational transformation in terms of culture, norms, processes and 
procedures. Perhaps the challenge faced by provincial government is due to 
policy limitations rather than a management problem. Moreover, the 
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transformation of government organizations is complicated even further by 
the fact that even among the black population there is no homogeneous 
culture. Public officials are therefore operating in a policy terrain that is full of 
limitations and opportunities.  
The findings also demonstrated that transformation policy is not immune to 
patronage. 55% in the G&A cluster argued that in government everything 
revolves around one’s association with the right group. They suggested that 
government opportunities are allocated on the basis of patronage rather 
than on merit. As they acknowledged, transformation policies were 
introduced with good intentions, but their implementation favours certain 
people. 15% in the G&A cluster explained that as much as black people 
were holding key positions, it was hard to influence the strategic direction of 
policy in government. Those in the G&A cluster suggested that this was due 
to the problem of internal committees which had powers to make key 
decisions. They believed that the manner in which people get appointed to 
key positions was questionable as it was not based on transparent processes. 
This was a thought provoking finding given that government officials are 
entrusted with authority to provide general leadership even when they 
perform their particular roles as members of various committees.  
Government decisions will always be contested terrain among various groups 
in government. But a government official’s policy brief is to ensure that he or 
she persuades others to achieve policy objectives and to exercise authority 
to ensure that there is transformation. Notably, 20% in the G&A cluster 
maintained that black leadership was not the agent of change. According 
to them, black managers lacked a transformation agenda, because their 
world view was not different from any other racial group working for 
government. This goes to the heart of transformation in South Africa. In fact 
this demystifies the central belief by many in South Africa that black 
managers, because of their group identity with the black population, would 
be loyal and biased towards their own in delivering services. But there are 
limits and trade-offs inherent in increasing participation, which may further be 
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dependent on leadership and dedication (Brinkerhoff and Crosby 2002: 59). 
Discussing the organizational hierarchy in the provincial government will 
further unpack the key issues which need to be taken into consideration.            
7.4 Organizational hierarchy 
 What is the relationship between the top echelon and operative employees? 
Table 7.7. Summary of the central themes of the theoretical framework: 
organizational hierarchy 
Themes Strategic focus 
Organizational hierarchy  Hierarchical-rule based organizational designs 
 Organizational power and influence 
 Policy change is controversial 
 Strengthen political will 
 Boost specialised skills 
 
Table 7.8. Clusters: organizational hierarchy  
ESID CLUSTER 
 Protocol dictates this (65%). 
 Strategy is always drive from the top  
(20%). 




 Operative employees 
must concentrate on 
project implementation 
(70%). 
  This is done to promote 
accountability (15%). 
 It’s the duty of executive 
management (5%).  
SPCHD CLUSTER 
 It’s because they don’t 
have project experience 
(40%). 
 Most of them did not 
move up the 
organizational ladder 
(30%). 
 It’s because of power and 
control (25%). 
 
What emerged from all the clusters was that the provincial government was 
following a strict hierarchical, rule-based approach on B-BBEE policy 
management. Strategic B-BBEE decisions were imposed by the top 
executives without any consultation.  
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70% in the G&A cluster suggested that key decisions were imposed by the 
top executives so that the operative employees could concentrate on policy 
implementation. According to them, in government there are clear 
guidelines regarding the allocation of roles and responsibilities which have 
led to top management having to make certain decisions on behalf of their 
organizations and to be accountable for such decisions. They explained that 
it was a matter of government policy that the top executives must make 
strategic decisions, otherwise operatives would not know what to do.  
Although the executives are responsible for making strategic decisions and 
are accountable for them, the issue here is whether such decisions were 
informed by sufficient consultation within their organizations. Those in all the 
clusters suggested that top management was not always in touch with the 
realities of policy implementation. This made their decisions irrelevant or 
incompatible with B-BBEE policy objectives.  
Members of the G&A cluster explained that it was the duty of the top 
management to mobilize resources so that the operative employees could 
concentrate on policy implementation. However, those in the ESID cluster 
challenged this approach since their experience had been that resource 
allocation undertaken on this basis had turned out to be irreconcilable with 
the objectives of B-BBEE policy. Consequently, they believed that the 
requirements for policy implementation needed immediate attention which 
was not forthcoming from the top executives. This created an impression 
among the operative employees that the top management lacked 
experience in policy implementation. Thus, the overwhelming majority of 
officials across the clusters felt that this top-down approach to policy 
management had been a bad strategy for policy implementation.  
It was found that because top executives were concerned with the 
allocation of the resources this meant that policy implementation had to be 
adjusted according to the availability of resources. In the end, policy 
implementation was often required to be aligned to the constraints of the 
government budget, rather than in terms of achieving policy objectives. Thus, 
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policy implementation, and reporting on it, had to be in accordance with 
government spending. In this sense, progress reports on policy were reduced 
to accounting for budget expenditure.  
This raises one fundamental question regarding policy accountability. How 
can the executives account for expenditure emanating from policy 
implementation when they are not actually involved at this level? The findings 
revealed that there was this kind of disconnect between executives and 
those responsible for operational aspects of policy implementation. The only 
form of interaction between operatives and executives seemed to be, 
according to those in the clusters, through executives issuing instructions and 
operatives carrying them out. This militates against the notion that the 
principal role of a hierarchy is to co-ordinate an organization’s 
interdependences (Peterson 1997: 159). Consultation and accountability 
need not be mutually exclusive. Instead, consultation should form part of a 
broad strategy for policy accountability. This would strengthen state 
accountability and ultimately its capacity and institutional arrangements.  
65% in the ESID cluster suggested that the situation was further compounded 
by government protocol. They noted that government protocol dictates that 
the executive management must make strategic decisions without 
consultation. All in the clusters expressed frustration regarding this approach, 
which they viewed as an impediment to successfully managing B-BBEE policy 
implementation, as well as being against the principles of democracy. 25% in 
the SPCHD cluster explained that this approach was informed by issues of 
power and control within the provincial government. Pfeffer (1992: 12) 
suggests that unless and until leadership in organizations is willing to come to 
terms with organizational power and influence, and admit that the skills of 
getting things done are as important as the skills of figuring out what to do, 
their organizations will fall further behind.  
It turned out that the issue of power relations in the management of B-BBEE 
policy in the province was further connected to the problem of a 
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generational divide. Those in the SPHD cluster explained that in government 
there was a generational divide on B-BBEE policy management. According 
to them, the inception of democracy in 1994 meant that most government 
organizations needed to hire highly educated and technically skilled young 
black employees. Such employees were concentrated at the lower and 
middle management levels within the hierarchy of most government 
organizations. Consequently, at the top level, there were old officials with 
inadequate or no qualifications, while in the middle and lower levels there 
were highly qualified young people but who had little experience. Members 
of the SPCHD cluster argued that this was creating conflict in B-BBEE policy 
management because the young generation’s approach to policy 
implementation was radically different to that of the top executives’ who 
were inclined to adopt tried and tested policy approaches.  
40% in the SPCHD cluster indicated that this major problem had created the 
perception among people in government that the top executives do not 
have project experience. Such a perception emanated from the 
experiences of policy implementation where policy proposals were rejected 
by the executives without any convincing explanation. 30% in the SPCHD 
cluster believed that this problem was because many executives had been 
hired without having had considerable previous experience in government 
administration. This had led to a style of management based on command 
and control. How the decisions made in this manner were communicated to 
the entire organization is an issue for the following section. 
7.5 Policy communication 
 Is the provincial government successful in communicating key B-BBEE policy 






Table 7.9. Summary of central themes of the theoretical framework: policy 
communication  
Themes Strategic focus 
Policy communication  Communication must take place at all levels 
 Good information flow is not a set of procedures 
 Without communication there is no organization 
 Attention to communication is dependent on its form 
 There are official and informal forms of communication 
 Communication must be at a centre stage of strategic decisions  
 Organizations need internal communication networks 
 
Table 7.10. Clusters: policy communication 
ESID CLUSTER 
 Not contributing to project 
implementation (40%). 
 Lack of critical engagement with 
issues (35%). 
 It is centralized at the top (20%). 
 
G&A CLUSTER 
 It happens, but it is not 
effective (65%). 
  It lacks a transformation 
agenda (15%). 
 It is not improving policy 
implementation (10%).  
SPCHD CLUSTER 
 It fails because it is 
control by the MEC’s 
office (55%). 
 Tools for communication 
are controlled by the 
top (20%). 
 It is because senior 
management is paranoid 
(15%). 
 
All the clusters acknowledged the importance of communication in the 
implementation of B-BBEE policy in the province. However, the prevailing 
view from all clusters was that the provincial government was failing to meet 
this expectation. This is due to a number of challenges, as indicated in Table 
7.10.  
65% in the SPCHD cluster suggested that policy communication happens in 
government, but that it was not effective. Those in the SPCHD cluster 
explained that problems in policy communication within government were 
getting worse, as the top executives had begun to issue instructions 
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prescribing that nothing was to be transmitted internally unless it was not job 
related. Officials in the G&A cluster expressed confusion about what 
constituted job-related information in relation to B-BBEE policy 
communication.  
It has been argued that the most common example of poor information flow 
is evident when one part of an organization is unaware of what another is 
doing (Cohen and Eimicke 2002: 170). All the clusters indicated that a lack of 
policy communication through proper communication official channels had 
resulted in a rise of informal means of exchanging information. There was a 
strong feeling that when it comes to centralizing policy communication, this 
emphasized the belief that the top executives were always apprehensive of 
operative employees. 15% in the SPCHD cluster felt that the top executives 
were paranoid.  
Thus, 65% in the G&A cluster suggested that although B-BBEE policy 
communication took place within government, it was not effective, and 15% 
in the same cluster believed that communication lacked a transformation 
agenda. Consequently, many in government, as well as the public in 
general, did not properly understand B-BBEE policy, and did not realize the 
effort that government was making to implement the policy. B-BBEE policy 
needed to be seen in conjunction with all other public policies which 
entailed transformation and development. This would reduce the negative 
perception, B-BBEE officials in the clusters maintained. Government 
employees would be able then to understand the essence of B-BBEE policy, 
its significance at all levels and could thereby serve as B-BBEE policy 
champions.  
40% in the ESID cluster specified that B-BBEE policy communication was not 
contributing to project implementation. 35% in the ESID cluster suggested that 
the issue was not policy communication per se that was a problem, since the 
serious challenge was a lack of critical engagement on B-BBEE policy issues. 
20% in the ESID cluster contended that the problem of policy communication 
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within government was also compounded by its location at the top level of 
the provincial administration. 55% in the SPCHD indicated that 
communication was located in the MEC’s office. This made policy 
communication structures inaccessible to policy specialists who needed and 
wanted to advance the technical aspects of B-BBEE policy. Consequently, all 
in the clusters argued that the structures for policy communication within 
government needed to be democratized and decentralized so that the 
myths associated with the policy could be corrected.  
Officials in the clusters believed that government had adopted inappropriate 
approaches to managing policy communication. Those in the ESID as well as 
the SPCHD clusters indicated that the top echelon in the provincial 
administration had introduced communication business units as a way of 
strengthening government policy communication. Thus, they contended that 
the problem with this is that these communication business units were given 
extraordinary powers to decide what gets transmitted within the 
organizational structures. Nothing was to be transmitted throughout 
provincial government unless and until it is approved by the communication 
section.  Some in the clusters believed that this has imposed censorship at the 
expense of a free-flow of information. According to Cohen and Eimicke   
(2002: 170) the difficulties experienced by organizations are often seen as 
problems of information flow, while in actual reality they are problems of a 
poorly designed organizational structure and inadequate constructed 
assignments. It turned out that these considerations were true with B-BBEE 
policy communication in the province.    
Officials in the SPCD as well as the ESID clusters indicated that the 
centralization of communication at the top level was having negative effects 
on policy communication because any critical views on B-BBEE policy were 
always construed as bringing government into disrepute. Those in the ESID 
cluster suggested that the problem was partly because political principals 
emphasized certain policies as priorities at the expense of others. In the end, 
a MEC’s choice of priorities became the organizational strategic focus which 
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had to be carried out by the top executives. Thus, any form of 
communication that was critical of such policy programmes could not be 
transmitted by anyone in government, except by the relevant MECs. 
Members of the ESID cluster remarked that even highly specialized 
employees who were hired to implement the policy in question were not 
permitted to communicate matters of technical nature relating to policy 
implementation.  
Responses from the ESID and SPCHD clusters indicated that this highly 
centralized form of policy communication made it impossible to provide 
constructive critique of policy within government that would improve B-BBEE 
policy implementation. It was clear from the findings that the issue was not 
only a problem about the form of communication but also what needs to be 
communicated by and within provincial government. Simon argues that the 
attention a communication receives will also depend upon its form (997: 216). 
In the provincial government the attention that policy communication 
received was not dependent upon its form, but on its location and on power 
relations within the organization.  
Policy communication was not seen as being at centre stage for policy 
management. Those in the SPCHD cluster, for example, indicated that the 
provincial government had all the necessary communication tools at its 
disposal, yet there was no clear and persuasive message about the broad 
intentions of B-BBEE policy. They believed that a compelling message on B-
BBEE policy could assist in convincing the role players to rally around policy 
implementation. Nevertheless, the existence of internal communication tools 
presents provincial government administration with an opportunity to create 
an effective communication system. This would entail decentralization and 
de-politicizing policy communication so that information dissemination could 






This study reveals that government policies are a complex phenomenon. 
They are characterised by many different interpretations, divergences, and 
conflicting demands from stakeholders as well as the need to carry out 
constitutional imperatives. Consequently, government has to be well 
equipped to deal with such challenges, not only in terms of introducing 
appropriate policies, but also in attending to institutional arrangements, and 
the professionalism of public officials. As was mentioned earlier in this study 
the South African government defines itself as a developmental state, one 
that is capable of intervening to correct historical inequalities, and of 
addressing poverty and unemployment through the creation of opportunities 
for more people. In responding to these challenges the government is also 
required, as a constitutional mandate, to further democracy in South Africa.  
This has led to the government publishing recently a National Development 
Plan for 2030 (NDP). This plan was formulated at the same time as the 
research for this thesis was undertaken. The significance of the NDP is that it 
affords South Africa a long term vision for development.  
The issues raised by the NDP have far reaching implications for provincial 
government, and for the role of B-BBEE policy and its implementation. But 
seen from another perspective the implementation of the NDP envisages an 
efficient and effective developmental state which is committed to 
democracy, transformation and development. Attaining good governance 
requires addressing the kind of issues that arose in this study pertaining to 
managing policy implementation, policy co-ordination, organizational 
transformation, organizational hierarchy, and policy communication. This final 
section considers, briefly, the NDP, in the context of what has been learned 
about the implementation of B-BBEE policy in the context of the provincial 
government of KwaZulu-Natal.  
In May 2010, the South African President, Mr Zuma, appointed the National 
Planning Commission to draft the South African National Development 
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Plan/Vision (NDP) for 2030. The Commission was appointed as an advisory 
body to the Presidency, consisting of 26 experts who were largely not 
employed by the state. The composition of the Commission included 
academics, researchers, independent policy analysts, individuals from 
business, labour, civil society, and it was chaired by the Minister in the 
Presidency who was responsible for the National Planning Commission. In 
June 2011, the Commission released its diagnostic report which set out South 
Africa’s achievements and shortcomings since the inception of the 
democratic administration in 1994. The report stated that South Africa’s failure 
to implement policies and an absence of broad partnerships among 
stakeholders were the main reasons for slow progress in development. The 
diagnostic report sets out nine primary challenges faced by the country: 
(i) There were too few people who were working. 
(ii) The quality of school education for black people was poor. 
(iii) Infrastructure was poorly located, inadequate and under-maintained. 
(iv) Spatial divides hinder inclusive development. 
(v) The economy was unsustainable and resource intensive. 
(vi) Public services were uneven and often of poor quality. 
(vii) South Africa remained a divided society. 
(viii) Public health system could not meet the demand or sustainable quality 
(ix) Corruption levels were high (NDP 2012: 14). 
The release of this report in 2011 generated serious debate during the 
consultation processes for the drafting and finalization of the NDP for 2030. 
The National Development Plan was debated and approved by the national 
Cabinet in August 2012.  
The NDP aims to eliminate poverty and reduce inequality in South Africa by 
2030. It specifies that South Africa can realize its goal by drawing on the 
energies of its people, growing an inclusive economy, building capabilities, 
enhancing the capacity of the state, and promoting leadership and 
partnerships throughout the society (NDP 2012:14). The NDP report (2012:14) 
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maintains that in every facet of life in South Africa advances have been 
made in building an inclusive society, overcoming the apartheid past and 
broadening opportunities for all. South Africa has been able to build the 
institutions necessary for democracy and transformation (NDP 2012:14). 
Healing the ‘wounds’ of the past and redressing inequalities caused by 
centuries of racial exclusion are constitutional imperatives (NDP 2012: 14). The 
South African Constitution enshrines a rights-based approach and envisions a 
prosperous, non-racial, non-sexist democracy that belongs to all of its citizens 
(NDP 2012:15). The Constitution also imposes obligation on the state to 
address the historical imbalances. As noted in the previous chapters of this 
study, government utilizes B-BBEE policy to deal in part with such inequalities.  
The NDP report (2012: 14) applauds and highlights the advances that have 
been made by the country since the inception of democracy in 1994. This 
includes South Africa’s increase in access to services for its people, economic 
stabilization and the fact that a non-racial society had begun to emerge 
(NDP 2012:14). Millions of people who were previously excluded now have 
access to education, water, electricity, health care, housing, and social 
security. Additionally, about three million more people were working now 
than in 1994, the poverty rate has declined and average incomes have 
grown steadily in real terms (NDP 2012:14).  
The fragmented apartheid governance structures have been consolidated 
into a system designed to serve the developmental objectives (NDP 2012: 
408). The composition of the public service has been transformed to better 
represent the entire population (NDP 2012: 408). This thesis has shown that 
black people are in the majority in the management structure of the KZN 
provincial government. The NDP report (2012: 408) suggests that the 
foundations have been laid, but weaknesses in how government structures 
function constrain the state’s ability to pursue the developmental objectives.  
The NDP specifies many challenges which are closely related to the findings 
on the main themes of this study.  
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On government management of policy implementation, the NDP notes a 
serious capacity challenge that is related to a number of factors. This includes 
challenges relating to uneven performance in local, provincial and national 
government (NDP 2012:408). The NDP contends that this was caused by a 
complex set of factors, including weakness in capacity, which is most serious 
in historically disadvantaged areas, where state intervention is most needed 
to improve people’s quality of life (NDP 2012: 408). The findings of this thesis 
revealed that inefficiency of government officials, which is mainly associated 
with a lack of skills and knowledge at different governance and 
administrative positions, can be described as a legacy of the past, but not 
entirely so. Specialist skills on policy implementation could be acquired 
through particular education and training, as well as from learning how other 
countries have carried out policies of transformation.  
The NDP maintains that a deficit in skills and professionalism has affected all 
levels of the public service (NDP 2012:409). Skills, a professional ethic and a 
commitment to public service should be recognized and valued at all levels 
of the public service (NDP 2012: 419). The NDP suggests that skills can be 
developed on the job, but staffers were often promoted too rapidly, before 
acquiring the experience needed for senior posts (NDP 2012: 419). This has 
resulted in the public service becoming top heavy (NDP 2012: 419). This was in 
part a reflection of skills shortages in the broader society, but specific 
interventions within the public service could help ameliorate this (NDP 2012: 
419). Although skills development is an important element of policy 
implementation, research for this thesis found that this is linked to other 
organizational issues, which go beyond to what is stated by the NDP.  
This thesis found that government policy implementation is hampered by 
weak policy governance models. As noted, this is a serious indictment of 
policy makers who design, plan and pass laws, but principally of the 
administrative arm of government which is obliged by law to apply public 
policies. The thesis revealed that government policy processes and 
procedures were too rigid to achieve policy objectives. But this is not the only 
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reason for the failure of policy implementation, as most government officials 
acknowledged that their role was more than public administration, since they 
have the power to convert government policies into implementable projects. 
This is why it was pointed out earlier that it was within a management official’s 
brief in the provincial government to rationalise outdated and rigid policies. 
The NDP notes tensions in the government-political administrative interface, 
instability of the administrative leadership, skills deficits, the erosion of 
accountability and authority, poor organizational design and low staff morale 
(NDP 2012: 408). As shown in this thesis, such challenges are directly 
connected to problems of policy co-ordination.  
On government policy co-ordination, the NDP notes that there have been 
many individual initiatives in the country, but there is a tendency to jump from 
one quick fix or policy fad to the next (NDP 2012: 408). These frequent 
changes had created instability in organizational structures and policy 
approaches that had further strained limited capacity (NDP 2012: 409). The 
search for quick fixes had diverted attention from more fundamental priorities 
(NDP 2012: 408). However, this thesis has shown that the situation could be far 
more complicated as silo management or a lack of co-operation among 
different government organizations was regarded by officials in all the clusters 
as a major problem for policy co-ordination in the KZN government.  
It was evident from the findings in this thesis that policy co-ordination was 
further constrained by set boundaries which were not in line with a broad 
organizational vision. The research revealed that silo management was 
informed by individual management priorities which had nothing to do with 
broad organizational strategic goals. This affects the distribution of scarce 
resources which could benefit a number of different components in the 
clusters. As noted in previous chapters, silo management of government 
policy had led to individual interests superseding the broad organizational 
goals. Thus, many within the KZN government clusters believed that there was 
no point in participating in policy co-ordination because there were no 
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benefits from the process. This serves as a barrier for policy co-ordination in 
the province. 
The NDP states that new initiatives to deal with co-ordination problems had 
often been ad hoc, with responses to individual problems being 
implemented without adequate consideration of the cumulative effects 
(NDP 2012: 409). Thus, among the stumbling blocks to efficient services were 
poor policy coordination and integration, multiple priorities, and an 
undefined hierarchy of authority amongst the plethora of government 
departments (NDP 2012: 154). This means that, for example, whenever a 
complex and integrated set of responsibilities was split across government 
organizations, it was difficult to maintain coherence over time (NDP 2012: 
154). This has resulted in public servants becoming increasingly overburden 
with paperwork (NDP 2012: 409). This thesis found that government 
organizational design was serving as a barrier to policy co-ordination. Most 
government organizations are structured according to their specializations. 
This inclines them to associate themselves with other organizations that have 
similar mandates. 
Furthermore, this research found that decentralization of government 
functions creates competition between government organizations, which 
was not beneficial because co-operation did not result and government 
efforts were not maximized. The main reason why there was such competition 
among government organizations was because of political interests rather 
than administrative considerations. However, in terms of the regulations 
governing public service practices in South Africa, civil servants should be 
apolitical. In other words, the public should receive services from officials 
irrespective of their political affiliation. The challenges of policy lead to a 
more general assessment of organizational transformation in government. 
The NDP suggests that South Africa needs to build a more equitable society 
where opportunities are not defined by race, gender, class or religion (NDP 
2012: 457). In order to make it easier for South Africans to interact with each 
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other across racial and class divides, the country needs to improve the public 
service. Consequently, measures that seek to correct imbalances of the past 
should be strengthened (NDP 2012: 457). The removal of the shadow of 
apartheid by developing the capabilities of the historically disadvantaged is 
necessary (NDP 2012: 460). The NDP believes that this is possible under the 
South African constitution as it has embedded in it values of human dignity, 
non-sexism, no-racialism and the rule of law. However, the NDP does not 
explain how the implementation of transformation policy could be managed 
by state institutions. As the NDP acknowledges, comprehensive legislation on 
transformation has been introduced, but the problem lies in its 
implementation and enforcement (NDP 2012: 470).  
The findings in this thesis identify some of the reasons why implementation of 
transformation policy is ineffective. As shown from the findings, the rigidity of 
administrative procedures and practices was cited as a major problem for 
transformation within KZN government. It also transpired that although blacks 
were holding key positions within the KZN government, they were unable to 
influence the direction of strategic policies. It was argued that their failure to 
exercise power and the authority vested in them was another barrier to 
organizational transformation within the KZN government. It was also 
suggested in the thesis that the apparent inability of black officials to 
influence the implementation of B-BBEE policy might be related to the 
drawbacks of patronage which were highlighted as another barrier to 
organization transformation in the KZN government.   
The thesis noted the issue of recruitment and promotion in the public service 
which was cited as another barrier for transformation. However, it was argued 
that the matter of the recruitment of public officials is not uniquely a problem 
of transformation, but a broadly organizational issue. In this context, it was 
discovered that the South African government faces a unique challenge in 
trying to recruit highly skilled, and technical black people (to reflect a 
commitment to transformation), while at the same time attempting to 
address poverty and underdevelopment. Yet, keeping such employees for 
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the sake of transformation requires that the government is able to 
compensate them appropriately.  
Thus, race is not the only factor to consider in furthering transformation in 
government in South Africa. For ambitious, well-qualified, experienced public 
officials advancement depends on a variety of matters, like patronage, as 
has been shown in this research on the KZN provincial government. The 
implementation of transformation policy is also dependent on structural 
issues, like organizational hierarchy.  
Power and authority which are associated with job positions in government 
organizational structures are cited as a major challenge for policy 
management by the NDP (2012: 419). The NDP maintains that the problem of 
authority and the experience attached to positions had been downgraded 
over time. Salaries were high for the work required (NDP 2012: 419). For 
example, a deputy director’s post used to be considered to be a senior one 
in the public service, but now people can enter such posts straight from  
university on a salary higher than many in developed countries or in 
equivalent posts in the private sector (NDP 2012: 419). This imposes pressure 
on higher ranking officials, which has increased the proportion of work that 
has been contracted out to highly paid consultants, who were often former 
public servants (NDP 2012: 419). In this context, policy work has been reduced 
to commissioning consultants and managing contracts, rather than engaging 
directly in public policy analysis (NDP 2012: 419). The findings in this thesis 
have shown that this problem was further connected to other structural 
management issues within the provincial government, including the 
challenge of policy decision-making.  
Findings from this research suggest that the working relationship between the 
top executive and operative employees within the provincial government 
has been centralized according to official structures. It was noted that 
decisions within the provincial government flow from the top executives 
downwards in the hierarchy. Accordingly, each individual component is 
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forced to follow its own line function without intruding on other levels.  This 
had made it difficult to respond appropriately to policy problems. 
Government officials in all the clusters believed that because of this nature of 
decision - making, policy decisions were not always relevant to the needs on 
the ground. The executive management within the KZN government saw its 
primary tasks as driving the organizational strategy, which meant mobilizing 
the required resources, and accounting for such resources. From the findings 
it was seen that the point of contact between the top executives and 
operative employees was through project proposals that are drafted and 
submitted by operatives for funding and approval by the executives. 
However, this approach was criticized by the operatives as ineffective and 
contrary to the principles of democracy. The NDP argues that power relations 
linked to job positions within the public service is widening the gap between 
policy formulation and implementation (NDP 2012: 419). At senior level, 
reporting and recruitment structures have allowed far too much political 
interference in selection and managing senior staff (NDP 2012:409), a factor 
that was identified in this thesis too.  
The findings in this thesis highlight that despite the occasional disagreement 
among government officials in different clusters within the KZN government, 
there were strong common feelings about the negative effects of the 
hierarchical administrative system. A sizeable proportion of the officials felt 
particularly aggrieved by this reality as they saw themselves as outsiders and 
not as integrated to decision-making. Thus, KZN government officials believed 
that the strict hierarchical structures dictated that they were obligated to 
follow strategic decisions that were imposed on them by superiors 
irrespective of the expected outcomes.  Consequently, the executives’ 
‘special projects’ were supposed to be implemented irrespective of the risks 
involved. 
The NDP argues that a lack of clarity about the division of responsibility, 
together with a reluctance to manage government systems had created 
tension and instability across the three spheres of government (NDP 
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2012:409). This thesis found that this issue was further linked to problems of 
power relations among government organizations. The NDP (2012:409) notes 
that there was no consensus on how problems relating to organizational 
hierarchy were going to be resolved and there was an absence of leadership 
in finding appropriate solutions. The NDP (2012: 409) suggests that reforms are 
needed that would enable people to do their jobs by strengthening skills, 
enhancing morale, clarifying lines of accountability and building an ethos for 
public service. Research in this thesis indicates that, even so, appropriate 
solutions do not occur in a vacuum; they need to be communicated to the 
entire government value chain.  
The NDP has not provided an assessment of communication as an instrument 
for government policy implementation. The NDP has rather concentrated on 
the broad problem of Information Communication Technology (ICT) in South 
Africa. On this, the NDP acknowledges that ICT in South Africa has not 
brought affordable, universal access to the full range of communication 
services. Therefore, the performance of state interventions in the ICT sectors 
has been disappointing (NDP 2012: 190).  
The findings of this thesis have highlighted many challenges of policy 
communication within the KZN provincial government. The officials in all the 
clusters emphasized the importance of communication as a broad strategy 
for policy implementation. But the findings revealed that policy 
communication was very poor. This was explained as a challenge that 
manifests itself in a number of ways in KZN government; for instance, an 
inability to mobilize stakeholders in a joint programme of action and an 
inability to transmit key information to B-BBEE policy target groups. This leads 
to a lack of critical engagement with B-BBEE policy issues, which is associated 
with the centralization of communication at the top level of public 
administration in the province. 
As argued in the thesis, this organizational problem reflects different 
interpretations of communication within the provincial government. Officials 
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in the cluster indicated that policy discussions were officially located at a 
certain high level in government structures, even in situations when it involved 
individual members of one department or government organization. This 
ensured that policy practices in the provincial government were 
hierarchically entrenched. As a result everything that was considered to be 
official was automatically elevated to the level of the top executives. Thus, 
the general views reported in this thesis are that the location of policy 
communication in provincial government was a cause for B-BBEE policy not 
being implemented effectively. To this end, a distinction was drawn between 
policy communication that is directed to the public outside government, as 
opposed to communication that flows within government structures. The 
focus of this thesis was on the latter. It was shown that policy communication 
has not formed a central role in the broad strategy for B-BBEE policy 
implementation. Its location within the KZN government ensures that it serves 
political aims rather than contributing to the successful implementation of the 
policy itself.  
The general issues highlighted in the NDP are largely confirmed by the 
research in this thesis which concentrated on the implementation of one 
specific policy, namely B-BBEE, by the provincial government of KwaZulu-
Natal. As this research has revealed, while the provincial government has 
had success in achieving transformation, shortcomings remain. These were 
identified and explored in terms of the themes of managing policy 
implementation, policy co-ordination, organizational transformation, 
organizational hierarchy and policy communication. Advancing 
management of B-BBEE policy will depend on the KwaZulu-Natal provincial 
government addressing the issues and problems that arose in the course of 
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February 2007 set clear target on the implementation of B-BBEE across the South 
African economic landscape. 
The main aim for all of these initiatives and interventions is to create an enabling 
environment for the empowerment and the reduction of poverty amongst the 
designated groups of this country. The main intention of this research is to 
understand how the policy on B-BBEE is managed by the provincial government of 
KwaZulu-Natal. Hopefully this will assist in strengthening the strategic-B-BBEE 
management in the province and the whole country.   
Instruction for the completion of this questionnaire 
This questionnaire is designed to solicit responses that will give accurate information 
for data analysis. It is therefore requested that the respondent place an ‘X’ in the 
appropriate block or blocks. Please note that for some questions more than one ‘X’ 
could be placed in response to questions. Should you wish to furnish additional 
information for open-ended questions, please use the space provided. We value the 
information provided and it will be treated in the strictest of confidence. 
Your assistance is greatly valued. 
  
Sixtus Sibeta                                                     Professor Ralph Lawrence  
Doctoral Candidate                                        Supervisor 
Contact Details: 033 264 2612                      Contact Details: 033-2605980 
Email: sibetas@kznded.gov.za       Email: Lawrencer@ukzn.ac.za     
                            
 Declaration 
 
I……………………… (Full names of participant) hereby confirm that I understand the 
contents of this document and the nature of the research project, and I consent to 
participating in the research project. 
I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so 
desire. 
 
…………………………………                                                 ………………….. 








B-BBEE POLICY MANAGEMENT QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MEMBERS OF CLUSTERS IN THE PROVINCIAL 
ADMINISTRATION OF KWAZULU-NATAL 
 
    Section A: General Information /Biographical 
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       Your Technical Cluster: 
 
Economic Sectors & infrastructure 
development 
 
Governance & administration  










Deputy Director  
Assistant Director  
Specialist  
Administrator  
Executive Manager  
 
 
SECTION B: PUBLIC POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
 
1.  Can you explain what has been your general views in the management of B-BBEE policy 
 by the provincial government thus far, and can you elaborate on the challenges?    










2.  The successful implementation of B-BBEE policy requires clear organizational            
  decision-making and execution of decision in an integrated and consistent way. 























     3.   Is your organization succeeding in co-ordinating stakeholders on B-BBEE  















4.  The executive management often introduces very broad B-BBEE policy objectives which 
  are not accompanied by resources to enable the operational officials to  carry out their  
  tasks. Do you agree? 
 
1 2 3 
 










SECTION C:  PUBLIC POLICY MANGEMENT/ADMINISTRATION 
 
5.  Are there definitive organizational B-BBEE strategies and structures in place within your       
  cluster to ensure the implementation of B-BBEE? 
 














6.  Transformation within your organization is extremely slow. Do you agree? 
 






















7.  There is a strong view that strategic B-BBEE management measures are not adequate     
  for the current empowerment processes and operations. Do you agree?  
 


















8.  Operational officials are not involved in strategic B-BBEE decision in your organization,  
  as the key strategic decisions are often imposed by the executive without consultation. 
                   Do you agree?        






















9.  There is no structured strategy of dealing with key stakeholders in the implementation of  
  B-BBEE within your cluster. Do you agree? 
 



















10.  To drive different teams sometimes the organization requires more than just skills of those  
  responsible to make correct decisions on B-BBEE. Do you agree? 
 

















SECTION D: COMMUNICATION 
 
11.  Organizational strategic decisions are not properly communicated to entire staff, as they 
  are taken at the top executive without a proper communication strategy. Is this the case 
  with your organization? 
    
No 0  
 
Uncertain 1  
 
Yes 2  
 
 





12.  There are official and unofficial channels of communication. Which methods does your  













13. Without communication there can be no implementation of B-BBEE policy, for there is no 
possibility then of group influencing the behaviour of the individual. Do you agree? 
 



















14.  Are there any reporting structures within your organization to exercise control over B-BBEE 




















SECTION E: RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
15.  Please state how B-BBEE can better be managed within your organization to achieve its  


















































































































1. Can you briefly explain your role/ ‘brief’ on B-BBEE policy implementation, and elaborate 
on the challenges encountered in pursuing your duties? How such challenges can be 
mitigated? 
  
2. What has been the most interesting part of your work in B-BBEE policy implementation 
thus far? 
  
3. Why did you specifically choose B-BBEE policy implementation when you could have 
decided to be involved in any other government policies? 
 
4. In your opinion, is the current B-BBEE policy co-ordination succeeding in the 
implementation of the policy? And what are the obstacles? 
   
5. To what extent are the provincial government departments integrated in the 
implementation of the policy in the province? Is their involvement sufficient, State why? 
 
6. What is the level of transformation within your organization? Elaborate on the challenges 
encountered in the management of various transformation processes in your 
organization? 
     
7. There is the general belief that key decisions within government are imposed by the 
Executive management without consultation. Is this the case within your organization? If 
so, what do you think is the main cause of this? 
     
8. Clearly, some of the important aspects of B-BBEE policy imperatives are control by the 
National Department of Trade and Industry i.e. sectoral charters. How far does this 
influence B-BBEE policy implementation in the province?  
     
9. Almost every Sunday in the news there is something about the successes or failures of B-
BBEE policy. It would appear that government does not set the agenda in terms of B-BBEE 
policy communication. Do you think government is doing enough in terms of 
communication on B-BBEE matters? Explain why?   
 
10. Can you specifically explain whether communication is strategically accommodating in 
the transmition of key B-BBEE policy information? Elaborate on whether it is assisting in the 
management of B-BBEE policy within government. 
      
11. How far do you think the implementation of B-BBEE policy has resulted in final outcomes 
being achieved in terms of management, implementation, communication, stakeholder 
relations, and general transformation of governments? 
               
12.  What factors do you believe could make B-BBEE achieve its intended goals?  
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13. What challenges do you anticipate or experiencing right now in B-BBEE policy 
management, and how such challenges can be mitigated? 
 
14. Anything which I have not asked that you would like to add? 
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